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ABSTRACT

This dissertation addresses the broad question: How do the discourses of climate
change and conflict travel across time and space to become policy, programming, and
ultimately a development initiative that exist on the ground? To answer this question, I
broke the research into three separate papers. The first examines how the US policy
community approaches, understands and seeks to address the discourses of climatesecurity. The second examines the ways in which climate change affects conflict outcomes
in Karamoja, Uganda. And the third, using the efforts of Mercy Corps in Karamoja as a
case study, examines the realities and opportunities in addressing climate-conflict from a
development perspective. Clear across all components of this research, and linking the
three manuscripts, is the salience of scale in climate-conflict, the paradox of how the ‘threat
multiplier’ discourse both oversimplifies and blurs the legibility of the relationship between
climate change and conflict, and the need to further deconstruct climate-conflict in the
context of particular places. The central contribution of this dissertation as a whole is to
elucidate the challenges facing institutions who have the mandate of addressing climateconflict and wider climate-security connections. While the lessons of this project have
academic implications, the evident challenges facing practitioners in conceptualizing and
addressing the link between climate change and conflict, should serve as an argument for
the policy and implementation community to critically examine how their efforts are
affected by the discourses and scales of climate-conflict and climate-security.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1

Introduction

The body of research examining climate change and conflict has been marked by
considerable attention to if and how climate change and its associated biophysical
impacts affect conflict outcomes (Buhaug et al., 2014; Buhaug, 2014; Burke, Hsiang, &
Miguel, 2015; Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2013; Kelley, Mohtadi, Cane, Seager, &
Kushnir, 2015). In addressing this question, the literature has focused on both trends at
global and regional levels (e.g., Hsiang et al., 2013) and outcomes in particular places
and contexts (e.g., Gleick, 2014; Johnstone & Mazo, 2011; Sternberg, 2012 Feitelson,
Tamimi, & Rosenthal, 2012; Ide et al., 2014; Milman & Arsano, 2014; Selby &
Hoffmann, 2014). While these complex questions warrant attention and debate, that
debate has largely overshadowed other questions of potentially greater relevance to
addressing the challenges posed by potential connections between climate change and
conflict (Lewis & Lenton, 2015). One critical area of inquiry that remains underaddressed is that of organizational efforts to understand and address the impact of climate
change on conflict outcomes. This dissertation focuses on that gap by focusing on
organizational efforts targeting the presumed connections between climate change and
conflict. Specifically, I seek to address the question, How do the discourses of climate
change and conflict travel across time and space to become policy, programming, and
ultimately a development initiative that exists on the ground?
The papers in this dissertation address this broad question by focusing on the
efforts of Mercy Corps, an international humanitarian and development NGO, in its
efforts to address the connection between climate change and conflict (hereafter referred
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to as climate-conflict)1 in Karamoja, Uganda. I focus on two particular programs being
implemented by Mercy Corps: Building Resilience Against Climate Extremes and
Disasters (BRACED) and the third iteration of Peace in East and Central Africa (PEACE
III). I seek to understand how these programs come to be across a continuum that invokes
discursive formation and problem identification, policy design, program funding and
design, project implementation, and evaluation.
By collecting data across the various stages – and places – of development
processes, I was able to elucidate contextual factors that define both the organizational
discourses of and the responses to climate-conflict. In the first paper of this dissertation, I
focus on the US Government’s approach to climate-conflict. I demonstrate that though
there are no sectoral consistencies to policy approaches to climate-conflict, there are three
primary ways this policy community understands and seeks to address climate-conflict:
1) An issue of adaptation and resilience; 2) A potent political argument; and 3) An issue
of limited salience. Of these approaches, the most common is the first framing. And
amongst that population there was a common line of reasoning: they described climate
change as a threat multiplier, then expressed a need to minimize or mitigate these threats,
and ultimately described a lack of clarity and even confusion in how to do so.
That lack of clarity was the impetus for the next stage of the research (i.e., the
work focused on Mercy Corps). It was also telling. While there was widespread demand
for policy and programming that addressed climate-conflict, that demand was simply
unmet. Understanding why this demand is unmet is essential to the dissertation. As I
explain throughout the chapters, the discourse of climate change as a “threat multiplier”,
1

I use this terminology for brevity. Clearly, as is expressed throughout the dissertation, the
relationship is far more complex and not unilear.
3

which appears on the surface to be a very broad, enabling construction of the climateconflict relationship, complicates implementation by limiting this relationship in its
causal directionality, its scale of analysis, and its assumed outcomes. This challenge of
conceptualization reverberated across all stages of policy development and program
implementation.
In the second paper, I turn to how climate change and conflict interact in
Karamoja. Karamoja, a traditionally pastoral and agropastoral community had, until
relatively recently, experienced high rates of intertribal conflict fueled by, amongst other
issues, a commercialization of cattle raiding, a breakdown of traditional governance
systems and an influx of small arms. As is explained in this paper, though presently
stable, Karamoja is still experiencing insecurity. However, this insecurity is far less
severe and on more localized scales than it had been during the years defined by largescale and violent cattle raiding. The data demonstrate that though the severity of conflict
has decreased in tandem with an increase in the severity climate change, the effects of
climate change are, in fact, interacting with contemporary manifestations of conflict in
the region.
The effects of climate change, in combination with other changes in land use and
access, are part of what I deem ‘the shifting landscapes of Karamoja’. That is, increasing
presence of commercial resource extraction, land grabs, and shifts to sedentary
livelihoods have put a series of pressures on the land and those reliant on primary
production, resulting in manifestations of conflict at more localized scales than had
existed during the peak of violence. Critically, though, and mirroring other examples in
the climate-conflict literature (e.g., Adano et al., 2012; Detges, 2014; Sternberg, 2012) it
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was not necessarily the places experiencing acute climate change impacts that were
experiencing the conflict outcomes. In Karamoja, this spatial complexity is a central
reason why the demand for policy and programming that addresses climate-conflict is
unmet.
In the final paper, I explain the multiple, overlapping barriers to addressing
climate-conflict with policy and programming. This paper demonstrates how the complex
spatiality and temporality of climate-conflict complicate conceptualizations of this
relationship and efforts to address it. Though I employ data from all stages of research in
this chapter, these barriers are explained largely in the context of my experiences with
Mercy Corps. I also demonstrate that when climate-conflict is harnessed for
peacebuilding, and when the complexity of scale are considered in development
programming, there exist clearer opportunities for intervention.
Connecting all of these papers are themes of scale and the impact of discourse on
policy formation and program implementation. Evident in the data collected for this work
is that the spatial complexity of climate-conflict inhibits conceptualization of the
relationship, whereas its temporality complicates how development organizations can
respond to climate-conflict. Likewise, while the threat multiplier discourse provides
clarity for global and more abstract conceptualizations of climate-conflict, it offered little
to, and indeed may have even detracted from, ground-level efforts to conceptualize and
address climate-conflict.
The next section situates the broad project of this dissertation in the intersection
of political ecology, conflict and the environment, and critical development studies. I
then turn to a literature review on the connection between climate change and conflict,
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directly addressing key themes and frameworks that link the multiple papers within my
dissertation. Following this literature review, I turn to a detailed description of the
research sites. Finally, I turn to the broad methodology that informed the papers focused
on those research sites.

Methodological & Theoretical Orientation
This research is informed by literatures at the intersection of political ecology and
environmental security (e.g., Barnett, 2001; Conca & Wallace, 2009; Floyd, 2008; Levy,
1995; O’Lear, 2016; Dalby, 2016; Wolf, 2009). As a field, political ecology seeks to
connect the impacts of environmental degradation with social, economic, and political
drivers (Forsyth, 2003; Robbins, 2004; Simon, 2008; Watts, 2015) As described by
(Robbins, 2004, p.14) “The term political ecology is a generous one that embraces a
range of definitions… Some definitions stress political economy, while others point to
more formal political institutions; some stress environmental change, while others
emphasize narratives or stories about that change.” Emerging from its roots in
approaches to the political economy of environmental change and degradation (e.g.,
Blaikie & Brookfield, 2015; Watts, Bohle, May, & Action, 1993; Watts, 1983; Wisner et
al., 2004), today political ecology calls into question how power dynamics operating
across scales alter environmental outcomes in particular places often from a political
economic perspective(Sheppard, 2009). Political ecology explicitly considers why
resource management and influences on resource management are not contained to the
‘local’ and that environmental degradation can best be understood through multiple,
overlapping scales of analysis. For example, in his study on soil erosion in developing
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countries, Blaikie (1985) demonstrates that the place where environmental degradation
occurs may not be where the source of degradation is located. Rather environmental
degradation is an outcome, and a factor in, broader inequalities.
The academic focus on connections between environmental change and conflict is
neither new, nor contained within political ecology. As environmental issues gained
traction in political discourse following the publication of Silent Spring (Carson, 1962)
and during the second wave of the environmental movement, discussions surrounding the
degradation of the environment were being brought up in the context of national security
(Trombetta, 2008 citing Brown, 1977; Falk, 1971). However, it was not until the
publication of Our Common Future in 1987 that the issue of environmental security was
brought into the mainstream of both the environmental and security communities
(Brundtland, 1987; Trombetta, 2008). At the core of the conversation was the idea that
global environmental change, specifically global environmental damage (e.g., destruction
of the ozone layer), created new types of vulnerabilities by threatening the environmental
systems on which humans rely (Trombetta, 2008).
This body of work was influential on highly publicized non-academic writing that
in turn, greatly informed the environmental security discourses of the mid 1990s (most
notably, Kaplan (1994). Kaplan’s article ‘The Coming Anarchy,’ published in the
February 1994 issue of The Atlantic Monthly, influenced the thinking of the Clinton
Administration (R. Kaplan, 1994). At the same time, this piece and others like it were
heavily criticized as a variation of environmental determinism that misrepresented the
linkages between the environment and security (see, for example, Deudney, 1990;
Gleditsch, 1998; Levy, 1995). While influential, the impact of Kaplan’s work remains a
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site of critique in policy and implementation communities. For example, even more than
twenty years after its publication, ‘The Coming Anarchy’ was critiqued throughout my
data collection in various organizations for altering the discourses of environmental
security, and therefore climate security, in an unhelpful manner too reliant on linear
explanations to capture the complexity of this relationship.
In this dissertation, I interrogate this wider environment and conflict literature
through a branch of political ecology that examines how environmental degradation does
– or does not – affect conflict (see, for example, Barnett, 2001; Barnett & Adger, 2007;
Benjaminsen, Alinon, Buhaug, & Buseth, 2012; Le Billon, 2001; Nordås & Gleditsch,
2007; Peluso & Watts, 2001; Raleigh, Choi, & Kniveton, 2015) and how the sources of
that degradation are themselves shaped by larger political-economic processes
(Abrahams & Carr, 2017; Adano et al., 2012; Benjaminsen et al., 2012; Carr, 2013, 2014;
Dalby, 2015; Sneddon & Fox, 2006; Watts, 1983). As a field, political ecology has been
central in pushing back on more determinist narratives (Dalby, 2014, 2016a; Floyd, 2008;
Gleditsch, 1998; Hartmann, 2010; Hayes & Knox-Hayes, 2014; McDonald, 2013; Selby
& Hoffmann, 2014a; Swyngedouw, 2010), demonstrating how climate change affects (or
fails to affect) conflict in particular places (Ide et al., 2016; Krampe, 2014; Milman &
Arsano, 2014; Snorek, Renaud, & Kloos, 2014), and calling attention to the risks of
securitization (Faris, 2007; Graeger, 1996; Hartmann, 2014; Selby, 2014; Selby &
Hoffmann, 2014b; Swyngedouw, 2010). This literature argues that without underlying
vulnerabilities driven by political, social, and economic power structures, biophysical
impacts worsened by a global climate change would have limited impact conflict
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dynamics (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Le Billon, 2001; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007). As
described by (Le Billon, 2001, p. 575)
An expanded political ecology approach also allows for a reformulation of the
dominant arguments on contemporary resource wars. Rather than simply being
driven by need (resource scarcity) or greed (resource abundance), conflicts may
be viewed as a historical product inseparable from the social construction and
political economy of resources.

This dissertation, pays close attention to the discourses of climate-conflict and
their role in policy and program development. As such, this work is informed by the
subset of critical development studies focused on discourses, discursive formation, and
discourse analysis that are generated in the Global North and are applied to interventions
in the Global South (e.g., Escobar, 1988; Ferguson, 1990; Mitchell, 2002). Discourses, as
is defined by Escobar, are the politics of truth (Escobar, 1988); discourse analysis,
therefore, involves a wide array of methodologies to determine the construction and
interpretation of language and meaning (Ferguson, 1990). Critical discourse analysis
includes examining both the structures of language as well as social and political context
through which that language is invoked (Campbell, 2009). A host of renowned critical
studies effectively demonstrate how power and control are embedded in the discourses of
development (Escobar, 1988; Fairhead & Leach, 2004; Ferguson, 1990; Luke, 1995;
Mathews, 2005, 2014; Mitchell, 2002). For example, (Ferguson, 1990) utilizes
Foucauldian notions of power and knowledge to examine how development organizations
“constructed” Lesotho as an object to be worked on in particular ways while masking the
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inherently political nature of development through technocratic language and expertise
(Ferguson, 1990).
Studies such as (Escobar, 1988; Ferguson, 1990) have been central for advancing
critical development studies. At the same time, to assume high-level discursive formation
is the only, or even primary, driver of development programming inputs and outcomes, is
to ignore the agency of the various parties that intake and alter programming across the
policy-to-development continuum. In this study, following orientations of scholars who
move past discursive formation as the causal force behind development and policy
outcomes and incorporate the political, logistical, and operational contexts that regulate
(and are regulated by) how the climate-conflict discourse threads itself through multiple
institutions, spaces, and individuals’ perceptions (Carr, 2013; Corbridge, 1998; Escobar,
1988; McKinnon, 2008; Moore, 1999; Simon, 1997, 2007, 2011; West, 2005). As is
evident in this dissertation, discourses shift and change as they are interpreted and
reinterpreted as they are filtered through perspectives, positionalities, and priorities of
individuals, teams, and organizations to eventually become observable outcomes (Carr,
2013; Moore, 1999). Reflecting the work of Li (1999) this research demonstrates that
there is no ‘up there’ force that determines a discourse, but instead a series of actors and
agenda that govern outcomes based on priorities, power, and circumstance.

Geography, Political Ecology and Climate-Conflict
The following section is a slightly modified version of a literature review paper
on climate-conflict and geographic and political ecological approaches I wrote with Ed
Carr (Abrahams & Carr, 2017). While I have chosen not to count this paper as one of the
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three that constitute this dissertation, its content is critical for framing the work of those
papers. The goal of this paper was to outline state-of-the-art thinking on the topic and the
methodologies and theoretical perspectives of geographers. As such, it speaks directly to
the theory and incorporates much of the literature that this dissertation builds upon.
The intellectual terrain of climate change’s impact on conflict is marked by varied
disciplinary and institutional interests, methods of gathering and analyzing data, and
starkly different opinions regarding what the data tells us.2 While the chapter on climate
and security in the most recent IPCC report makes it clear that, in general, (N. Adger et
al., 2014) (Adger et al., 2014, p. 758) “human security will be threatened as the climate
changes” it also argues that (p. 760) “Given the many and complex links between climate
change and human security, uncertainties in the research on the biophysical dimensions
of climate change, and the nature of the social science, highly confident statements about
the influence of climate change on human security are not possible” (Adger et al., 2014).
In short, The connection between climate change impacts and conflict outcomes is highly
place and time-specific, and is the product of many different, intersecting factors. It is,
then, an inherently geographic question, and one to which geography and allied
disciplines have made substantial contributions in recent years
In this section, I review the contributions of the literature emerging from
geography and the closely-allied field of political ecology, including literature heavily
influenced by lessons from these areas of inquiry, which further the understanding of the

2

This section is adapted from a literature review published in Current Climate Change Reports,
titled ‘Understanding the Connections Between Climate Change and Conflict: Contributions from
Geography and Political Ecology’. For the purposes of clarity I replace all uses of the plural ‘we’
with the singular ‘I’. Reprinted here with permission of the publisher.
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connections between climate change impacts and conflict. I focus on how this literature
challenges the threat multiplier narrative, which remains prevalent, most evidently in
policy communities. I begin with a brief situation of the question of climate change
impacts and conflict in broader geographic questions surrounding the relationship
between conflict and the environment. I then present the methods used for this review,
before turning to the literature to assess the methods used, and the broad themes and
findings which emerge from, or have drawn upon, lessons from the geographic and
political ecological literatures. I close with a brief discussion of gaps in this literature that
point to future research directions.

(i) Conflict and the Environment in Geography and Political Ecology
While geography is an integrative discipline, and therefore challenging to define
in terms of unique methods, subject areas, or interests, it has been marked since its formal
inception by strong interests in the relationship between people and the environment, and
by the particularities of place that shape the human experience. It is not surprising, then,
that geography has long taken an interest in particular cases of conflict that emerge
around the human use of and experience with the environment (Adger et al., 2014;
Barnett, 2001; Peluso, 2008; Peluso & Watts, 2001). This interest is most clearly
expressed in the subfield of political ecology, which emerged from the fields of hazards
and risk, integrating political economy and the environment perhaps most clearly in terms
of the structural causes of famine and other disasters (Watts, 1983; Watts & Bohle,
1993), the conflict emerging around conservation efforts (Brockington, 2002; Goldman,
2011; King, 2010; Ramutsindela, 2007; Schroeder, 1999), and the challenges that emerge
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around agrarian change (Bassett, 1998; Carr, 2011; Peters & Kambewa, 2007).
Political ecology is not the exclusive province of geography, as it emerged across
a range of fields (including anthropology and rural sociology). However, in whatever
disciplinary context it might be enacted, contemporary political ecological research draws
heavily on geographic framings of scale and political economy, thus drawing the two
fields into what might be represented as a heavily-overlapping Venn diagram. It is
marked by a broad consideration of the ways in which various processes at different
scales plays out in particular nature-society relationships, and emerged from a cultural
ecological fascination with the ways people, communities, and societies adapt to their
environments (Watts, 2015). From this geographically-informed lens, climate change and
its impacts on the environment is a natural fit for political ecology. It links global
processes of change to impacts on the environment and people in particular places.
For this review, I focus on the literature comprised of place-based and critical
policy studies that speak to our understandings of the connection between climate change
and conflict. This literature is not all explicitly political ecological or even geographic,
but it draws heavily from the lessons of these bodies of thought – whether such influence
is overtly acknowledged or not. More specifically, I examine how these studies are used
to critique and further understand the discourses and contextualized realities of the
climate-conflict nexus.

(ii) Methodology for the Review
This review focuses on literature published after the most recent IPCC
Assessment Report, the first to have a chapter dedicated to human security that reviewed

13

current thought on the intersections between climate and conflict and climate and security
(Adger et al., 2014). I used Google Scholar to identify literature exploring these
connections as it provided the widest coverage of the social sciences and because some
significant publications (or citations to important publications) are found in the gray
literature, both of which are better covered in Google Scholar when compared with other
scholarly databases (e.g., Web of Science). The gray literature, which is not necessarily
peer-reviewed, has played an important role in shaping the discourses of climate-conflict.
Further, because it is used in advocacy and policy making, it was important to integrate
this work into the literature review to more fully demonstrate how the discourses of
climate-conflict developed.
Table 1.1 shows the search terms and total results. In some cases, we excluded
terms that were irrelevant to the search but made the results difficult to navigate.3 Articles
were then examined for their relevance to the question of how the geographic and
political ecological literature approaches the connection between climate and conflict. All
relevant publications were then organized by theme.
There are references to articles before the period defined above. That is for the
following reasons 1) in some cases the work we were reviewing cited these articles; 2)
the articles are grounding, foundational, or otherwise central to the points we make in this
review; 3) I felt it important to demonstrate how understandings of a topic have evolved
over time.

3

For example, “job security” and “food security” when searching for climate change and security
greatly increased total documents to point of being unnavigable.
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Table 1.1: Search Terms
Search Terms (title only)

Total Articles

"climate change" AND security

297

“climate change” AND conflict

126

“climate security” OR “climate-security”

96

“climate conflict” OR “climate-conflict”

91

conflict AND adaptation AND climate

12

security AND adaptation AND climate

12

resilience AND conflict AND climate

8

“drought AND conflict”

7

“weather AND conflict”

6

resilience AND security AND climate

5

"global warming" AND conflict OR security

4

resilience AND climate AND climate “peace building” OR

1

peacebuilding
adaptation AND climate AND “peace building” OR peacebuilding

0

(iii) Geographic Approaches to Studying the Climate-Conflict Connection
As boundary (sub)disciplines or fields of thought, geography and political
ecology utilize multiple methods to examine the role of climate change in causing,
perpetuating, or even alleviating conflict. This diversity of methods is a core strength of
geography as an integrative discipline. Geographical and geographically informed
examinations of the link between climate change and conflict have employed a range of
methodological tools including mapping climate-conflict vulnerability (e.g., Busby,
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Smith, & Krishnan, 2014; Busby, Smith, White, & Strange, 2013), the remote sensing of
land use change as it relates to climate-conflict (e.g., Uexkull, Croicu, & Fjelde, 2014),
quantifying climate-conflict risk in particular places (e.g., Bell & Keys, 2016; Seter,
2016; Weezel, 2015), qualitative case studies (e.g., Chandra, McNamara, Dargusch,
Caspe, & Dalabajan, 2017), critical studies examining the narratives and realities of the
nexus (e.g., Selby & Hoffmann, 2014), and discourse analysis examining how policy
approaches develop and are understood across spatial and temporal scales (e.g., Hayes &
Knox-Hayes, 2014). For this study I examine the following: 4
•

Case studies that capture the place-specific interactions of climate change, climate
variability, and conflict with a wider political economy (e.g., Chandra et al., 2017;
Gleick, 2014; Milman & Arsano, 2014; Snorek, Renaud, & Kloos, 2014; Tubi &
Feitelson, 2016; Vivekananda, Schilling, & Smith, 2014).

•

Efforts aimed at the development and testing of conceptual models and spatial and
temporal aspects of the climate-conflict nexus (e.g., Baalen & Mobjörk, 2016;
Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2016; Devlin & Hendrix, 2014; Feitelson & Tubi, 2017;
Namasaka, 2015; Rüttinger et al., 2015).

•

Critical analysis of policy and discourses related to the nexus, including examinations
the nexus in the context of policy formulation, power dynamics and securitization
(e.g., Dalby, 2014, 2016; Dunlap & Fairhead, 2014; Hartmann, 2014; Mason, 2014;
Santelices Spikin & Rojas Hernández, 2016; Jan Selby, 2014).

•

Review studies that amalgamate findings in order to find points of consensus

4

While I do not review studies that employ mapping or remote sensing as primary
methodologies, we do consider that work in the broader context of the review.
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regarding the connection between climate change and conflict/security and identify
critical research gaps for the field (e.g., Baalen & Mobjörk, 2016; Bretthauer, 2016;
Namasaka, 2015; Rüttinger et al., 2015)

1) Case Studies: Developing and Refining Theory
In the wider climate-conflict field, after large-N quantitative studies, the most
common way to examine this relationship is through qualitative case studies (Ide, 2017).
Studies rooted in a particular place and time, or examining a particular organization or
policy, are important not only for understanding how climate change interacts with
conflict in specific contexts, but also for grounding, contextualizing, and testing theories
present in quantitative studies and theoretical arguments. For simplicity, I broadly
describe this work as case studies. Ide (2017), in his review of different research methods
used to examine the link between climate change and conflict, provides a typology of
qualitative research that includes (Ide, 2017):

•

tracing how the mechanisms linking climate change or variability to conflict
interact in a particular place or time (e.g., Feitelson & Tubi, 2017; Gleick, 2014;
Swain & Jägerskog, 2016).

•

ethnographic studies of communities affected by climate change and conflict
(e.g., Chandra et al., 2017; Milman & Arsano, 2014; Snorek et al., 2014).

•

research that contextualizes climate change and conflict dynamics into a broader
political economy (e.g., Asah, 2015; Ide, Schilling, Link, Scheffran, & Ngaruiya,
2014; Papaioannou, 2016).
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These studies employ a range of data collection methods, largely embodied in
qualitative case studies (i.e., interviews, direct observation, surveys), but also incorporate
tools from related areas including GISciences, remote sensing, and data collection and
analysis focus on atmospheric sciences and biophysical processes. Qualitative case
studies, which ground the intersection of social, political, economic, and biophysical
processes in particular places, provide the highly granular, contextual data necessary to
understand the processes through which climate change impacts are – or are not –
translated into conflict. For example, Chandra et al. (2017) demonstrate how different
genders experience conflict-related vulnerabilities related to climate variability and
change in Mindano, Philippines (Chandra et al., 2017). While both women and men
smallholder farmers face increased vulnerability as a result of climate change and
conflict, the impacts of extreme climate events had more severe impacts on women,
including loss of land rights and forced migration (Chandra et al., 2017). Ide et al. (2014)
exemplify a more mixed methods approach; using both qualitative and quantitative
methods to map climate-conflict links in Kenya and Uganda (Ide et al., 2014). Using a
spatial lens on the question of climate-conflict connections, the authors were able to
determine where joint effects of climate change and conflict are most likely to occur.

2) Discourses, Policy Analysis, and Securitization
The geographic approach to discourse analysis is greatly influenced by poststructuralism and Foucauldian theory (Carr & McCusker, 2009; Dixon, Paul, & Jones,
1996; Peet, 1998; Pickles, 2001) and largely focuses on how power and policy reflect and
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refract understandings of place and the relationship between people and the environment.
Discourse analysis generally rests on the critical analysis of existing documentation and
literature, but can also employ key informant interviews and direct observation. Much of
the literature examining the discourses of climate-conflict is a direct response to positivist
studies purporting a more direct relationship between climate change and conflict (Selby,
2014).
With its heavy focus on discourses of nature and society, geography has provided
tools and lessons that subtly shape a growing literature that not only draws attention to
the inherent risks of securitizing climate change, but also by employing the lessons of
previous criticisms of simplistic connections between people and the environment to
problematize the overly determinative discourses that purport a stronger relationship
between climate change and conflict than is evident in the data. This includes
examinations of:

•

the climate-conflict nexus that call into question the validity of the connection
purported in select large-N quantitative studies or instances in which the climateconflict nexus was overstated in specific contexts (Dunlap & Fairhead, 2014;
Hartmann, 2014; Mason, 2014; Selby & Hoffmann, 2014; Selby, 2014)

•

the progression of knowledge and understanding of the nexus as well as the
evolution of the discourse (Boas & Rothe, 2016; Floyd, 2015; Gemenne, Barnett,
Adger, & Dabelko, 2014; Ide & Scheffran, 2014; Lewis & Lenton, 2015;
McDonald, 2013; Okpara, Stringer, & Dougill, 2016)

19

•

how different organizations perceive and seek to address the climate-conflict
nexus (Conca, Thwaites, & Lee, 2016; Hayes & Knox-Hayes, 2014; Scott, 2015)
as well as how the discourses of climate change translate into policy informed by
their institutional identity (Floyd, 2015; Hayes & Knox-Hayes, 2014)

•

the climate-conflict nexus as it relates to securitization and/or neoliberalism
(Asah, 2015; Dunlap & Fairhead, 2014; Floyd, 2015; Hayes & Knox-Hayes,
2014; Mason, 2014). The securitization literature is largely focused on the risks of
depoliticizing conflict through narratives that ignore the root causes of conflict
(Mason, 2014; Selby & Hoffmann, 2014), further enforcing existing power
structures through environmentally driven governmentality (Mason, 2014; von
Lucke, 2016), and/or reinforcing states’ disproportionate focus on activities that
reinforce existing power structures (Boas, 2015).

Below I describe key contributions from the contemporary geographic and political
ecological literature (including literatures informed by one or both), with particular
attention to that portion of the literature centered on qualitative case studies. This body of
work, largely informed by theory and methods typical of political ecology, points to a
need to expand current perspectives on the connection between climate change and
conflict beyond a unlinear model tracing climate change to conflict or insecurity.

Geographic contributions to understandings of climate-conflict relationships
The most common framing of the climate-conflict nexus, particularly within
policy communities, is that of climate change as a threat multiplier (CNA, 2007, 2014;
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Lewis & Lenton, 2015; Rüttinger et al., 2015; USAID, 2014). This framing suggests that
climate change won’t cause conflict, but it can exacerbate the risks or worsen the impacts
of conflict. This discourse was popularized by a 2007 report issued by the Center for
Naval Analysis (CNA) (CNA, 2007), and has persisted, despite CNA more recently
reframing climate change as a conflict catalyst that accelerates instability (CNA, 2014).
The Arab Spring, is a commonly referenced, though contested (Selby, Dahi,
Fröhlich, & Hulme, 2017), example of the role of climate change as a threat multiplier
(Fetzek & Mazo, 2014; Gleick, 2014; Kelley et al., 2015). In the instance of the Arab
Spring, scholars are careful to describe climate change impacts as factors that hastened or
exacerbated, but did not cause, the uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa, as
well as in conflict events that followed (Gleick, 2014; Kelley et al., 2015; Sternberg,
2012; Werrell & Femia, 2013). Similarly, the largely gray literature associated with the
policy and implementation community reflects the framing of climate change as a threat
multiplier (Baalen & Mobjörk, 2016; Reiling & Brady, 2015).
The threat multiplier framing, while helpful in moving away from causal and
explicitly deterministic arguments to allow space for place- and time-specific
understandings of the relationship between climate and conflict, is imperfect. When first
developed, it was predominantly understood in security and defense terms, as the idea
was put forth primarily for those purposes. Yet as the discourse has evolved, a range of
other actors are now engaging with the nexus (Boas & Rothe, 2016), including many
non-security-oriented communities such as development, humanitarian, environmental,
and diplomatic actors. Many of the findings of the geographic and political ecological

21

literature on climate and conflict nuance, build on, or critique this threat multiplier
framing.

(iv) Scale and the Understanding of Climate Change and Conflict
Geographic literature that examines the climate-conflict nexus builds upon a
broader disciplinary history of conceptual, critical, and applied examinations of scale.
The temporal and spatial scale at which one examines the relationship between climate
change and conflict is a critical determinant of how the problem is framed and
understood, and how efforts to address the link are conceptualized (Adger et al., 2014;
Devlin & Hendrix, 2014; Ide et al., 2014; Lewis & Lenton, 2015; Salehyan, 2014).
Varied understandings and different framings of temporal and spatial scale are often cited
as reasons why the climate-conflict nexus remains so contentious (Adger et al., 2014;
Bell & Keys, 2016; Buhaug, 2015; Devlin & Hendrix, 2014; Ide et al., 2014; Lewis &
Lenton, 2015; Salehyan, 2014; Seter, 2016). For instance, the impacts of climate change
in one place might drive conflict in another. As argued by (Salehyan, 2014, p. 2):
Aggregate statistics on food and water availability at the national level in a
country as large as say, India, may mask local-level variation; rainfall statistics for
India may not accurately reflect water availability in conflict-prone Assam state.
Yet, if there are reasons to believe that rural people affected by drought or other
natural disasters will take their protests to the capital, migrate to urban areas, or
join highly-mobile rebel organizations, then there is no reason to believe that
local-level climatic variables will correlate with conflict in that same locality
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The Arab Spring again offers a contextual example of the complications of scale
in the context of the threat multiplier discourse. Though no scholars argue that the Arab
Spring was caused by climate change, many argue that it was hastened, or affected by the
impacts of a changing climate (Beck, 2014; Fetzek & Mazo, 2014; Gleick, 2014; Kelley
et al., 2015; Sternberg, 2012). One of those arguments is that climate change-linked
drought in Russia devastated wheat harvests, which generated grain shortages that
reverberated through an increasingly interconnected global food system, resulting in an
increase in global wheat prices (Sternberg, 2012). The price of bread increased
substantially – in some places upwards of 300% - sparking so-called ‘bread riots’ which
injected significant momentum into the then-nascent Arab Spring (Sternberg, 2012). In
this case, the distance between the “multiplier” and the conflict outcome highlights the
challenge of where to adapt to the threat multiplier effects of climate change.
The geographic literature also suggests that temporal scale is an important
determinant of how the nexus is understood and potentially acted upon. Climate change
and climate variability are often conflated in the broader climate change discussion
(Seter, 2016), and in the climate-conflict literature. the difference is not always made
explicit. As further explained by Seter (2016, p. 2) (Seter, 2016):
Climate change says something about changes in mean climate at a location over long
periods, whereas climate variability describes short-term changes in climate (such as
standard deviations, the occurrence of extremes, etc.) (IPCC, 2007, pp. 871–872). An
effect of climate variability (anomalously warm or dry periods) on conflict levels
cannot automatically be translated into the conclusion that climate change (a warmer
planet) will lead to more conflict.
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The temporal scale at which one understands climate-conflict connections can
implicate climate change, climate variability, and climate shocks, thus influencing
academic findings as well as policy design and implementation. In examining the
atmospheric shocks that link climate change to conflict, some onset over years (drought)
and others can have rapid onset (e.g., floods, cyclones). Treating all shocks as similar
drivers of conflict without a deep consideration of their different manifestations and
impacts could obscure important stressor-specific linkages, while enabling problematic
policies and programs that could themselves trigger conflict (Dabelko et al., 2013; Lewis
& Lenton, 2015; Rüttinger et al., 2015; Salehyan, 2014; Seter, 2016; Snorek et al., 2014)
Therefore a careful consideration of how the different timescales of climate change
impacts affect different scales of conflict is essential for fully understanding the
mechanisms of climate-conflict generally, as well as in specific contexts (Salehyan,
2014). This includes differentiating short-term shocks from long-term shifts and
understanding the nuance of these impacts in the context of particular places.
Without a robust understanding of the ways in which human responses to the
short-term expression of climate variability might be linked to human responses to the
local impacts of longer-term changes in the global climate, studies that use climate
variability as a proxy for climate change rest on assumptions that are without empirical
verification. A number of studies offer insight by linking climate change, conflict, and the
intermediary effects that largely define climate change (T. Benjaminsen et al., 2012). By
connecting climate variability to the factors that can affect conflict, this subset of
literature can offer important insights into the mechanics by which climate change may or
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may not affect conflict, and thus the validity of the assumptions that drive some largerscale investigations of the linkages between climate and conflict (e.g., Devlin & Hendrix,
2014; Raleigh, Choi, & Kniveton, 2015).

(v) Resilience and Vulnerability
The framing of climate change as a threat multiplier often presents climate change
outcomes as the product of exposure to environmental changes and/or events, sensitivity
to those changes/events, and a community’s adaptive capacity (Vivekananda et al., 2014;
Vivekananda, Schilling, & Smith, 2014a). In that way, the political ecology of climate
change and conflict closely mirrors the hazard-disaster frameworks for vulnerability
(Wisner et al., 2004). That is, climate change and variability, or more accurately the
rapid and slow onset shocks related to climate change and variability, can exacerbate or
trigger conflict. This is framed most often as a function of high and direct reliance on
primary production with limited adaptive capacity in the context of place and time
(Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2016; Ide & Scheffran, 2014; Raleigh et al., 2015). This viewpoint
is clearly embodied in a report commissioned by the G7, A New Climate For Peace
(Rüttinger et al., 2015). The report noted the following seven compounding factors that
link climate change with conflict: 1) local resource competition; 2) livelihood insecurity
and migration; 3) extreme weather and disasters; 4) volatile food prices and provision; 5)
transboundary water management; 6) sea-level rise and coastal degradation; and 7)
unintended effects of climate policies. Nearly all of these compounding factors assume
reliance on primary production or limited adaptive capacity.
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Both the academic and the gray literature offer resilience as a means of
broadening the vulnerability lens beyond a focus on primary production to consider a
wider range of drivers, outcomes, and relationships (Crawford, Dazé, Hammill, Parry, &
Zamudio, 2015; USAID, 2014; Vivekananda et al., 2014a; Vivekananda, Schilling, &
Smith, 2014b). While the resilience framework emerged from ecology and socioecological studies, its implementation in the context of climate and conflict clearly takes
on the lessons of political ecology that stress a need to look beyond proximate
environmental factors to larger issues of political economy when explaining the rise (or
lack of a rise) of conflict in particular places. Even some scholars critical of claims about
the connection between climate change and conflict see a focus on resilience as
productive. For example, Boas and Rothe (2016) argue that resilience offers a reframing
of the climate-security nexus in a way that allows for action, adding (p. 628):
Freed from the alarmist tone of climate conflict storylines, and acknowledging the
complexity of socio-ecological drivers of insecurity, climate security discourse
becomes something to which developing and emerging states, actors from the
development field, and critical academics can again relate.

This wider lens on climate-conflict relationships can be employed to productive
ends. USAID (2014) provides an example of how peacebuilding and resilience are
interrelated. One of their partners, Mercy Corps, implemented conflict resolution
mechanisms among pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia (USAID, 2014). The freedom of
movement that followed, and the associated access to pasture and water, led to increased
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adaptive capacity and higher rates of drought resilience when compared with other
groups.
Resilience efforts, however, are not free of the challenges that accompany more
targeted adaptation efforts. As described by Vivekananda and her co-authors
(Vivekananda et al., 2014b) in their study of community resilience in the context of
conflict, in all of the study areas resilience-building efforts also drove unintended
consequences, including negative impacts on the long-term sustainability of food
security, alterations to labor markets, and conflict centered on the aid efforts themselves.
Furthermore, resilience-based approaches in the context of climate change-affected
conflict present a range of practical and conceptual challenges to implementation and
academic communities. While resilience-centric programming seeks to bolster the ability
of communities to deal with the sorts of shocks and stressors that can exacerbate, trigger,
or make communities more vulnerable to conflict, the inherent vagueness of the term can
push interventions away from a broader political ecological framing of stressors into a
focus on more immediate needs, thereby limiting the long-term impacts of resilience
programming.

(vi) Environmental Peacebuilding
While vulnerability and resilience perspectives introduce nuance into the vague
framing of the threat multiplier, it is important to acknowledge that this relationship is not
merely one where climate change drives conflict vulnerability. The increased
vulnerability to climate shocks as a result of conflict is an important, but oft-ignored
component of the climate-conflict nexus (Buhaug, 2016; Buhaug, 2015; Dabelko et al.,
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2013; Gemenne et al., 2014; Lewis & Lenton, 2015; USAID, 2014). While there remains
considerable controversy over the mechanics of the climate-conflict nexus, there is little
disagreement over the impacts of conflict on vulnerability to climate shocks (U. T.
Okpara et al., 2016). Indeed as noted in the IPCC chapter on Human Security, “conflict
strongly influences vulnerability to climate change impacts” (Adger et al., 2014), p. 758).
The negative impact of conflict on vulnerability manifests in negative impacts on longterm investment, infrastructure, and human suffering leading to communities’ with
limited resilience to climactic shocks (Buhaug, 2016). And while much of this of this link
is intuitive, a deeper understanding is needed to understand how conflict can exacerbate
climate change vulnerability and how these joint challenges can best be addressed.
The concern for conflict-generated vulnerability to climate change raises the issue
of environmental peacebuilding. Political ecological studies (Krampe 2014; Matthew
2014) and gray literature (Reiling & Brady, 2015) examining the connections between
climate change and conflict outcomes demonstrate that while climate change can, in fact,
negatively affect conflict, it can also be harnessed for peacebuilding activities (Buhaug,
2016; Gemenne et al., 2014; Link, Scheffran, & Ide, 2016; Matthew, 2014). These studies
show that resource scarcity will not always drive risk and can, in fact, drive cooperation
(Crawford et al., 2015; Dinar, Katz, Stefano, & Blankespoor, 2015; Gemenne et al.,
2014; Krampe, 2014; Matthew, 2014). Yet the potential of climate change as a factor in
peacebuilding has not received much attention when compared with climate change’s
role as a driver of conflict (Asah, 2015; Buhaug, 2016; Crawford et al., 2015; Egorova &
Hendrix, n.d.; Gemenne et al., 2014; Krampe, 2014; Link et al., 2016; Richard Matthew,
2014). This is of particular salience when considering the spatial dynamics of the climate-
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conflict relationship. There is considerable geographical overlap between areas
conducting ongoing peacebuilding activities and places vulnerable to the effects of
climate change, including effects on conflict (Busby et al., 2014; Busby et al., 2014). This
is evident in Asah’s examination of hydropolitics in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) (Asah,
2015). The LCB faces overlapping challenges of water scarcity, inter- and intra-state
conflict, and unequal distribution of water, all of which necessitate interstate cooperation
and threatens water security. Further, power dynamics also affect these issues, with
Nigeria having considerably more power to mobilize water use than other countries in the
basin (Asah, 2015). As a result of this convergence, both peacebuilding and adaptation to
the effects of climate change are closely intertwined (Asah, 2015). This nuanced
understanding of hydropolitics is requisite for preventing conflict, aiding in sustainable
water management, and facilitating cooperation and peacebuilding in the LCB (Asah,
2015).
As noted by (Buhaug, 2016, p. 336) “robust scientific evidence indicates that
peacebuilding is the most effective climate resilience strategy in war-torn regions.
Without peace and stable, well-functioning political institutions it is hard to see how
societies can address existing and future security challenges affected by climate change.”
There are, however, inherent challenges to environmental peacebuilding in conflict-prone
areas. As described by Matthew (2014) in their work on Rwanda and Sierra Leone, while
it would be beneficial to integrate climate change adaptation into UN peacebuilding
missions, it will also be seen as an additional cost in a sector that puts a premium on
quick benefits (Matthew, 2014). Thus, it will be treated as a low priority in the urgent
need and quick impact mentality of peacebuilding (Matthew, 2014).

29

(vii) Backdraft: The Conflict Impacts of Climate Change Adaptation
Further problematizing the idea of a unidirectional threat multiplier at the climate
conflict nexus is the growing literature demonstrating that there are conflict risks related
to adaptation efforts (Dabelko et al., 2013; Milman & Arsano, 2014; Reiling & Brady,
2015; Snorek et al., 2014). This literature argues that such efforts, if not carefully
considered in the context of conflict, risk triggering conflict, principally through the
unequal distribution of adaptation benefits (Dabelko et al., 2013; Milman & Arsano,
2014; Reiling & Brady, 2015; Snorek et al., 2014). Demonstrating the complex spatiality
of addressing climate-conflict connections, Milman and Arsano (2014), in their study of
Gambella, Ethiopia, describe the challenges and possibly inherent contradictions in
adaptation programs which, in aiming to decrease vulnerability for one group,
simultaneously increase the vulnerability of another group, potentially leading to conflict
(Milman & Arsano, 2014). Similarly, Snorek et al (2014), using the example of
agriculturalists and pastoralists in Niger, describes what they deem ‘divergent
adaptation’, a situation where an adaptation to climate shocks by one group increases the
vulnerability of another (Snorek et al., 2014).

Geographically deconstructing the threat multiplier
As is evident across multiple review articles, there are some points of consensus
in the often-contentious climate-conflict literature. While not solely responsible for the
following insights, the grounding of geography and political ecology has contributed
significantly to these understandings:
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•

The relationship between climate change and conflict is not causal; it is widely
acknowledged that climate change interacts with a host of other issues to produce
conflict (or build peace).

•

While the places most likely to be affected by climate-affected conflict have
preexisting tensions and conflict and are likely to have limited capacity to cope
with climatic shifts, focusing heavily on places with a reliance on primary
production and limited adaptive capacity overly-constrains our understanding of
conflict outcomes.

•

Conflict increases vulnerability to climate change.

•

Adaptation efforts can trigger conflict.

The geographic and political ecological literature make it clear that more
productive approaches to understanding the climate-conflict relationship emerge when
we move beyond linear examinations of climate change’s impact on conflict (Buhaug,
2015; Gemenne et al., 2014; Ide, Link, Scheffran, & Schilling, 2016). Despite the
demonstrated multi-directional nature of the relationship between climate change and
conflict, much of the academic literature and the policy communities active on the issue
continue to approach this relationship predominantly through the conflict risk lens
embodied in the threat multiplier framing. While helpful for moving away from causal
frames evident both in earlier environmental security discourses as well as some
contemporary climate-security framings, the threat multiplier framing is unidirectional
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and tells us nothing about the scales, both temporally and spatially, on which climate
change may interact with conflict.
I argue that this disconnect exists because current work on the relationship
between climate and conflict largely ignores the question of how to address this
relationship in a productive manner. As argued by Vivekananda, Schilling, & Smith
(2014, p. 497) while highlighting the limitations of large-N studies, “The focus of the
quantitative literature on identifying correlations and arguing causality between climate
change and conflict has been of limited value for the peacebuilding community as it
provides no answer to the question of how climatic changes and conflict might be
related” (Vivekananda et al., 2014a). This, I argue, is where the qualitative, highly
granular spatial and temporal framings that have been the hallmark of geographic and
political ecological work on the climate-conflict nexus can move the literature and
practice forward. This type of scholarship provides explanations for the patterns of
climate change and conflict identified in the broader literature, and offers detailed
framings of particular conflict events that point to sites for productive intervention
through development, adaptation, or conflict mitigation programming. However, for
these qualitative, granular findings to have wide impact and import, they will need to
explore productive connections between case-based work and larger datasets that allow
for their detailed findings to inform work in a wider set of contexts. Likewise, moving
beyond framings solely rooted in vulnerability, most notably climate change as a threat
multiplier, and a direct engagement with climate change as a factor in peacebuilding,
conflict as a factor in climate change vulnerability, and the potential risks of adaptation
efforts will lead to more effective policy that seeks to address the relationships between
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climate change and conflict.

Understanding Mercy Corps

The extent to which an NGO’s mission drives programming is variable and
difficult to gauge. Nonetheless, organizational self-identification is an important starting
point to understanding how development discourses, in this case those focused on linking
climate change and conflict, get incorporated into organizational strategy. Mercy Corps’
official mission is “To alleviate suffering, poverty and oppression by helping people
build secure, productive and just communities” (Mercy Corps, 2018, p. 1). As further
described in their most recent audit, (KPMG, 2017, p. 7)
Mercy Corps is a global organization, 5000 strong, powered by the belief that a
better world is possible. Mercy Corps helps people survive and get back on their
feet when natural disaster strikes, economies collapse or conflict erupts. Where
there are chronic threats to peace and progress, Mercy Corps partners with
communities to overcome obstacles and thrive… Mercy Corps employees live
and work in more than 40 countries facing the world’s toughest challenges. For
more than three decades, Mercy Corps has worked alongside more than 170
million extraordinary people to strengthen their communities from within. In
everything we do, Mercy Corps looks for moments of transition to connect people
to resources and expertise that can catalyze transformative change.
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Though this research expands beyond Mercy Corps, I treat them, and more
specifically the two programs they are implementing in Karamoja, Uganda (BRACED
and PEACE III), as the research site. While Mercy Corps and their work does not fully
represent all development organizations, they offer insight into the typical processes of
development that speak to the research question and sub-questions at the heart of this
project: they raise budgets, implement programming, work with partners, mobilize
communities, deliver services, report to donors, and monitor and evaluate their projects.
Therefore, Mercy Corps and those two projects provide a lens on the challenges,
opportunities, and day-to-day realities of implementing climate-conflict-related
development programming. My time with Mercy Corps does not allow me to speak to all
of the intricacies of an organization vast in size and scope, as my observations of
differing views and (at times) conflicting interests and beliefs within the organization
demonstrate that it is far from a monolith. However, the research design, which included
time at multiple types of offices, provided critical insight into how development efforts –
and conceptualizations of development – differ across the organization.

Mercy Corps Financial Information
With more than 5000 employees and nearly $400 million in operating expenses,
Mercy Corps has a large, and rapidly growing presence amongst development
implementers. By their own accounts, employees see themselves as part of an innovative
organization – which they see as unique in development. For example, when describing
the potential challenges of addressing large scale environmental destruction, a senior
member of Mercy Corps noted that even if the organization was taking a risk, it ought to
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target high-risk, high-reward efforts because if Mercy Corps was not, nobody else was,
insinuating that they were more flexible, innovative, and entrepreneurial than most large
development organizations.
In my discussions with Mercy Corps employees, many noted their need to reimagine themselves from a mid-sized ‘scrappy’ organization to an influential
organization within the development and humanitarian sectors. This was a shift that they
sought to capitalize and build on. To that end, there was a broader sense that Mercy
Corps’ rapid growth and innovative approach has given them an opportunity to steer
development trends in a direction that had not previously been possible. For example, in a
conversation between Mercy Corps’ Environment, Energy, and Climate (EEC) Technical
Support Unit (TSU) team and senior leadership, there was widespread agreement that use
of the organizations’ Strategic Resilience Assessment (STRESS) (a tool to measure
resilience capacity) was shifting not only efforts within Mercy Corps, but also other
organizations’ efforts in certain geographies. As such, they viewed their role to include
both implementing on behalf of donors and influencing donors to shift how and where
they fund and design programming.
As is demonstrated in Figure 1.1, Mercy Corps has seen a rapid increase in
funding and expenditures over the span of the past decade. According to their most
recent financial disclosure, for the fiscal year July 1, 2016 – June 30, 2017 (FY 16-17),
the agency had $392.4 million in programmatic expenses (Audit, Annual Reports). In
2006, Mercy Corps had total operating expenses of $215.3 million. This growth can be
attributed to multiple factors. Based on trends evident in financial data (see Figure 1.2),
descriptions in annual reports, and discussions with Mercy Corps staff, their growth is
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most directly attributable to increasing funding for ongoing refugee crises, steadily
increasing capacity and funding for long-term development and resiliency efforts (largely
focused on fragile places), and an increasing visibility as a major development
implementer with expertise in complex crisis. As described to me by a senior EEC team
member as a means of contextualizing how the agency has changed, this increase in
funding, size, and presence means that they now need to be part of any humanitarian
response to a major crisis, even in the places where they don’t have historic capacities.

Mercy Corps Growth
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Figure 1.1: Mercy Corps Growth in millions (data source: financial Audits 2007-2017)
Mercy Corps funds come from a mix of public and private support; for FY 16-17
they received $287.7 million from Government support and $139.3 million from private
support (i.e., fundraising). As is seen in Figure 1.1, this composition of funding has
remained relatively stable since circa 2009. Prior to 2009, however, they received
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roughly equal amounts of public and private support.5 This shift in orientation is notable
as it will likely results in them being more attentive and responsive to donors’ priorities
due to 1) the importance of speaking to donor priorities and initiatives; and 2) the higher
degree of flexibility that comes from private support.
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Figure 1.2: Composition of Funding Sources (in millions)
Evident in Figure 1.3 is that while funding for ‘health’, ‘civil society and
education’ and ‘humanitarian assistance – recovery’ has stayed relatively steady over
time, the increase in funding for ‘livelihood and economic development’ as well as
‘humanitarian assistance – relief’ accounts for the increase in Mercy Corps funding. The
amount of funding for ‘humanitarian assistance – relief’ spikes and dips dramatically in
5

This chart does include what is referred to as ‘other’ in the annual reports; all data are from
Mercy Corps annual reports from those years.
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response to worldwide events. Based on discussions with Mercy Corps staff, it is likely
that the sharp spike in funding for humanitarian assistance – relief, beginning in 2013,
can be explained by their response to a series of events including drought in the Horn of
Africa, typhoon Haiyan which struck the Philippines, and the Syrian Civil War (Mercy
Corps, 2013). The steady increases in funding for livelihood and economic development
is largely due to the organization’s increased focus on resilience and longer-term
development efforts. As the discourses of development have shifted increasingly towards
achieving ‘resilience’ which speaks to addressing vulnerabilities and fragility (see, for
example, USAID 2014), Mercy Corps has leveraged its capacity in places experiencing
complex crisis to implement longer-term development projects (e.g., BRACED in
Karamoja).
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Figure 1.3: Mercy Corps Expenditures (in millions), data source: Mercy Corps Annual
Reports 2007 – 2017
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Despite Mercy Corps’ efforts in longer-term development, resilience, and disaster risk
reduction, organizational discourses continue to stress its capacity in difficult-to-access
places and complex crises. Within that framing, they position themselves as an
organization with unique capacities and capabilities to address conflict (Relief Web,
2018).6 Indeed, references to “saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places”
was often displayed in stickers and posters throughout offices (see Figure 1.4). However,
as is clear in spending breakdowns (see Figure 1.3), the organizational mandate is not
limited to immediate emergency response and includes longer-term development
initiatives (often in places experiencing complex crisis. Funds earmarked as humanitarian
assistance and relief accounted for slightly less than half of overall organizational
spending for FY 16-17; longer-term development work can be further broken down into
livelihood/economic development (31.7% – $124.3 million), civil society and education
(12.8% – $50.2 million), and health (8% – $31.3 million).
The framing of Mercy Corps as an organization built for complex crisis is critical to
understanding its efforts to integrate environmental and ecosystem-centric considerations
into its programming. As I demonstrate across the different stages of this research,
integrating longer-term environmental priorities into acute crisis response is inherently
complex (Abrahams, 2014; Henley-Shephard et al., 2017). That challenge is not limited
to the implementation site. It can be experienced at the organizational level as well.

6

For example, as noted to me by multiple team members, the CEO of the organization has been
increasingly drawing attention to conflict as being the defining challenge for humanitarian organizations in
the 21st century. As the CEO, Neal Keny-Guyer describes in (Relief Web, 2018). “The big force that’s
laying the foundation for many of the crises we see today is conflict. As the World Bank has said, conflict
is the number one driver of extreme poverty in the world.”
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Despite these challenges, Mercy Corps is increasingly considering – and seeking to
address – environmental challenges in the context of their programs. Such efforts, which
fall within the purview of the EEC TSU, are a central component of the research because
they illuminate the institutional opportunities and challenges that emerge around
discourses that link climate change and conflict.

Figure 1.4 Saving and Improving Lives in the World's Toughest Places
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Understanding Organizational Strategy, Approaches, and Operations
Mercy Corps’ strategy is outlined in its ‘Compass’ document, which outlines
core strategies (Mercy Corps, 2018), as listed on p.1, the three core strategies that guide
their work are:
•

We empower people to find opportunity during times of crisis

•

We catalyze locally-owned solutions

•

We seek breakthrough innovations that transform lives

Their guiding principles (Mercy Corps, 2018, p. 3), listed below, further reinforce
the scope of the organization, as does their Vision for Change (see Figure 1.5), which
highlights their organizational self-identification as an innovative, market-oriented
organization with capacities both working with both local communities and with local
and central governments. The circle stresses that the ‘three Is’ (as they are referred to
internally) are all interrelated and interdependent. The central triangle speaks to a key
organizational mantra, and the white space speaks to the needed stakeholders.
•

We tackle complex challenges by taking an integrated, adaptive, multi-sector
approach, understanding that there are no easy or fast fixes.

•

We work in partnerships to create sustainable change at scale, knowing no single
group can solve the world’s toughest challenges alone.

•

We believe in evidence and learning. We use data to manage our programs more
effectively, understand the impact of our work and influence others.
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•

We use a gender lens. Understanding the role of gender – especially making the
right Investments in girls and women – is critical to building strength from within.

Figure 1.5: Mercy Corps vision for change (source: Mercy Corps Compass, p.1.
Format adjusted slightly)

Unsurprisingly, the extent to which Mercy Corps adheres to these strategies and
principles varies by office and program. This is, to an extent, intentional or at least
understood by Mercy Corps leadership. For example, posters marking the wall of the
Portland office note “Our strategy is our compass, not our roadmap.” Organizational
strategy, which is largely conceived by senior management with input from country
offices and technical support units (TSUs), faces myriad hurdles as programs transition
from their conceptual origins to specific interventions in the context of a particular place
and time. As was evident in this research, Mercy Corps, across all offices, is acutely
aware of the challenges of bridging priorities and conceptualizations across such broad
temporal and spatial scales (e.g., chains of communication, logistics, politics, budget
management).
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Mercy Corps’ priorities and objectives, which have expanded with the growth of
the organization, cross sectoral divides, work across multiple time frames, and require
addressing communities’ micro-level needs and concerns while simultaneously making
such programming scalable to much larger populations.7 This breadth speaks to a core
challenge in addressing climate change and conflict: climate-conflict responses require an
inter-disciplinary effort, but integrating environmental management and conservation into
efforts to address complex crisis often face pushback as these efforts move towards onthe-ground priorities (this topic is addressed in chapter 5; see also (Abrahams, 2014;
Henley-Shephard et al., 2017). This challenge was at the heart of the EEC TSU’s efforts
to prioritize ecosystem-scale and natural resource management within Mercy Corps.

Origin of Mercy Corps Partnership
I was introduced to Mercy Corps through a contact in my network. The initial
person that I spoke with, a former EEC employee and program director at the time, did
not end up being engaged with the research (he had already made plans to leave the
organization prior to our call, but was a Mercy Corp employee when we spoke). He did,
however, introduce me to the head of the EEC, who took interest in the research. A series
of meetings and conference calls took place with the current director and deputy director
of the EEC team to identify potential projects and locations, to refine the work plan, and
adjust expectations. This agreement with the EEC team (and therefore Mercy Corps) was
key not only for the research design, but also for convincing USAID (who funded this

7

This is not, however, an issue unique to Mercy Corps. Other humanitarian agencies describe the
increasing breadth of their program. One theory is that the emerging dominance of ‘resilience’
centric paradigms has led to a broadening of operational agendas.
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research) of the project’s viability. My informal agreement with the EEC team was that I
would be allowed to examine particular Mercy Corps efforts addressing the connection
between climate change and conflict, in return for which, I offered to provide input in the
field when it would be useful (which I did on occasion),8 provide learning documents
regarding this research, and share the findings with them. The latter was done via a series
of presentations across multiple offices and doubled as a chance to member check the
research.
Because I had already been awarded the Ceny Walker grant by the Walker
Institute for International Affairs at the University of South Carolina, a competitive
fellowship for graduate students to facilitate international fieldwork, I was able to start
the research with Mercy Corps almost immediately after agreeing to the partnership,
despite not yet obtaining the USAID contract. Initially the EEC team and I identified
BRACED as the project on which the study would focus, and we planned to compare and
contrast BRACED efforts in Wajir, Kenya and Karamoja, Uganda. The plan, which was
largely put in place through the EEC team, was that I would spend time working very
closely with the BRACED program director based in Nairobi and go on field visits with
her and her team.9
While in Kenya for the initial field visit, a number of factors became clear that
altered the study plan. First, focusing on two implementation sites (Wajir and Karamoja)
resulted in significant logistical complications that threatened the viability of the project
8

For example, I helped develop/reviewed climate change-related program documents, assisted in
setting up events, offered insight onto environmental processes. Generally speaking, however, I
offered only limited input to the field teams.
9
The program director left the organization not long after I arrived (the Friday before I arrived on
a Monday) I later met with the former BRACED director, who was preparing to leave the
country. As such, during this time, I shadowed the BRACED program manager.
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such that the benefits of comparing the two did not appear to justify the costs or
complications. Second, BRACED was not addressing the connection between climate
change and conflict as directly as I anticipated (or as was suggested in the grant
documents). Third, other programs had a more explicit climate-conflict component –
PEACE III being the most apparent. It was after this first visit, when I visited Wajir and
Karamoja, that I refined the research to focus on BRACED and PEACE III in Karamoja.
Because EEC brokered the field visit with country directors and program
managers, there was very little pushback from these teams regarding my presence.
Though some program members were more guarded or had more protocols for me than
others regarding what meetings I would and would not be able to attend, there were only
very few instances where I was unable to join the teams in their activities. 10 This access
allowed me to develop a deeper understanding of what it means to be a development
organization operating across geographies and trying to address the connections between
climate change and conflict in its programming.

Description and Role of Different Teams
Mercy Corps’ approach to climate-conflict is greatly shaped by its structure. For
the purpose of this research, I break the organization into three categories: administrative;
country and program teams; and technical support units (TSUs). Their different
functions, which take place across multiple geographies, highlight the myriad forms
10

There was no consistency in what settings I was permitted to join. Some examples include: I
was unable to sit in on an all-TSU meeting while I was in Portland, attend meetings with donors
and BRACED leadership, and once a PEACE III partner that reported directly to USAID asked I
not be part of calls. In all instances in which I was unable to attend an activity, I would be briefed
by someone who was in attendance. Conversely, I was able to attend all-staff meetings and
trainings, manager’s meetings, annual planning, etc.
45

development takes within an organization. All of these functions, no matter how
geographically or functionally removed they are from implementation, affect
development outcomes.

Administrative parts of the organization consist of individuals and teams
performing a range of ‘back-office’ functions for the agency. This includes fundraising,
accounting, legal, logistics support, drivers, administrative assistants, financial planners,
marketing, communications, and other similar functions. Their responsibilities include,
for example, obtaining and distributing program funds (both for salaries and for
programmatic purposes), ensuring security and financial protocols are followed, ensuring
hiring and firing procedures follow all rules and regulations (both internally and based on
in-country law), getting teams to and from the field, and organizing travel.
The administrative functions are required for both programming and institutional
operations, yet they are often a source of frustration for programmatic staff. In field
offices, considerable portions of the weekly Monday morning staff meetings were spent
negotiating and navigating the at-times divergent needs of the field teams and the
administrative teams, which negotiations were often contentious. Those dynamics reflect
fact that development outcomes are not constrained solely by field-related factors (Carr,
2011). For example, if the accounting team, in following the rules of the organization and
of the funder, does not authorize funding to pay the travel costs of community members,
there can be negative impacts on the program (e.g., falling behind schedule, alienating
local officials).
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Program and Country Teams consist of individuals working directly on
programmatic activities. The majority of these individuals and teams are based in the
field offices, though heads of programs and senior programmatic staff tend to be in
country offices. Those are the individuals and teams who worked directly with
communities and partners to implement programs I with whom I interacted most closely.
These roles vary based on the type of programming being implemented. Within Mercy
Corps, and within the two programs studied in this research, much of this work was akin
to community organizing. Teams would galvanize support for particular projects from
communities receiving programming, both soliciting community input and/or directly
presenting potential project ideas. For BRACED this was largely done through resilience
action planning (a formalized process to understand vulnerabilities and capacities at a
parish level). For PEACE III teams operating on the ground, their role more explicitly
involved promoting dialogue, rather than directly implementing projects that required
community support. These teams are also responsible for many of the initial stages of
reporting required by donors, providing documentation and initial metrics to senior
programmatic staff and M&E officers in Mercy Corps.

Technical Support Units (TSUs) – consists of individuals and teams with technical
expertise on programmatic issues, but who do not directly implement programming or
manage specific programs. In many ways they function as an internal consulting team to
the organization. At the time I conducted my research, Mercy Corps had 11 TSUs. I
worked most closely with the Environment, Energy, & Climate (EEC) TSU. The other
TSUs that I engaged with include Governance and Partnerships; Peace and Conflict;
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Youth, Gender and Girls; Market Systems and Development; Food Security; and
Agriculture. Mercy Corps also has a dedicated Research and Learning team, which was
involved in aspects of this research. Understanding the EEC TSU’s experiences as they
tried to integrate environmental and resource management priorities in Mercy Corps’
projects is a central component of my analysis. Their experiences reflect that despite
widespread organizational interest in addressing climate-conflict, the technical and
political hurdles unique to the issue complicate their efforts. This, then, serves as a
microcosm for wider development efforts seeking address the link between climate
change and conflict. I also interacted closely with the Peace and Conflict TSU which,
increasingly, is focused on the role of resource management and climate change in the
context of climate change and peacebuilding.

Mercy Corps Offices
The goal of this study is to trace the processes by which the relationship between
climate change and conflict shifts from discursive formation to become policy,
programming, and ultimately an on-the-ground intervention. Therefore, a critical
consideration for the research design was to understand how climate-conflict discourses
shift and change across offices (i.e., places of implementation), and how that was
reflected in, and affects, development programming. While this research focuses on work
designed for, and ultimately implemented in, Karamoja, the geographies of development
extend far beyond the implementation site. As such, my fieldwork extended beyond
Karamoja to Mercy Corps offices in Kampala, Nairobi, Washington, D.C., and the
organizational headquarters in Portland, Oregon.
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Like Mercy Corps, BRACED and PEACE III are best conceptualized as multisited spaces including, but not limited to the physical projects through which
communities encounter programming, the multiple office spaces (including country,
regional, satellite, and partners’ offices), the conference rooms and hotels that hosted
learning events and reflection meetings, and even the ubiquitous land cruisers that span
the interstitial spaces of development (Figure 1.6).

Figure 1.6: Development Spaces. The Land Cruiser, inside and out.

Below I describe the different offices, note how long I spent in each one, and
outline the functions as they relate to PEACE III and/or BRACED. Exploring these
spaces helped me to better understand the different perspectives and pressures that can
shape programming decisions. More specifically, by spending time across these different
sites of program implementation, I was able to better comprehend the different contexts
in which discourses linking climate change and conflict shift across time and space, and
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thus how geographic differences and office priorities, positionalities, and unique
pressures can alter program trajectories. These experiences demonstrate that
organizations and organizational culture are far from monolithic (Simon, 1997, 2007).
Indeed, even within teams, perspectives on programming often varied widely.

Moroto, Uganda
The plurality of my time, roughly six months, was spent in the Moroto field
office. The Moroto office was a converted house that sits at the base of a small mountain
in the Mount Moroto mountain range. The office was walled, guarded 24 hours/day by
unarmed guards, and housed anywhere from 20 – 50 employees (the amount differed
depending on the day). The office had solar panels and a large battery, and therefore had
electricity nearly all the time, a luxury in Karamoja reserved mostly for development
organizations. There was internet access, though it was very slow – considerably slower
than a connection available on mobile phone. The office was originally set up as part of
PEACE III, but during my fieldwork it housed a number of other large programs
including Global Health and Governance (GHG), BRACED, and Girls Improving
Resilience with Livestock (GIRL). As a result, space in the office was limited.11 Mercy
Corps’ PEACE III activities and Mercy Corps Uganda’s BRACED activities were largely
based in this office.
Behind the office was a small garden, immature fruit trees, and a pit for burning
trash. On occasion pastoralists would wander by with herds of goat and/or cattle. In the
11

As of my final visit to this office, there were discussions that Mercy Corps was to take over the
recently abandoned office of another agency, ACDI Voca, who had recently not been awarded the
next iteration of GHG. It is of note, local governance officials tended to press NGOs to build new
structures rather than take over or modify existing offices or houses.
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dry season these pastoralists would burn the grass behind the office in preparation for the
rainy season.12 Chickens, lizards, and songbirds were regular, if unruly, residents of the
outdoor space, and would occasionally wander indoors to surprisingly little fanfare.
Large crows would often hop on the office’s tin roof creating a cacophony of scraping
claws and shrieking caws, which echoed loudly across the office. Snakes and scorpions,
though less frequent visitors, were occasionally found on the compound as well.
The office was adorned with posters outlining Mercy Corps rules, regulations, and
organizational ethos; notice boards; weekly movement plans and donor-funded whistleblower hotlines to report fraud and corruption. Though there were patterns to where
people sat, desks were not assigned, and on more crowded days there were often two
people to a desk. An outdoor structure, called a tukul doubled as a meeting place and a
spillover place where desk-less people could do their work. Depending on the weather –
wind being the largest determinant, heat a distant second – this could be a very desirable
or very undesirable place to work. For purposes of observation, I often sat here.
Inside, depending on how one chooses to count, there were six rooms of varying
sizes and each room held a number of desks roughly proportionate to its size. One of
those rooms had been recently transitioned from a guest room to another office to address
the overflow of employees.13 Who was in each room broke down largely by program,
with the exception of one room mostly housing senior programmatic staff across teams:
this was occasionally referred to as “The Manager’s Room.” There was also a kitchen

12

Pastoralists in the area believe that this practices increases the nutrient density of the grass.
The guest room was predominantly used to house one of the senior member of PEACE III
when he came from Nairobi, but due to space shortages and his limited time in the office, they
opted to transition it to an office.
13
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which, like offices everywhere, served as a congregating point for tea, [instant] coffee,
and chats. The office also had an outhouse and an internal toilet – the latter was
predominantly used by visitors, ex-pat staff, and employees not based in this office.

Figure 1.7: Clockwise from top to bottom: Moroto Field Office, a Resident Chicken, and
the Tukul
The office technically operated from 8:00am – 5:00pm, Monday to Friday, and
field teams tended to depart around 9:00am returning at varied times. On weekends the
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office was accessible and usually 5-10 people could be found working there. Some would
also come for electricity and Internet, which most employees did not have at their homes.
Transport was largely in Mercy Corps branded vehicles, but for certain types of
travel (generally defined by the amount of people going and the availability of cars)
motor bikes (known locally in Uganda as Bodas (short for Boda Bodas)) were the
preferred option.

Figure 1.8 Means of Transport, Land Cruisers and Bodas

Field offices, generally, were responsible for directly implementing the
programming or working closely with partners (usually, though not entirely, local
Community Based Organizations (CBOs)). The personnel in these offices were also
responsible for the production of paperwork that ultimately filters back through regional
offices, in some cases through domestic offices, and ultimately back to the donors in the
form of monthly, quarterly, and annual reports. This includes, for example, data on total
‘beneficiaries’ served, rationales for activity, expense reports, and purchase orders. In all
of these ways, Moroto was a very typical field office. The working language in the office
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was English. Occasionally conversations would happen in Karamajong, but many staff –
including Ugandan staff – did not speak the language. Unlike other field offices
(Kaabong and Kotido, for example), there were living quarters for employees at this
office.

Portland, Oregon
Mercy Corps headquarters are in Portland Oregon. I twice visited this office, each
visit lasting one week. The building housed the full range of functions required by a
modern development and humanitarian NGO, including fundraising, accounting,
management, program leadership, technology support, and monitoring and evaluation
staff. This office also housed the majority of senior staff that develop organizational
strategy, pursue new initiatives, and craft the public face of an increasingly visible
organization. Critically for my research, this office was central in framing and defining
how, as an organization, Mercy Corps approaches and seeks to address the connection
between climate change and conflict. The office was home to several people who
provided technical input and interact closely with PEACE III and BRACED14 donors.
The office was a four-story formerly industrial, LEED-certified building that
holds roughly 300 employees. The office looked out on the Willamette River near to the
heart of downtown Portland. On the first floor, a security guard screens visitors to the
office. Also on the first floor was the Mercy Corps Action Center, a place for Mercy
Corps to showcase their work and an area that doubles as an event space . The workspace

14

BRACED, however, also has a considerable presence in their UK office, as it is a DfID-funded
program.
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was filled with conference rooms named after rivers in areas they work, high-resolution
photos of program recipients, large tables filled with awards and framed photos of senior
Mercy Corps staff with dignitaries and celebrities (e.g., the CEO with John Kerry) (see
Figure 1.10), and a place to leave or take small amounts of money from the places they
operate to help facilitate employees having local currency on hand when arriving on trips
to field sites (See Figure 1.10).15

Figure 1.9: Mercy Corps Portland, External View

15

A note about the term ‘the field’. While not a contested term, exactly, it is flexible in its
meaning. Based on usage within Mercy Corps is, in essence, one step closer to the communities
Mercy Corps works with from wherever one predominantly exists. For example, a trip from
Kampala to the Moroto field office would be referred to as going to the field. A trip from Moroto
to a community site, a local government official’s office, or a project would also be referred to as
going to the field.
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Figure 1.10: Mercy Corps Portland, Internal View, Conference Rooms and Waiting Area
(Left) and Wall of Awards (Right) and Leave-and-Take Currency Jars (Bottom)

The immediate area was described to me as “historically, the grittier part of
downtown Portland.” When changing office space to accommodate their growth, the
organization had the option of putting their office in a more established part of town, but
felt that to do so would be in contrast to their organizational culture. There is a small
portion of Mercy Corps – Mercy Corps Northwest – that addresses development
questions in the context of Portland. Their focus is on homelessness, small business
loans, and prison reentry. However, those functions are based out of a different office in
Portland.
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Being headquartered in Portland offers a set of benefits and challenges. As
described by one of the Portland-based employees, being the only major international
development actor in a place well-known for its quality of life is a key recruitment tool.
All those I spoke with described loving Portland and the surrounding area – many
compared it favorably to their experiences living in Washington, DC. Some noted being
congratulated for moving to Portland by fellow Portlanders. It was also noted recruitment
still faces a challenge in that Washington, DC, was the more obvious landing point for
US-based development workers and holds a much larger pool of candidates due to the
greater opportunities for internationally-focused work.

Kampala, Uganda
Mercy Corps’ country office in Uganda was on the 4th floor of a building shared
with multiple western-based development organizations, including a USAID monitoring
and evaluation office, Tufts University’s Feinstein International Center, other NGOs, and
a number of businesses. Entrance to the building required going through a metal detector,
but security protocols were not particularly stringent. In total I spent two months at this
office. The office is an open plan with a few meeting rooms and was divided largely into
programmatic staff and administrative staff. The Kampala office housed the country
director and currently the East Africa regional director.16 This office spends considerable
time coordinating activity with donors, and the ‘back office’ functions of a major
international NGO (e.g., logistics, accounting, human resources). This office housed

16

During my first trip the East Africa regional director was based in Nairobi – this changed after
a shuffling of positions in 2017
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senior programmatic staff working in Uganda (e.g., the Program Director for PEACE III,
BRACED),17 and the Deputy Director in charge of Programming. In both this office and
the Nairobi office, the back-office functions are largely separated from the programmatic
staff through a wall or barriers.

Figure 1.11: Mercy Corps Kampala
Employees in the field offices occasionally referred to country offices as
‘paperwork’ offices or ‘HQ’ – both terms used pejoratively. Yet they offer multiple
personal and professional benefits and therefore are desirable places to work. For
example, many Moroto-based staff described a desire to work in Kampala so they could
pursue educational opportunities. Some PEACE III and BRACED staff currently take the

17

There were, technically, two program directors for BRACED. The lead is based in Nairobi, but
the program director for Uganda-focused BRACED activity is in Kampala.
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overnight bus to Kampala to pursue advanced studies on the weekend.18 Additionally,
pay was perceived to be higher in the Kampala office when compared to the field
offices.19 Finally, especially for the younger staff, Kampala was considered more socially
desirable. Despite this, field staff tended to prefer the day-to-day work that happened in
the field office, which focused on working directly with the community, when compared
with the jobs based in Kampala, which focused more on coordination and reporting.

Nairobi, Kenya
The Nairobi office, which is the Kenya country office, is a central hub for Mercy
Corps work in the East Africa region and, naturally, Kenya-focused projects. I use the
term ‘Kenya-focused’ as some programs, most notably PEACE III, centered on Kenya,
but had operations that crossed into other countries. I spent approximately two months in
this office. Mercy Corps occupied a floor in a building within ABC Place, a shopping
center and office plaza with grocery stores, pharmacies, and restaurants, as well as many
NGO and business offices. The shopping center required security checks to enter and, on
occasion, police armed with rifles would stand guard from the rooftops. The office
contained a handful of offices for senior staff, multiple meeting rooms, but was mostly an
open plan with many cubicles.
The primary function of this office is the management of programs, coordination
with donors and other partners, reporting to donors and headquarters on program updates,

18

The overnight bus runs daily (there are a few companies that run this bus back and forth from
Kampala), from both locations. Outside of the overnight bus, there are limited options available
to individuals to get from Kampala to Moroto.
19
I lack any data on Kampala salaries and am unable to answer that question definitively.
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and general administrative function for Kenya-centric programming. Mercy Corps did
have some livelihoods-focused programming targeting youth in Nairobi, but these were
secondary functions of this office. All BRACED activities went through this office,
which housed the Programme Director. PEACE III had, at times, key personnel housed in
Nairobi, but the majority were either in Moroto or Kampala. PACT, the primary grant
recipient for PEACE III (Mercy Corps was technically a sub-contractor on this project),
was based in Nairobi. As a result, most program-wide PEACE III meetings took place in
Nairobi.

Washington, DC
Mercy Corps occupied roughly 1/3 of the 6th floor of a large building in
downtown Washington, DC, and was currently in the process of expanding. Mercy Corps
shared the floor with CISCO and a fitness center. I visited this office four times, each
only for a day. Like the Portland office, this office was dotted with photos and awards
related to their work. This office was initially developed predominantly as an auxiliary
office to the Portland headquarters to focus on policy/advocacy and fundraising. In recent
years, however, it has expanded rapidly. This office housed multiple functions, and many
key personnel from the TSUs and the Research and Learning Team of Mercy Corps,
including the head of Research and Learning, the head of the Environmental TSU, and
the lead on all TSUs. Though I only list the total days formally conducting research with
Mercy Corps on these days, multiple meetings coordinating the research took place here.
My time here focused largely on coordinating activities, updating and catching up with
the EEC director, and briefing personnel on my findings.
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Lodwar, Kenya
Just across the Ugandan border, Mercy Corps’ Lodwar office existed as a satellite
office for programs based out both Mercy Corps Kenya and Mercy Corps Uganda. I had
two roughly week long visits in Lodwar. The Lodwar office is part of a group of offices,
including those of other development agencies. Like the other offices, it was gated and
guarded. It has three rooms and the number of employees in the office was variable,
ranging from five to fifteen on the days I was there. For the purposes of the programs I
was working with, Lodwar was largely used for coordinating Kenya-related activities for
PEACE III. Lodwar is well known for its remarkable heat, it reaches well over 40 °C
(104.0° F) in the hotter times of the year; on one of my visits it reached 42 °C (107.6° F).

Kaabong, Uganda
Kaabong is a field office akin to Moroto. Though the core programs I studied
were based out of Moroto, activity for PEACE III took place in areas near this office. I
had two roughly week-long visits to Kaabong. The majority of activity in this office
centered on a different program, Global Health and Governance (GHG), a USAIDfunded program comparable to BRACED, but there were PEACE III partners in
Kaabong.20 The office, which was also converted from a house, had multiple structures,

20

BRACED and GHG had enough overlap that the decision was made to keep programming
geographically separate. PEACE III for certain types of programming, worked with GHG in the
context of livelihoods.
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including housing for employees, a tukul, and multiple single unit sleeping units for
visiting Mercy Corps staff.

Wajir, Kenya
The Wajir office focused largely on BRACED and other programs designed for
the specific context of the region. I spent one week in Wajir. Due to the proximity to
Somalia, and recent incidents in the area, this office is heavily guarded and more fortified
than other offices. Movement is also more restricted in Wajir due to security concerns.
The office was, like others, a converted house with multiple desks in an open layout. A
large conference table doubles as an auxiliary work space and a central meeting point.
My time in this office was largely observing BRACED activities in the area.

Kotido, Uganda
Kotido was also a field office akin to Moroto. I made sporadic visits to this office
totaling five days. Though no formal activity for PEACE III or BRACED took place out
of this office, it was the main office for GHG. The Kotido office was also a modified
house. Like Kaabong, Kotido was able to house multiple full-time employees and guests.
My time in this office was predominantly as a stop to and from Moroto and Kampala on
swaps, or en route to Kaabong with PEACE III.
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Eldoret, Kenya
This was once a major office, but due to the limited activity in the area, only a
few people were working in this office. I stopped here once, along with a PEACE III
official, en route to another meeting. No relevant programming took place here.

Program Descriptions
BRACED and PEACE III, the two programs of study, offer a corollary. BRACED
is a climate change-centric program that exists in the backdrop of conflict/post-conflict
dynamics. PEACE III is a conflict mitigation and peacebuilding program that is seeking
to integrate climate change into the core goals of the program, such as peacebuilding.
Comparing program dynamics offered a unique vantage point into the challenges and
opportunities regarding the translation of discourses of climate change and its impact on
conflict into programming.

Table 1.2: BRACED and PEACE III Comparison

Goals

Financial Information

PEACE III

BRACED

PEACE III is focused on

BRACED is focused on

cross-border conflict

developing resilience to

mitigation and peacebuilding.

shocks and stressors

The total budget for PEACE

4.6 million pounds over three

III is $20.3 million. Of which

years ($6.2 million)
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Mercy Corps was responsible
for $3 million.
Geographic Scope

The wider program

The program is being

encompasses border areas of

implemented in Wajir, Kenya

Kenya-Somalia; Kenya-

and Karamoja, Uganda.

Ethiopia; Kenya-Ethiopia-

Though I spent time in Wajir

South Sudan; Kenya-Uganda;

during the initial research

Kenya-Uganda-South Sudan;

stage, the focus of this work

Uganda-South Sudan (see

is within Uganda. Within

Figure 1.16 for a map). This

Karamoja, Braced focuses on

research, however, focuses on

Moroto, Napak, and

Kenya-Uganda.

Nakapiripirit.

Donor

USAID

DfID

Climate-Conflict focus

PEACE III has a direct focus

BRACED aims to mitigate

on addressing climate-conflict

the impact of conflict on

in their programming. This is

climate change vulnerability

a broad mandate.

and address future conflict
risks through resilience
programming
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BRACED Background
Mercy Corps is implementing a portion of BRACED. BRACED is, collectively, a
£110 million comprised of 15 projects across 13 countries (BRACED, 2016).21 It is
considered a high risk, high return program that seeks to address climate change
vulnerability in volatile places (BRACED, 2016, p. 1). The goal of the overall program,
as is articulated in program documents, is to “reach some of the people most vulnerable
to disasters in the world, who have received the least support and investment in disaster
resilience to date, with measures that will be sustained beyond the lifetime of the
programme.” BRACED has three strategic output areas that aim to increase resilience
over both the long term and the short term (BRACED, 2016)
•

Output 1: Strengthened technical and adaptive capacity of formal and informal
governance of structures in natural resource management, climate change
adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and economic development with improved
coordination between local, national and regional levels.

•

Output 2: Improved economic opportunities for women, men and youth in rural,
peri-urban and urban areas natural resource management and climate smart
investment.

•

Output 3: Reduced inequality and increase empowerment of women, men, girls
and boys

21

The program technically ended in December 2017, however, Mercy Corps has been awarded
the second iteration of BRACED. My work focused entirely on Mercy Corps’ work on the first
iteration of BRACED.
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Mercy Corps received £4.6 million pounds for their component of BRACED. As
described in the grant agreement, BRACED programming focuses both on addressing
short-term instability and vulnerability and igniting transformational shifts in the
resilience of people in the area:
The aim of PROGRESS [BRACED]22 is to build absorptive, adaptive and
transformative capacities of household and communities to be more resilient in
the face of increasing climate risks, referred to as shocks and stresses. In both
north-eastern Kenya and northern Uganda, these shocks and stresses include
drought, increased aridity, flooding and flash floods, soil erosion, slashing and
burning and massive deforestation. All of these contribute to environmental
degradation which reduces the local resource-base for viable livelihoods.

Mercy Corps’ BRACED team and its associated focus and programming is
broken down into the five teams: Governance, Natural Resource Management (NRM),
Lands, Markets, and Gender. Though there is some overlap in these teams, they have
different foci that align closely with their team names. During my time with the
organization, there were some all-hands-on-deck efforts, such as forming resilience
action committees (described below) and in the distribution of ‘scratch cards’, which
were essentially coupons that provided discounts on agricultural inputs such as seeds and
fertilizer for BRACED recipients. Though I spent time with all of these teams, my focus
was largely on the NRM, Lands, and, to a lesser extent, Governance teams.

22

At the time of writing the grant application the portion of BRACED being handled by Mercy
Corps was known as PROGRESS
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BRACED Geographies
Mercy Corps is implementing BRACED in two distinct locations: Karamoja,
Uganda and Wajir, Kenya. The decision to host the work in two such disparate locales
was strategic: while culturally unique, both places have livelihood systems with deep
roots in pastoralism and were facing many of the same climactic stresses. Likewise, both
areas have experienced considerable conflict in recent years, but of varied type and
intensity. This combination would allow for overlap in program design and effective
learning outputs. In the initial program documents there was considerable overlap in the
types of programs that would be rolled out in the two sites. The decision to focus on these
two geographies, however, was later described to me as regrettable due to the
complications of program management.23

Figure 1.12: BRACED Geographies (credit: Kevin Remington)

23

It is of note that there were changes in personnel within BRACED from program design and
the early program implementation to more advanced stages of the grant. For the scope of this
research it is important to acknowledge that 1) many of those implementing the project did not
agree with the initial design of the program. 2) This shift, in many ways, resulted in a
fundamental reconfiguration of the program that centered much more on governance and
community mobilization.
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After a strategic restructuring of the program, Mercy Corps made the decision to
focus their work on three particular districts in Karamoja rather than the entire region
(Moroto, Nakapiripirit, and Napak). Mercy Corps and BRACED personnel had two
reasons for focusing the work on select geographies within Karamoja. First, the sheer size
of Karamoja and the finite resources of the grant, most critically, transport, made
covering the entire area impractical. Karamoja is 27,000 square km in size, and the
project only had a few Land Cruisers at its disposal to move staff and equipment.
Therefore, a spread-out strategy was unmanageable. Second, another program, GHG,
conducts very similar programming in the northern part of district. Stretching out
BRACED operations and resources did not make sense when another program was doing
comparable work from a more strategic location for the northern districts. Third, in their
decision to focus on community mobilization and resilience action committees (RACs,
described below) there was a desire to limit the scope of not just where, but also with
whom, they work. All of these factors highlight a challenge faced by all development
organizations: balancing what is achievable and measurable with ideas and goals that
might have greater impact for a wider community. In the table below, I describe some
sample activities of BRACED in order to demonstrate their approach to building
resilience.
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Figure 1.13: The Districts in Karamoja Where BRACED is operating (red) (credit: Kevin
Remington)
Table 1.3 BRACED Sample Programming

Program

Descriptions

Activity
Resilience

RACs underpinned all BRACED work. RACS were to mobilize the

Action

community, form committees representing BRACED issue areas

Committees

(e.g. land, NRM, gender) and elect representatives that steer the

(RACs)

programming in communities receiving programming.
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Resilience

Following the mobilization of the RACS, teams developed RAPS.

Action Plans

These were one- to two-day processes following a defined protocol.

(RAPs)

The goal of RAPs was to identify community-identified hazards
and resources with the ultimate goal of bolstering resilience.

Governance

The governance team mobilized communities to train groups on

training

advocacy, organizing, and their legal protections.

Permagardens

Permagardens and training on permaculture techniques was a
passion of one the original program directors. Due to the climate of
Karamoja (and for that matter, Wajir), agricultural techniques that
conserved water were seen as central for resilience.

Safe spaces

A gender-centric program where girls were given space and time to
pursue projects under the guidance of a mentor.

Sack and

Similar to permagardens in promoting very localized agriculture,

community

sack and community gardens were designed to grow food in small

gardens

spaces or in canvas sacks.

Scratch Cards

In partnership with an agricultural dealer, these cards allowed
Karamoja residents receiving BRACED programming discounted
access to key agricultural inputs. This was facilitated by mobile
technologies.

Land Rights

The lands component of BRACED worked to identify key

Committee

governance partners to work with on issues of land rights and land
tenure.
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Land Rights

Mercy Corps organized trainings for the land rights committees and

Training

other community members on the different land systems in Uganda,
and on their land rights.

Training on

A partnership with governance officials to ensure their budgeting

Gender

process considered the unique vulnerabilities of women and girls.

Sensitive
Budgeting

BRACED, Climate Change, and Conflict
In grant documents, Karamoja was positioned as an insecure place somewhere
between a conflict and post-conflict setting. For example, as described in the grant
narrative (Mercy Corps, 2014, p. 38)
The overall security rating for both Wajir and Karamoja is “High” with some
locations considered “Extreme,” reflecting a high likelihood of threats related to
operational risks, terrorism, and political/social instability. Threats of criminality
(assaults, car-jacking, kidnapping) are high in many remote locations. Clan
rivalries and skirmishes, the Somali conflict (Wajir), and cattle rustling conflict
(Karamoja) are sources of continuing violence in the region. Both regions are
deeply traditional and likewise, both have an extremely high saturation of
weaponry. Most areas in Karamoja and Wajir are extremely remote with limited
response and medical facilities.24

24

On the ground, the challenges of cattle rustling and of small arms was not as acute as suggested
here.
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The effects of conflict and the challenges of the shifting economic and physical
landscapes of Karamoja were often described by BRACED staff as a challenge for
resilience, both in the sense that it heightened vulnerabilities to contemporary challenge
(e.g., food security) and underscored its importance. Yet, for the communities, conflict
was often framed as a past concern. During RAPs, BRACED staff would explicitly ask
community members about their concerns about conflict and security. This was done in
the context of identifying wider vulnerabilities. Using a ranking system, community
members were asked to identify what they deemed to be the biggest challenge in their
community. Each community member voted, receiving six rocks; each member then put
three rocks on the most pressing concern, two rocks on the second most pressing, and one
rock on the third. Mercy Corps then noted the six most common challenges.

Figure 1.14: Ranking Vulnerabilities, The Gun Was Used to Represent Conflict
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Most community members did not list conflict as a major concern. For example,
only 11 of 36 member communities listed conflict and security amongst their top six
concerns (the number used in the resilience assessment process). They did, however, note
that while concerns ‘of the gun’ had decreased, other forms of insecurity – most notably,
food security – and other more localized forms of conflict (theft, household violence, and
resource conflict) were a contemporary challenge.
As such, the ways in which BRACED addressed climate-conflict connections was
in the context of pressures that might contribute to conflict and in guiding populations
towards more resilient livelihoods and increased food security. This was seen as a direct
response to the reduction in food security resulting from years of conflict and a
disarmament campaign that led to a widespread loss of cattle and decreased food security.
BRACED was not, however, explicitly focused on alleviating conflict in their program.

PEACE III Background
PEACE III is a conflict mitigation and peacebuilding program that operates in
multiple countries. It builds on two previous iterations, PEACE and PEACE II and
though it has a broad geographical remit, it is centered in Kenya (see Figure 1.14). As
described in the 2015-2016 annual report (PACT & Mercy, 2016).
PEACE III is a five year, USAID funded regional conflict transformation program
awarded to Pact in partnership with Mercy Corps in April, 2014. The program
seeks to contribute to stability in the Horn of Africa region, by strengthening the
horizontal and vertical linkages within & between local, national, and regional
conflict management actors.
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Figure 1.15: PEACE III Model of Change
Mercy Corps is a subcontractor to PACT, a US-Based NGO, on PEACE III and
predominantly focuses on Zones 5-8 (see Figure 1.16).25 Because PACT is the primary
contractor they technically have considerable influence over Mercy Corps’ activities
under this project. However, because PACT and Mercy Corps divided the work and
operated in different geographies, Mercy Corps had relative autonomy over day-to-day
decisions. As a result of the vast area and the associated operational challenges it poses,
Mercy Corps relies heavily on partnerships with local CBOs and NGOs. When PEACE
III was awarded, Mercy Corps and PACT were informed that the funding came in part
from USAID’s climate change funds. As a result, a requirement for the implementation
of PEACE III was to integrate climate change, specifically efforts that address climateconflict links into programming; the specifics of this mandate were left broad.

25

Due to security and logistical concerns, my time centered on Zone 6, 7, 8.
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Figure 1.16: PEACE III Geographies, Mercy Corps is operating primarily in Zones 6, 7,
8 and manages activity in Zone 5.

Peace III Geographies
Following are descriptions of the program geographies taken from (PACT &
Mercy, 2016). The geographies vary considerably but speak to some of the barriers and
opportunities described in chapter 5. For example, Zones 7 and 8 are stable and relatively
accessible and therefore are far easier places to operate when compared to Zone 5, which
during my time with the program, often was inaccessible due to safety concerns and
Ethiopian governmental restrictions. While the geographies vary widely, so do the issues
PEACE III is seeking to address. For example, the challenges and conflict across the
Kenya-Somalia borders differ from those of Uganda-Kenya and Ethiopia-Kenya-Uganda.
Though there is communication and lesson-sharing between the different teams, the
programming differs considerably depending on the zone. My work centers on Mercy
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Corps activities focused on Zones 6, 7, and 8 (predominantly zones 7 and 8). These
activities were all based out of the Moroto office.

Table 1.4: PEACE III geographies related to operations in and around Karamoja

Zone

Description Taken From (PEACE III, 2016, p. 10)

Zone 6

This zone that covers a triangular border area between Uganda/Kenya

Kaabong-

and South Sudan. Increased arms inflow into Uganda and Kenya from

Oropoi/

South Sudan is a contributing factor to several attacks in this zone

Loki-

around Kaabong and Turkana. In South Sudan, tension has been high

Kapoeta

due to ongoing crisis which climaxed in July this year when fighting
erupted between the two warring parties. However, there are some
examples of success: the resource sharing agreement signed between
Turkana of Kenya and Dodoth of Loyolo-Kaabong has led to peaceful
coexistence. PEACE III also facilitated opening of Pire Market at the
border between Uganda and South Sudan and Nadapal along the
Kenya-South Sudan border.

Zones 7 and

Zones 7 and 8 have largely remained peaceful and security conditions

8: Moroto-

improved. The two zones are occupied by Turkana from Kenya;

Loima/West

Matheniko and Tepeth of Moroto, Uganda; Pokot of Amudat, Uganda

Pokot

and Pokot of Kenya. Over the year, interaction between local
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Amudat

governments, other peace actors like youth groups, coordination

(South

between partners, and increased cross border trade have generated a

Karamoja
Conflict
System).

peace trend that needs to be consolidated. There still remain some
incidences of livestock theft and conflict over water and pasture but
most of these conflicts are localized and low scale. Emerging trends
include the increasing demand for donkey skins following
establishment of a Chinese tanning factory in Lodwar leading to
accelerated theft of donkeys

PEACE III Example Programming
The focus of PEACE III is predominantly on dialogue, reconciliation, and
enhancing the ability of governments to respond to conflict and conflict risk. This has, at
times, made the integration of climate change into the program an awkward fit. As
described by a senior member of the Mercy Corps team, ‘we don’t do environment
programming, but we’re dealing with environmental issues.’ Put differently, the core
capacities of the program and the personnel do not align with what are deemed to be
environmental goals. Table 1.5 contains a descriptions of typical activities (PACT &
Mercy Corps, 2013; PEACE III, 2016, 2017).
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Table 1.5: PEACE III Programming Examples

Programming

Descriptions

Trauma Healing

Addressing past violence and grievances between groups and fostering
spaces to deal with trauma.

Peace Dividends

Projects or activities that celebrate, reward, and reinforce lasting peace
between communities (e.g., the construction of a watering dam or
sponsored bull slaughter celebration).

Peace Rallies

A means to disseminate and celebrate peace resolutions following
peace dialogues

Dialogues

A core of the program: dialogues are used to promote promoting
reconciliation among conflicting communities – these processes are
often referred to as “ strengthening horizontal linkages between actors.”
These are often supported by PEACE III but can be initiated by the
program or by local governments.

Supporting youth

The program carries out a range of activities specifically targeting
young people to enhance leadership abilities and create change

Capacity building

Building peacebuilding and conflict mitigation capacity, predominantly

of local peace

through training, for program teams, local CBOs, and local governance

actors

actors is core to the program. PEACE III also works to foster
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relationships with local, national, and regional governments as a means
to support ‘vertical linkages’.
Intergovernmental

Supporting and encouraging information sharing, learning, and joint

collaboration

planning on a range of topics across borders.

across border
Promoting

Setting up channels and incentives for collaborations and connections

networking and

across different boundaries and borders, and brokering peace

linkages

agreements

PEACE III, Climate Change, and Conflict
As noted previously, PEACE III was tasked with addressing climate change as a
condition of its funding. This was not an initial part of the program design and was a
significant shift for the program. Indeed, in the grant application the term ‘climate
change’ is noted once (PACT & Mercy Corps, 2013), however in the 2015-2016 annual
report, ‘climate change’ is listed 25 times (PACT & Mercy, 2016). In other words, within
the geographies of Peace III, in particular in Zones 5-8, concerns for the connection
between climate and conflict have gone from nearly non-existent to an important framing
of the project. As described in their annual report to USAID (PACT & Mercy, 2016):
Contextually the program has been shifting more towards countering violent
extremism (CVE) programming in the Somali Cluster, and climate change
integration programming in the Karamoja cluster... In the Karamoja cluster the
program’s approach to Climate Change, NRM and Conflict is premised in the
idea that improvements in peace and security, contribute to communities’ abilities
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to cope with stress and shocks.

The manifestation of climate change as a factor in conflict was raised both
abstractly (i.e., how does climate change affect the program) and in the context of
specific geographies and initiatives by personnel, in reporting and planning documents,
and by program partners. Yet the struggle to conceptualize climate change in the context
of programming was a consistent frustration for the PEACE III team. As a result,
considerable effort was spent on trying to understand climate-conflict. For example,
PEACE III worked with the research firm International Business & Technical
Consultants (IBTCI) to develop an understanding of how climate change affects conflict
in the region. They also hired a local consulting firm to develop a user guide on climateconflict and train constituents in the topic. Yet, by most internal accounts, this work
offered very little to the program goals and outcomes.

Methodological Summary
In this section I describe the research methods that I draw upon for this work.
These descriptions focus on research done in the context of Mercy Corps and the two
programs of study rather than the research focused on governmental approaches to
climate-conflict (chapter 2). In each paper I describe the specific methods used to answer
the research questions at hand. The goal of outlining the methodology here is to draw
together the overall methodological approach which I used to trace the discursive
formation around climate change and conflict through to program implementation.
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I follow methodologies typical of institutional ethnography, namely a focus on
participant observation, textual analysis, and interviews (Billo & Mountz, 2016).
Originally coined by Dorothy Smith, a sociologist, institutional ethnography has its roots
in feminist and Marxist scholarship (Billo & Mountz, 2016; Devault, 2006; Smith, 1987;
Smith, 2006). The nature-society and science and technology studies literatures, both
within and beyond geography, have utilized institutional ethnography topics ranging from
the testing of nuclear weapons by American nuclear scientists at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (Gusterson, 1996) to how indigenous community associations
construct discourses that connect with transition networks in the Ecuadorian Amazon
(Perreault, 2003a, 2003b).
This dissertation fits within the institutional ethnography literature focused on the
intersection of development, the natural environment, and the production and impact of
discourse (Bebbington et al., 2004; Essex, 2013; Goldman, 2001a, 2001b, 2007; King,
2009; Moore, 1999; Thomas Perreault, 2003a, 2003b; Welker, 2014). This body of work
explicitly moves beyond the discourses evident in programmatic documents and seeks to
understand the inner working of organizations, and how teams and individuals interact
with external stakeholders – what (Welker, 2014) refers to as “the messy back stage”. As
described by (Bebbington et al., 2004 p.35) in relation to the Ferguson’s and Ecobar’s
seminal texts on the discourses of development (Escobar, 1988; Ferguson, 1990), “while
such analyses may reflect how the texts of development institutions can be and are read
from the outside, they say little about the actors, dynamics, and political processes
underlying the production of such texts.” That is, there is no ‘up there’ Discourse that
defines Development (Hart, 2004; Li, 1999; Moore, 1999; Simon, 2011) Rather
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discourses, are produced, reproduced, and negotiated in the processes of development
practice (Gardner & Lewis, 2000; LI, 2005). As further described by (Bebbington et al.,
2004, p. 38):
The World Bank might be viewed as a battlefield of knowledge with different arenas
in which the contests are waged: internally among its staff (the battlefield we focus on
here); externally with non-Bank actors and those encountered in the course of
implementing projects; and – more intriguingly – cross-border battles in which
different sub-communities within the Bank are linked to different communities
outside the Bank, and where the battles engage larger communities whose
memberships transcend institutional boundaries

The same can be said of not just Mercy Corps, but the programs of study –
PEACE III, BRACED – and each of the offices previously described. There were
constant negotiations based on priorities, positionalities, and prerogatives. Central to my
approach, and institutional ethnography more generally, is to triangulate understandings
of these processes within and across the institution(s) of study utilizing mixed methods
rooted in understand how the quotidian influences larger processes.

Direct observation
Direct observation consisted of a range of activities including attending training
and learning events, attending coordination and planning meetings, going to field sites,
participating in resilience assessments, attending meetings with local governance
officials, attending briefings, attending coordination meetings with other NGOs, and
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sitting on annual planning and annual review meetings. Essentially, I was able to observe
the day-to-day activities of development programming from the perspective of a wide
range of actors.
To capture these observations, I took detailed notes. While I did do some formal
interviews, some of the richest data came from interview-like informal conversations
grounded in the context of what I was observing. This middle ground proved to be a very
fruitful source of data as I was able to ask questions based on the immediate context. Due
to their informality and unplanned character, I do not characterize any of these
conversations as interviews. Some examples of these types of conversations include:
•

After getting a flat tire in an area that had, until recently, been considered
extremely dangerous, I had a long conversation about the intricacies of
navigating Karamoja’s landscape before and during the disarmament.

•

After a planning meeting, upon asking for clarification of a joke, I had a
detailed conversation with a Mercy Corps employee about the time he had
been ambushed and shot while in the field26 and how that affects his approach
to peace building.

•

Over lunch one of the Mercy Corps employees, a former ‘warrior’27,
explained in detail his experiences as a pastoralist and the shifting role of
guns, land, and tradition in Karamoja.

26

A note about the term ‘the field’. While not a contested term, exactly, it is flexible in its
meaning. Based on usage within Mercy Corps is, in essence, one step closer to the communities
Mercy Corps works with from wherever one predominantly exists. For example, a trip from
Kampala to the Moroto field office would be referred to as going to the field. A trip from Moroto
to a community site, a local government official’s office, or a project would also be referred to as
going to the field.
27
Warrior being a catch-all term for an armed pastoralist who took part in cattle raids
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•

Over tea, an employee confided in me about a problematic boss, helping shed
light on the internal politics that can complicate development.

•

Over beers, an employee of separate NGO explained to me challenges she had
recently been having with other NGOs, including Mercy Corps, relating to
learning events and ‘per diem’ culture.

To the extent that I was able to blend in, I tried.28 I relied on hand-written rather than
typed notes to further avoid calling attention to my presence. All notes were then typed
up in detail – and with reflections – at the end of each day. This practice with my field
notes was critical for description not just of the conversations, but the settings,
interactions, and insights from the day (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011).

Survey
In order to better understand the Karamoja context, I conducted a survey focused
on government officials in the region (n=103). The survey is included in the appendix.
When developing the survey I worked with multiple Mercy Corps employees to ensure
the questions were both understandable and applicable in the context of Karamoja. I also
tested the survey before formally implementing it, giving it to three employees of Mercy
Corps who role-played different governmental positions. The survey was designed to be
either administered orally or given directly to respondents to fill out manually. It was also

28

The Mercy Corps team largely got used to me sitting quietly and taking notes (as was
commented to me on my final day in Moroto during a send-off by the entire office).
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designed and tested to be completed in under 30 minutes out of respect for the officials’
time and to ensure all questions were answered with officials’ complete attention.
The survey focuses on the perspectives of local governance officials, primarily
Local Council 1s (LC1s)29, on 1) climate and environmental change; 2) conflict and
security; and 3) NGO activity. Because the majority of the population in Karamoja is
illiterate, the survey was most frequently administered orally in Karamajong by a
Karamajong woman who at the time was working part time for PEACE III (she is now a
full-time employee). This arrangement, which had the approval of senior Mercy Corps
officials, was critical for the data collection: it allowed her easy access to places of data
collection and the government officials themselves, offered her entry points to the
respondents, and allowed opportunities to conduct multiple surveys when, for example,
PEACE III would host trainings, learning events, or community mobilizations. Some
surveys were also filled out by hand by respondents attending PEACE III events.
The focus on local government officials was purposeful. My experiences
suggested that this population is aware of both the issues facing individuals in their
community and the more macro effects of policy and development. Moreover, because
the majority of the sample live in their respective communities, they could speak to the
day-to-day existential challenges facing their areas and how climate change, conflict, and
development relate to those challenges. This allowed considerable insight into the
shifting conflict, economic, and physical landscapes in the region. Furthermore, their
roles required interaction with my primary research topic: the development apparatus that

29

LC1 stands for Local Council 1. It is the most localized elected representative within the
Uganda system. They represent villages and report to an LC3 (who represents the sub-county)
who in turn reports to an LC5 (who represents the district). The LC1 can be conceptualized as a
combined village mayor and representative.
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exists in the region. Their perspective on development and economic change in the area
was deeply insightful.
I took multiple steps in the implementation of the survey to ensure conflicts of
interest were minimized and that government officials did not simply reflect development
discourses in order to ingratiate themselves to PEACE III. These included 1) designing
the survey such that questions about climate change and conflict were kept separate; 2)
working with my research assistant on how precisely to ask questions such that she would
not influence response; 3) building quantitative questions with space/probes for
qualitative explanations, which allowed topics to be broached non-normatively; 4)
considering how the questions about NGOs offered insight into how each respondent
viewed development efforts, this offered clarity into how development discourses
individuals’ responses; 5) ensuring that prior to each survey my research assistant
explained to respondents that this work was not for Mercy Corps and instead it was for
academic research, which the respondents understood. She also explained that their
responses would be kept strictly confidential; 6) targeting lower-level government
officials who were less likely to interact with development agencies.
Additionally, having someone who could ask questions in Karamojong and speak
to shared experiences in the region proved critical to the richness of the data. Based on
the respondents’ candor, including frank criticism of development efforts in the region
and of Mercy Corps, I do not think this connection with Mercy Corps had a significant
influence on the responses. Having support from Mercy Corps, however, made
identifying and accessing key officials far simpler.
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Gray Literature
Gray literature utilized in this research includes internal documents from the two
programs, such as quarterly and annual reports, the initial grant documents, internal
memos, and documents from partners. Many of these were provided to me directly by
Mercy Corps. I was also given access to Mercy Corps intranet for defined periods of time
when I was able to download these reports and other Mercy Corps material. These
documents provided direct insight into how the organization approached the relationship
between climate change and conflict, and development more generally. It also allowed
me to gain better insight into Mercy Corps strategy (e.g., via the Compass document) and
organizational structure. I restricted my downloads to documents that spoke directly to
the research. I also collected artefacts such as handouts at meetings, attendance lists, and
program activity summaries used in reporting. Finally, I utilized reports, briefs, and
policy documents available on the internet that are related to the research topic.

Interviews
Interviews varied greatly throughout the research, both in terms of approach and
content. Though semi-structured interviews with policy officials were at the heart of the
first stage of research, they did not play as important as a role for the research with Mercy
Corps. The informal conversations described above proved to be a far more fruitful tool
when compared with the results of formal interviews during these research stages. When
conducting interviews with Mercy Corps staff and partners, often they would repeat
broad development discourses and organizational talking points. This data, therefore, was
less useful than the observational data. As such, for the majority of data collection
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focused on Mercy Corps, I used interviews primarily to answer very specific questions
and patch knowledge gaps. For example, interviews were effective for learning about
NGO interaction with the government in the region, how individuals gauged the success
of programming, and questions about specific job functions. In total I conducted 39
interviews, 29 in the course of learning about the contemporary discourses of climate
change and conflict in the policy community and 10 interviews for the research focused
on BRACED, PEACE III and Mercy Corps.

Member Checking the Research
To enhance the validity of the findings (J. Maxwell, 2012, Chapter 6), I presented
my preliminary findings, over multiple stages, to key stakeholders within Mercy Corps
offices (see Table 1.6). In all cases, I presented the work and then facilitated a discussion.
I also explicitly pushed for areas of disagreement or issues that need to be further
explained. Generally, there was only limited disagreement with the research findings. For
example, I received some pushback on topics balancing the scale of the challenges with
the scope of Mercy Corps, a subject I discuss in chapter 4. Such pushback, however,
always led to nuanced conversations between people in the room that clarified my
interpretations and generally resolved our differences. In addition to vetting the findings,
this process also helped clarify the differences in Mercy Corps perceptions of climateconflict across different institutional positionalities.
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Table 1.6: Member Checking Dates and Descriptions

Location

Dates

Audience Description

Moroto – Peace III

October 30,

This focused on Moroto-based staff

2017

working directly on program
implementation of PEACE III;
predominantly Program Officers

Moroto – BRACED

October 30,

This focused on Moroto-based staff

2017

working directly on program
implementation of BRACED;
predominantly Program Officers and
Program Managers

Kampala – Uganda

November 3,

This focused on Country leadership and

Leadership

2017

included the Country Head, Director of
Uganda Programming, the Program
Director of PEACE III and other
programmatic leadership

Portland – TSU directors

January 16,

An interactive discussion whereby I

2018

walked through the findings with the
Deputy Director of the EEC

Portland – Organizational

January 17,

Senior officials within the organization

Leadership

2018

including the head of programming,
regional leads, the Director of Peace and
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Conflict, and other senior members of the
TSU had a roundtable discussion about the
work
Portland – Brown Bag: Entire

January 17,

This talk was open to the entire Portland

Organization

2018

office and was streamed online; it is still
available for the organization to watch.

Washington DC,

January 22,

Senior officials within the organization

Organizational Leadership

2018

including the Director of the EEC TSU,
VP of Technical Leadership, Policy and
Advocacy leaderships, and other senior
members of the TSU

Analysis
The qualitative data was entered into qualitative software (MAXQDA), coded for
specific themes, and then analyzed across these themes. The codes were developed
deductively during an initial review of the data, then refined to create a simpler schema
(Emerson et al., 2011). This process was done twice. The coding structure was then
utilized to review specific combinations of topic whereby I created a more granular set of
codes. From there key patterns were identified and examined based on specific criteria.
In total there are 20 primary codes, each with a range of 1-17 sub-codes. The data were
coded for descriptive factors (e.g., location and program), local variable (e.g., hazards
and conflict patterns), relationship dynamics (e.g., central government interactions with
implementing agencies), and a host of themes that relate closely to the papers in this
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dissertation (e.g., pressures on the landscape, barriers to implementation, scale, and
Mercy Corps processes).
For the survey data, my research assistant and I went through each survey one-byone with her reading responses so that I could input each answer into Microsoft Excel. We
then double checked the data to make sure it was all inputted correctly by going through
each document a second time. The data for the survey was organized in multiple ways: 1)
biophysical impacts of climate change 2) listed socioeconomic impacts of climate change
3) current climate change adaptation; 4) listed long-term concerns about climate change
5) interactions with NGOs. Qualitatively the data were reviewed and analyzed for
patterns that align with the coding structure used in analyzing interview and observation
data. I also created Boolean columns for some columns to allow for quantitative analysis
for specific categories (e.g., the specific biophysical and socioeconomic impacts of
climate change, recent security challenges, and adaptation efforts). In these instances,
listed answers were given a yes/no code. Descriptive statistics were then used to identify
patterns within the quantitative data. Then specific tests were conducted to examine
correlation and relationships across different variables. This process principally informs
the Chapter 3 which focuses on Karamoja.

Positionality and Mercy Corps
Mercy Corps was an object of study, but they were also my host. And,
collectively, they were generous and gracious hosts. I used their Internet, bathrooms, and
electricity. I rode in their cars to and from the field, drank their water, and was always
invited to office-wide lunches. The Kenya Country Director picked me up on my first day
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of field work, I joined team dinners in Portland, and enjoyed day-long goat roasts awash
with local brew in Karamoja alongside Mercy Corps employees. Their logistics team
helped facilitate travel, employees described to me their frustrations about their work, and
I was privy to office gossip. On occasion, I provided minor input or answered technical
questions related to programming and strategy. However, the staff all understood my
positionality as a researcher. And I never concealed my intention to understand climateconflict processes through Mercy Corps programming.
As an outsider, I was seen by many as both a sympathetic ear and potentially an
important voice. Therefore, Mercy Corps staff often shared concerns and frustrations
with me, unsolicited. For example, the drivers would often describe to me the
(compelling) reasons Mercy Corps ought to budget for better tires. Likewise, others saw
me as an easy and safe way to vent about other teams, rules and policies, and other
frustrations without risk of consequence. Some staff, who just wanted to be helpful, went
out of their way to show me a document or share an anecdote that they thought could be
informative. Having these sorts of experiences greatly aided the research. Moreover,
because I was able to spend considerable time in the Karamoja and attend key meetings
with, for example, the EEC team my perspective was not heavily filtered.

Summary
In this chapter I situated this work within the literature, outlined the geographies
of this research, described Mercy Corps and the two programs of study (i.e., the research
sites), and the research methods that link the themes and papers that follow in the
proceeding sections. In sum, this research centers on understanding how a particular
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organization, through two particular programs, seeks to address climate-conflict. It is
clear that the organization is far from monolithic and programming can be steered or
altered as it traverses the many stages along the policy-to-implementation continuum.
Program implementation, even when defined by a clear set of programmatic goals,
introduces complex questions related to geography and inter and intra-organizational
interests. Mercy Corps, in part because of its size, complexity, and breadth of focus,
offers a productive vantage point from which to draw insight into the path of discourses
of climate change and conflict as they travel from policy to implementation. In the next
section of this dissertation, I present three core papers that demonstrate how climateconflict discourses affect policy making, how climate-conflict interactions took place in
Karamoja, and ultimately, what it meant to develop programming targeting climateconflict overlap.
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Introduction
While there has been considerable research examining the mechanisms and extent
to which climate change does – or does not – affect, exacerbate, or trigger conflict (e.g.,
Barnett & Adger, 2007; Buhaug, 2014, 2015; Burke, Hsiang, & Miguel, 2015; Devlin &
Hendrix, 2014; Gemenne, Barnett, Adger, & Dabelko, 2014; Hsiang et al., 2013; Ide,
Link, Scheffran, & Schilling, 2016; Kelley et al., 2015; Nordås & Gleditsch, 2015;
Raleigh, Choi, & Kniveton, 2015; Rüttinger et al., 2015; Salehyan, 2014; Selby, 2014;
Selby, Dahi, Fröhlich, & Hulme, 2017), there has been far less research conducted on
how policy institutions approach, understand, and seek to address the connections
between climate change, conflict, and security (e.g., Floyd, 2015; Hayes & Knox-Hayes,
2014; McDonald, 2015; Scott, 2015). This gap persists despite institutions’ clear interests
in the topic. This article, through the study of US institutional actors concerned with
climate change and security, furthers the understanding of how policy-makers frame the
question of climate-security linkages and envision the policy implications of those
linkages.
The idea that climate change can influence security and/or conflict is no longer
confined to climate change or security specialists (Floyd, 2008, 2010; Salehyan, 2014;
Swyngedouw, 2010; Szasz, 2016). For instance, speeches and statements by highranking political officials including former President Obama, former Secretary of State
Kerry, former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, former Secretary of
Defense Chuck Hagel, former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, and current Secretary
of Defense James Mattis reference climate change as a security risk (Carter, 2016;
Clapper, 2013; Hagel, 2014b; Obama, 2015b, 2015a; Pecquet, 2014; Revkin, 2017).
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Additionally, statements by vocal, high-ranking military officials (e.g., CNA, 2007,
2014), and popular media uptake of well-publicized academic articles on climate-conflict
linkages (e.g., Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2013; Kelley et al., 2015) have further
mainstreamed the potential linkages between climate change and conflict (climateconflict) and climate change and security (climate-security)31 in the discourses of
policymaking in the US . This shift is visible in the inclusion of climate change as a
security concern in a range of policy documents (e.g., Hagel, 2014a, 2014b; Obama,
2015a) and on-the-record comments by senior officials in the US Government (e.g.,
Kerry, 2015; Obama, 2015b, 2016b). Furthermore, despite broad shifts in the US
Government’s approaches to climate change following the election of Donald Trump, the
discourses of climate change and security within its policy institutions have largely gone
unchanged.
This article examines US-based policy actors’ and organizations’ approaches to
climate change and security. The US represents a unique but critical case as it relates to
the policy uptake of climate-security discourses (Busby, 2008). It has the world’s largest
military and aid budget, it is the largest per capita emitter of greenhouse gases, and there
is considerable political tension around the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate
change (Dunlap, McCright, & Yarosh, 2016). Thus, while in many ways a product of the
US’s particular political climate and institutions, US framings of this relationship and
policies such framings enable will have an outsized impact on climate-security policy and
practice worldwide (Busby, 2008).

31

Climate-security offers a broader framing than climate-conflict to include indirect threats such as food
and water security that can lead to conflict outcomes
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I begin this article with a review of the literature, primarily focusing on climatesecurity discourses emerging from the current state of knowledge. I then describe the
research methods informing this paper before turning to the approaches to climatesecurity amongst the US policy community. I close the paper with a discussion of the
lack of sectoral or organizational consistency in approaches to climate-security within
this community or even within particular governmental agencies, and demonstrate that
despite a growing demand for policy addressing the connection between climate and
security, there are considerable challenges in conceptualizing how to respond to climate
change as a threat multiplier.

Climate and Security: The State of Knowledge
Climate-security discourses have their roots in and closely parallel those of
environmental security (Detraz & Betsill, 2009; Floyd, 2008, 2010). Links between the
environment and security risks are often made to draw political attention to
environmental issues that are otherwise treated as low political priorities (Trombetta,
2008). The impact of the environmental security discourse on policy were most evident in
the mid-1990s. This could be seen most clearly following the publication of Robert
Kaplan’s article ‘The Coming Anarchy’ in The Atlantic Monthly. That article (and later a
book of the same title) helped mainstream the environmental security discourse in the US
and received significant attention in policy circles (Floyd, 2008; R. Kaplan, 1994, 2001;
Levy, 1995). However, many scholars dismissed the article, and the associated
discourses, as a variation of environmental determinism that did not acknowledge that
environmental degradation is a stressor, that rarely, if ever, causes violent conflict (e.g.,
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Gleditsch, 1998; Levy, 1995).
Policy officials, most prominently senior staff within the Clinton White House,
were directly influenced by Kaplan and Thomas Homer-Dixon (whom Kaplan cited
extensively, but selectively) (Levy, 1995). Indeed, Homer-Dixon twice briefed Vice
President Gore on topics of environmental security (Floyd, 2008), Senior officials began
to cite environmental change and potential resource conflict as issues of national security
leading to both sweeping statements and the creation of high-level positions such as the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security (Dabelko & Simmons,
1997; Levy, 1995). As described by (Levy, 1995, p. 35) “President Clinton was reported
to have scribbled marginal notes on his personal copy, and citation of it became
practically de rigueur for Cabinet members appearing before Congress.” However, the
discourse of Kaplan’s article, which drew on neo-Malthusian framings of scarcity and
conflict, did not reflect the complex and contextual realities of how environmental
change can affect conflict outcomes (Deudney, 1990; Gleditsch, 1998; Matthew, 1995).
Over time, the lack of alignment between the more alarmist framings of environmental
security and the complex reality of how environmental change can alter security
outcomes damaged, or at least watered down, efforts to elevate environmental issues to a
political concern akin to traditional conceptualizations of security (Conca & Dabelko,
2002; Floyd, 2008; Gleditsch, 1998; Peluso & Watts, 2001).
Much like the emergence of the environmental security discourse, those looking
to advance climate-related policy have leveraged the climate-security discourse to elevate
climate change beyond routine administration and into high politics by linking it to
national security concerns (Conca & Dabelko, 2002; Dalby, 2016; O’Lear & Dalby,
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2016; Oels, 2015; Swyngedouw, 2010; Szasz, 2016). The present-day climate-security
discourse emerged circa-2007 (Dalby, 2015; Floyd, 2010; Lewis & Lenton, 2015;
Methmann & Rothe, 2012). At this time, climate change was increasingly being framed
as a national security concern that could drive instability and conflict by actors in the US
and beyond (Floyd, 2010; Lewis & Lenton, 2015; Methmann & Rothe, 2012). This
framing was, at least in part, driven by the difficulties of getting climate change
prioritized as a domestic or international political topic (Swyngedouw, 2010; Trombetta,
2008). At the same time, high-profile reports linking conflict in Darfur to climate change
(e.g., UNEP, 2007), the first debate by the UN Security Council on climate change as a
security threat (Scott, 2015; United Nations, 2007), and statements by military officials
about climate change (CNA 2007) helped shift the once esoteric arguments about climate
change and conflict firmly into the mainstream (Dalby, 2016; Detraz & Betsill, 2009;
Floyd, 2010; Lewis & Lenton, 2015; McDonald, 2013; Meierding, 2013; Methmann &
Rothe, 2012).
Exemplifying the rapid ascent of this field of study are the fourth and fifth IPCC
assessment reports (AR4, AR5) released, respectively, in 2007 and 2014 (Gleditsch &
Nordås, 2014; IPCC, 2014). Gleditsch and Nordås argue that that while AR4 lacked
systematic research that examined climate-security connections, AR5 paid close attention
to climate-security debates across multiple chapters (Gleditsch & Nordås, 2014; IPCC,
2007, 2014; Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007). Over that same period, the climate-security
discourses have become significantly more nuanced, with the relationship decreasingly
framed as causal. Gleditsch and Nordås (2014) highlight IPCC WGII chapter 15, ‘Human
Security’, as exemplary in this regard (Adger et al., 2014; Gleditsch & Nordås, 2014).
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As with the wider environmental security discourse, the political ramifications of
overstepping the evidence for the connection between climate change and conflict were
evident during data collection for this research. For example, multiple scholars have
challenged the claims that conflict in Darfur was climate-driven, demonstrating that the
links between climate change and the conflict were overstated, if not outright incorrect
(Hartmann, 2010; Kevane & Gray, 2008; Selby & Hoffmann, 2014a; Tertrais, 2011). In
the course of the research represented in this article, research participants, often
unprompted, noted that past overstatements of the climate-conflict link, including
regarding Darfur, have negatively impacted the perceived credibility and legitimacy of
the broader climate-security discussion.
Though the relationship between climate change, conflict, and security is a
subject of ongoing academic debate (Benjaminsen, 2016; Buhaug et al., 2014; Buhaug &
Nordkvelle, 2014; Burke et al., 2015; Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2014; Kelley et al.,
2015; Nordkvelle, 2014; Salehyan, 2014; Selby et al., 2017), policy communities have
largely – though not ubiquitously – accepted the idea that climate change is a security
concern, most often framing this relationship as a ‘threat multiplier’ (Abrahams & Carr,
2017). This term was popularized by a 2007 report from the Center for Naval Analysis
(CNA), a security-focused think tank, entitled ‘National Security and the Threat of
Climate Change’ (CNA, 2007). The threat multiplier frame suggests that the impacts of
climate change will not cause conflict, but rather can hasten, exacerbate, or trigger
conflicts (CNA, 2007). For example, shifting weather patterns might lead to acute
resource shortages or price shocks, which in turn exacerbate the risk of conflict in a
particular place. Despite a relatively recent reframing of climate change by CNA as a
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‘conflict catalyst’ (CNA, 2014), the threat multiplier remains the most common way to
understand the relationship between climate change and security (Abrahams & Carr,
2017). Despite the near-ubiquity of this framing, a clear articulation of associated policy
prescriptions has not followed. This can be attributed, in part, to the vagueness and
linearity of the threat multiplier discourse, which frames climate change primarily driving
conflict without accounting for either the potential role of climate change in
peacebuilding and cooperation or the potential of conflict to lead to climate change
vulnerability (Abrahams & Carr, 2017).
There have been multiple efforts to consolidate the different methodological,
epistemological, and disciplinary perspectives emerging around the connection between
climate and security. Literature reviews (e.g., Gilmore, 2017; Ide, 2017; Lewis & Lenton,
2015), as well as the Human Security IPCC chapter in AR5 (Adger et al., 2014), special
issue journals dedicated to questions of climate-security including Climatic Change
(2014), Current Climate Change Reports (2017), Geopolitics (2014), Journal of Peace
Research (2012), and Political Geography (2007, 2014)), and reviews targeting policy
makers (e.g., Rüttinger et al., 2015; Stark, 2014) have all helped to organize the wide, and
at times contradictory, findings in a literature that crosses disciplines, methodological
orientations, and theoretical positionalities. Collectively, these reviews identify the
following points of consensus in the literature (Abrahams & Carr, 2017):
•

The relationship between climate change and conflict is not causal; it is widely
acknowledged that climate change interacts with a host of other issues to produce
conflict (or build peace).

•

While the places most likely to be affected by climate change-affected conflict
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have preexisting tensions and are likely to have limited capacity to cope with
climatic shifts, focusing heavily on places with a reliance on primary production
and limited adaptive capacity overly- constrains our understanding of conflict
outcomes.
•

Conflict increases vulnerability to climate change.

•

Adaptation efforts can trigger conflict.
These points of consensus are very broad and thus leave many important

questions regarding the integration of climate-security into policy priorities unanswered
(Lewis & Lenton, 2015; Meierding, 2013). These questions include, but are not limited
to, the epistemological implications of the spatial and temporal scales at which climatesecurity is understood (Gemenne et al., 2014; Lewis & Lenton, 2015; Salehyan, 2014),
the question of who’s or what’s security is of concern (Barnett, 2001; McDonald, 2013),
and whether climate change has, in fact, experienced securitization, and what
securitization might mean for policy-making institutions.(Boas, 2015; Hartmann, 2014;
Mason, 2014; Oels, 2015; Oels, 2012).
Collectively, these questions reveal the fundamental challenges inherent to
translating the disparate understanding of climate-security connections into actionable
policy (Boas & Rothe, 2016; Floyd, 2015; Hayes & Knox-Hayes, 2014; Lewis & Lenton,
2015; Scott, 2015). This article illuminates the ways in which individuals and
organizations tasked with developing and implementing policy and programming
understand the connection between climate and security, and use those understandings to
identify problems to be addressed and the solutions to those problems.
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Research Methods
The data for this article was gathered through participant observation, document
analysis, and semi-structured interviews. Data collection was informed by grounded
theory, whereby with all data sources, the goal was to reach saturation when no new key
ideas or themes emerged during data collection (Corbin & Strauss, 2008 p. 6). The use of
multiple methods allowed for findings to be triangulated across multiple sources (Corbin
& Strauss, 2008), thus deepening and reinforcing saturation.
I conducted participant observation at conferences and meetings directly
addressing the connections between climate and security (n=16). During these events I
took detailed fieldnotes about presentations, panel discussions, and questions and answers
following the presentations and panels. I identified appropriate events through my
professional network, information hubs centered on the topic, and through
recommendations from research participants. I attended these events in person whenever
possible (n=7), though I also participated in public webinars offered by the Security and
Sustainability Forum and the Center for Climate and Security. I supplemented participant
observation with resources available on the Internet. That includes watching additional
panels and presentations hosted by the Woodrow Wilson Center, the World Affairs
Council, and the Henry Jackson Foundation.
My document analysis rests on the examination of documents issued by the U.S.
Government (USG) and its partners (i.e, organizations funded by or directly informing
the USG such as the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Center for Climate and Security, and
Mercy Corps), as well as white papers, blog posts, technical reports, op-eds, and internal
memos from organizations actively working on climate-security. Documents were

139

identified through Internet searches, cross-checking references in academic and gray
literature, and suggestions from research participants. They provided insight into the
‘official’ discourse of organizations, which I then used to compare with individual
understandings that emerged during observation and interviews. In total, 64 documents
were incorporated into my analysis. Since this stage of data collection commenced prior
to interviews and observation, I searched for a broad domain of documents in order to
identify key themes and questions, which were then considered in interviews and
analysis.
I conducted semi-structured interviews with 29 individuals working directly on
climate-security who either worked for the US Government (n=18) including the
Department of Defense (DoD), State Department, and the Agency for International
Development (USAID) or organizations working closely with the US government (n=11)
(e.g., NGOs working closely with USAID and think tanks whose goal is to influence and
inform US policy).32 The majority of interviews (n=24) were recorded and transcribed,
though in select instances research participants asked that I do not record primarily due to
the sensitivity of the topic and their position in the United States Government (n=5).
Interview questions focused on participants’ engagement with climate-security,
perceptions of the validity of the connections between climate change and insecurity, and
potential policy responses. Interview participants were identified at the conferences and
events where participant observation took place, through my professional networks, and
by reaching out to specialists in the field. Sampling was based on a snowball method

32

The empirical data collection done for this research was predominantly done prior to the election of
Donald Trump. All interviews were done with individuals who were part of the Obama administration.
Many, however, continue to hold roles underneath the Trump administration.
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whereby I asked for references from initial participants to identify later participants.
Some participants were interviewed twice, allowing me to member check key findings
(i.e., present preliminary findings to research participants) (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).
The data I gathered through these methods were entered into qualitative analysis
support software (MAXQDA) and coded. A total of 107 unique codes were created
across 11 categories, including sectors, role, participants’ perceptions of climate-security
connections, perceptions of other sectors, definitions of key terms, and
challenges/strategies in addressing the connection between climate and security. This
coding allowed an alignment of core themes based on sector, organization, and role,
which facilitated an identification of the different ways that research participants
conceptualize climate-security, their approaches to understanding and addressing the
issue, and the sorts of policies – if any – they see as central to addressing the link.

Research Participants, Categorizations, and Description of Interview Participants
The connections between climate and security inherently engage a diverse
community. The sectors represented by the research participants can be broken into three
categories: defense, development, and environment. Each is described below, as is the
total number of individuals interviewed from that category. These categories reflect the
self-identification of research participants, which coincides as well with the primary
focus of their organization as well as their individual role within that organization.

Defense – this category consists of individuals working for defense or national securityoriented organizations, including operational organizations such as the Department of
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Defense (DoD), organizations focused on intelligence gathering and analysis, securityfocused think tanks, and organizations otherwise focused on US national security (n=15).

Development – this category consists of individuals working for donors such as USAID,
implementing organizations, development-focused think tanks, and diplomacy-focused
organizations (i.e., the US State Department). Individuals working for humanitarian
assistance-focused organizations were also categorized as development actors due to the
structure of the sample and the individuals’ focus (n=10).

Environmental – this category consists of any individual working for organizations that
are primarily focused on natural resources or natural resource management. Most present
in this discussion are international NGOs and multilateral organizations working on
implementation of programming with environmental goals or on environmental
advocacy. Despite employing a snowball sampling strategy and starting with an
individual who was classified as an environmental actor, this was the least represented
group (n=4). I explain this low number below.

The higher proportion of defense and development-focused actors relative to
environmental actors does not represent a sampling bias – explicit attempts were made to
get a broader perspective from those in the environmental sector. Instead, the formulation
of the sample is largely representative of the community at large, which is more heavily
represented by defense and development organizations and actors rather than those
representing more explicit environmental goals and priorities. Nonetheless, to ensure the
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widest possible engagement, I sought out individuals with an environmental background
following initial data collection. When asking for references from research participants, I
made explicit requests for references for individuals working for environmental
organizations. The vast majority of references remained for individuals focused on either
the defense or development aspects of the connection between climate and security. As I
will demonstrate below, however, while those I interviewed worked in particular sectors,
the discourses of climate change and conflict they employed were not confined to those
sectors.

Results
The data demonstrate that there are three distinct but overlapping themes that link
climate-security discourses to questions of policy development. These themes, though not
mutually exclusive, reflect how policy organizations and actors approach climatesecurity:
1) A challenge of adaptation and resilience: Climate-security connections are
framed as an issue of risk to be managed through adaptation and/or resiliency
efforts. The majority of interview participants invoked this theme.
2) A potent political tool for elevating climate change in the policy world:
Climate-security connections are a means of motivating people to ‘act on
climate’; to galvanize those who have been uninterested in the issue of climate
change or to bring on board those who question the science behind it. This
theme was prevalent, but less common amongst participants than the first

143

frame. It was, however, very common in official documents, speeches, and
op-eds.
3) A topic of limited importance and feasibility: Climate-security connections are
either insignificant as a conflict driver, irrelevant in development
programming, or impossible to address for particular sectors. This was the
least commonly-referenced theme across all forms of data.

It is of note that many participants mobilized multiple themes (n=15) including
eight defense actors, four development actors, and three environmental actors. Those
referencing two themes almost entirely linked questions of adaptation and mitigation (i.e.,
themes one and two). This can be explained, in part, by the connections between multiple
themes seen in the broader discourses of climate and conflict presented in speeches and
policy documents. For example, speeches given by President Barack Obama and
Secretary John Kerry were heavily focused on adaptation challenges as they relate to
climate-security (Kerry, 2015; Obama, 2015b; also see Figure 2.1). These adaptation
arguments were then used to highlight the need for mitigation efforts such as pricing
carbon emissions or garnering support for reaching a global climate accord.

A challenge of adaptation and resilience
The most common expression of climate-security in the context of US policy is
that climate change is a “threat multiplier” such that climate change impacts can increase
communities’ and places’ vulnerability or exposure to shocks and stressors, which, in
turn, increases the likelihood and/or impact of conflict, thus decreasing overall security.
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This was expressed consistently in official documents as well as by research participants.
For example, as described in the 2014 Quaddrenial Defense Review (Hagel, 2014b, p. 8):
Climate change may exacerbate water scarcity and lead to sharp increases in food
costs. The pressures caused by climate change will influence resource competition
while placing additional burdens on economies, societies, and governance
institutions around the world. These effects are threat multipliers that will
aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation, political
instability, and social tensions – conditions that can enable terrorist activity and
other forms of violence.

This framing of climate change as a threat multiplier implies that the mitigation of
climate-related conflict can be achieved by efforts to address shocks and stressors
through adaptation or resilience-building efforts. Multiple research participants used
some variation of the terms ‘threat minimizer’ or ‘threat mitigation’ to describe their
understanding and/or efforts in this arena. For example, as noted by Informant 21, a
development practitioner who worked for an implementing organization:
In that we need to look at this connection [between climate change and security]
within the larger development spectrum, so let's look at vulnerabilities in terms of
what are the underlying vulnerabilities in development. And then how are these
multiplied by climate change? Climate change is really seen as a multiplier effect
in terms of risk and in vulnerabilities to development. Adaptation tries to mitigate
that risk.
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The implementation of “threat mitigation” was plagued by difficulties in
conceptualizing what constitutes policy and programming that address the connection
between climate and security. This gap was a common theme at conferences and was
brought up unprompted by many interview participants. For example, when describing
climate-security topics that needed more research, a majority of interview participants
consistently noted the need for more granular information about the processes that link
climate change to insecurity, ways to identify inflection points that would limit the effects
of climate change on insecurity through policy and programming, and the types of
adaptation efforts that could address the challenges of climate change as a threat
multiplier. In short, there remain deep uncertainties regarding how, and where, to adapt
or build resilience to the joint challenges of climate change and security. Referencing
these challenges, Informant 20, who worked for USAID, described the challenges of
funding structures and institutional mandates that can inhibit policy efforts targeting
climate-security:
The ways that climate change and conflict issues are interacting in the world are
so fundamentally interdisciplinary and your entry point could be, for example,
rule of law to solve the problem. Your entry point could be economic
development. But that stuff is not called climate adaptation and can’t be attributed
to the earmark33. Maybe your best entry point is a bunch of paralegals to do X, Y,
and Z. [Adding in a joking tone] But that is not a climate adaptation intervention,
so you can’t do it.

33

In this context earmark is shorthand for the sectoral area from which the money is drawn. Therefore,
earmarks define for what money can be used for and the type of intervention.
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A potent political tool for elevating climate change in the policy world
The political potency of the threat multiplier discourse is readily apparent in the
US, where climate change is viewed often in partisan political terms (Dunlap et al., 2016;
Hornsey et al., 2016; Leiserowitz et al., 2014). Linking climate change to security – in
particular, national security – potentially shifts the political landscape as it offers a
message, and messengers, viewed as more appealing to right-leaning political actors who
may be uninterested in, or unconvinced by, the scientific consensus on anthropogenic
climate change. Although the political potency framing was less prevalent than the
adaptation/resiliency framing, multiple research participants framed the connection
between climate change and national security as a motivator for addressing climate
change with policy (in particular mitigation-focused initiatives) both nationally and
internationally.
Multiple research participants argued that shifting the messenger on climate
change – even if the message largely stayed the same – would shift the left-right split
around climate action in the US. In this argument, having high-ranking military members
and national security-focused institutions emphasizing the ways in which climate change
multiplies security threats is a way to bring constituencies who have previously been
disengaged from or actively against climate action due to their perceived political
leanings into efforts to address climate change. For example, Informant 5, who had
decades of experience in the United States Military, described why military institutions
and personnel are, theoretically, more effective at convincing non-traditional audiences to
care about climate-security and climate change more generally:
These guys are not wide-eyed radicals; they don’t fall for every fad and next shiny
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object. These guys are busy. They go and fight and win America’s war when they
are called upon to do so. They are concerned with climate change – that ought to
concern you guys. Because these guys are not lightweights. They are only
concerned about shit that’s real. They are only concerned about stuff that’s going
to impact their basing, their training, their ability to respond. So I think that’s the
real contribution that we’ve made. People believe us… We’re not doing this for
fun. We’re not doing this because it’s cool. We’re not doing this because we’re
liberal; we’re not tree huggers. We’re doing this because we believe this is going
to affect our ability to base, to train, to respond.

The allusion to high-ranking US military actors, the US military as an institution,
and the concept of climate change as factor in US national security has become a
common thread in the political discourse centered on acting on climate change. This
framing was an effort to move climate change beyond an abstract risk in far flung places
to a concrete security issue that stresses US interests. It was evident, for example, in
President Obama’s speech to the 2015 Coast Guard’s graduating class (Obama, 2015b),
Secretary Kerry’s speech at Old Dominion University entitled “Remarks on Climate
Change and National Security” (Kerry, 2015); and President Obama’s 2015 and 2016
State of the Union Addresses (Obama, 2015a, 2016). For example, in the 2015 address
Obama noted (2015):
The best scientists in the world are all telling us that our activities are changing
the climate, and if we do not act forcefully, we'll continue to see rising oceans,
longer, hotter heat waves, dangerous droughts and floods, and massive disruptions
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that can trigger greater migration, conflict, and hunger around the globe. The
Pentagon says that climate change poses immediate risks to our national security.
We should act like it.

Allusions to the connection between climate change and national security, US
military efforts on climate change, and individuals such as those in CNA’s Military
Advisory Board34 (e.g., Hagel, 2014a, 2014b), all relying upon the threat multiplier
discourse, were prevalent in op-eds, speeches, and articles in the weeks and months
leading up to the December 2015 Conference of the Parties (COP) in Paris. For example,
on October 22nd, 2015, three weeks before the Paris COP, the Partnership for a Secure
America (PSA), an organization with an aim “to advance bipartisanship on today’s
critical national security and foreign policy challenges,” issued a statement and
advertisement, including a full-page advertisement in the Wall Street Journal, that touted
bipartisan support of action on climate change based on the security risks it poses.
The advertisement shown in Figure 2.1 reflects a political argument that rests on
an overarching discourse of climate-security informed by key aspects of the threat
multiplier. In it, a man, presumably a member of the U.S. military, is perched in a
helicopter solemnly scanning a devastating flood of what appears to be New Orleans; the
American Flag patched to his uniform sits at the forefront of the screen. The message is
clear, climate change no longer exists in as a future, abstract concern. It is a ‘threat
multiplier’ challenging US national security at home and abroad. The advertisement is
signed by a host of dignitaries, government officials, and security leaders. It is of note
34

The Military Advisory Board a group of high-ranking, retired military officials advocating for climate
action from a military perspective
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that much as in the case of those who were interviewed for this article, the 48 signatories
were mostly comprised of individuals from defense-focused organizations with only one
from an organization focused on environmental or natural resource management issues,
Christine Todd Whitman, the Environmental Protection Agency administrator from 2001
– 2003. Notably, Whitman is a Republican, reflecting this advertisement’s clear efforts to
engage those seen to be politically outside the climate action community.

Figure 2.1: An Advertisement in the Wall Street Journal Touting the Need to Address
Climate Change for the Purposes of National Security

150

Evident in the desire to rely upon the military as a neutral arbiter of the
seriousness of climate change is the perception that other sectors, in particular the
environmental sector, is not. It was expressed by multiple research participants, both
implicitly and explicitly, that the political potency of the connection between climate
change and security exists in its apparent political centrality and neutrality, but that
neutrality can come into doubt when it is presented by individuals, organizations, or
sectors that are perceived to be left leaning on the political spectrum, Informant 1, who
worked at a think tank focused on defense issues, perceived the climate-security
discussion as critical in shifting the political landscape on climate change from a leftleaning issue to a bi-partisan issue. This individual clearly linked the environmental
sector with a political leaning, and association that would limit the efficacy of climatesecurity conversations:
[We don’t] want to work too closely with them [the environmental community],
because we want to be – they're portrayed and seen as on the left-leaning side of
the spectrum – and we want to be bipartisan. So we don’t come out on the policies
and things more to the left because it would harm some of our credibility with the
center and the right.

As noted by Informant 7, a researcher with a focus on defense topics who saw the
connection between climate and security primarily as a political motivator, “In
conservative circles, if [the climate-security] nexus becomes painted as environmental, it
is a non-starter.” In other words, though not actively being blocked out, the
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environmental community is seen as unwelcome in these broader discussions for risk of
watering down the political potency of the climate-security argument or shifting it from a
perceived-as politically neutral argument to a concern for left-leaning actors.

A topic of limited importance and utility
Though less common than the first two approaches, those who expressed this
theme explicitly questioned the merit of attempting to address the connections between
climate change and security. Those invoking this theme did not necessarily question
climate change’s potential to act as a threat multiplier, but rather whether policy
institutions had the capacity to address it as such.
This perspective was notably uncommon in policy documents describing climatesecurity. Participants ascribing to this view often acknowledged the existence of a link
between climate change, conflict, and security, but saw policy efforts targeting these
linkages as either redundant with broader efforts to address climate change or impossible
to address. As noted by Informant 23 who worked for the State Department and
describing what he saw as an unhelpful focus on climate-security linkages:
There is a specter of climate and security that I’ve sort of evolved over the past
few years to just throwing up my hands about it. I don’t question the overall
concept. I think, yes, we are entering a very volatile phase of resource whatever
you want to call it…. But, again, I think when you take it out of the abstract
academic debate what does that mean exactly? And what kind of response is that
going to require? Better forecasting? We need better forecasting anyway. Better
water management? Well we need better storage and water management anyway.
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Linking climate change to a particular conflict is enormously difficult. It requires
identifying pathways through which a biophysical event is translated into a human
impact, often in complex ecologies and economies, and often in spatially unconfined
places across multiple temporal scales. Because the knowledge base on how (and where)
climate change does (or does not) affect conflict remains coarse, explicitly acting on the
connection between climate and security is extremely difficult, and according to some,
quixotic. Those who voiced this theme raised concerns regarding the opportunity costs of
shifting of funding and human capital towards addressing connections between climate
and security. For example, as noted by Informant 27, who worked for USAID:
I think there is a lot of uncertainty about the links between climate stress and other
environmental stress and what sparks, what leads to conflict. So reorienting a lot of
our programming to address a very uncertain linkage, I don’t think is a good idea.

Though less common than the other two perspectives, the salience of this
perspective is reflected in the challenges outlined in the first theme, and the fact that the
second is largely focused on more generic mitigation policy. That is, these participants
are all reflecting an observed reality that reacting and responding to the links between
climate change and security –i.e., developing threat minimizers – is at best incredibly
challenging and at worst quixotic.
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Continuity of Discourse in the US Policy Community
Naturally, political change can drive changes in policy discourses. The most
apparent shift to the climate-security political landscape in the US is the election of
President Donald Trump. Despite some notable changes in policy related to climate
change more generally, both in the official capacity of the administration (e.g., exit from
the Paris Accord) and in broader discourses of climate change (e.g., ambiguity in the
President’s acknowledgement of anthropogenic climate change), the discourses of and
approaches to the connections between climate change and security appear consistent
with those that held sway under the Obama administration. There are numerous examples
that demonstrate the relative stability of the policy discourses around climate change and
conflict in the context of a transition from the Obama administration to the Trump
administration.
For instance, at a public briefing entitled The National Security Implications of
Climate Change, held on June 5th, 2017, focused on climate change’s role as a threat
multiplier. The moderator, John Conger, a former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense, alluded to the new administration, asked the rhetorical question of whether past
attention to climate-conflict and climate-security connections from the DoD under
President Obama were primarily political or whether “there is really a core national
security issue that drives the DoD’s interest in the impacts of climate change.” He then
brought up comments by President Trump’s Secretary of Defense James Mattis to
demonstrate that the military’s efforts were, in fact, not politically driven. Secretary
Mattis, reflecting the theme that climate change represents a challenge for adaptation and
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resilience – in this case altering DoD strategy and efforts to prepare for shifting threats
and resource access, issued the following statement during his confirmation process
(Revkin, 2017):
I agree that the effects of a changing climate — such as increased maritime access to
the Arctic, rising sea levels, desertification, among others — impact our security
situation. I will ensure that the department continues to be prepared to conduct
operations today and in the future, and that we are prepared to address the effects of a
changing climate on our threat assessments, resources, and readiness.

In a similar vein, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Paul J.
Selva, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on July 18, 2017, described
potential national risks in the Middle East North Africa region, the Sahel, and the Horn of
Africa in relation to a changing climate (Revkin, 2017; Werrell & Femia, 2017):
The dynamics that are happening in our climate will drive uncertainty and will drive
conflict… you could look at the decimation of the fisheries off Somalia that
contributed to piracy because the fishermen couldn’t make their livelihood by doing
what they do best, which is fishing on the fishing grounds off of Somalia. So I think
we need to be prepared for those. It will cause us to have to address questions like
humanitarian disaster relief. It will also cause us to have to focus on places where
climate instability might cause actual political instability in regions of the world we
hadn’t previously had to pay attention to.
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The Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman both emphasized the need to
address the security challenges posed by climate change, and in doing so mobilized one
of the themes common in Obama-era discourse on this issue, suggests that this discourse
is resilient in the face of substantial political change. However, policy continuity without
clarity regarding the means of response to this challenge does little to inform concrete
actions by those working in the development, defense, and environment sectors.

Discussion
Amongst those interviewed, the most common theme in the discourse connecting
climate change and security is that the security risks posed by climate change are a
question of adaptation and resilience; 26 of 29 respondents (89.7%) reflected it as such,
as compared with 15 (51.7%) who described climate security as a political argument that
might raise the profile of climate change-related policy, and three (10.3%) who explicitly
questioned the importance and feasibility of the issue.35

Table 2.1: The Percentage of Themes Mobilized by Interview Participants Across Sectors
(n=29)
Theme 1: A challenge

Theme 2: A potent

Theme 3: A topic of

of adaptation and

political tool for

limited importance

resilience

elevating climate

and utility

35

I do not include conference participants’ descriptions of the connections between climate and security in
this instance as I was unable to systematically determine their approach. Anecdotally, however, the
approaches and discursive reflections of this group aligns very closely with the interview sample.
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change in the policy
world
Defense

100%

53%

0%

80%

40%

30%

100%

75%

0%

93%

52%

10%

(n=15)
Development
(n=10)
Environment
(n=4)
Total (n=29)

Table 2.1 demonstrates that among the sectors there are two key differences. First,
only those in the development sector explicitly questioned the importance of the
connection between climate change and security (i.e., Theme 3). In total, 30% of the
development sample questioned whether climate security is a feasible and/or worthy goal,
as compared to 10.34% of the sample as a whole. This reflects this sector’s greater
engagement with implementation. Despite high-level statements and directives (e.g.,
Obama, 2016a), ground-level programming targeting climate-security is difficult to
conceptualize and implement. Thus, this group did not see the lack of actionable policy
simply as a challenge to be worked out, but as a roadblock; they were reflecting their
experiences integrating questions of adaptation and resilience into questions of climatesecurity. Though no defense-focused participants reflected this theme, they faced
comparable challenges in their efforts to identify inflection points that would limit the
effects of climate-security connections. For example, reflecting the argument that the
Arab Spring was hastened by climate change, multiple defense participants expressed
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deep uncertainty about what defense and intelligence agencies could have done to predict
or mitigate the impacts of climate change on the uprisings. Unlike the development
actors, however, they were able to pivot their attention to clearer, more straightforward
adaptation efforts, such as the careful consideration of impacts on basing and training, to
fill the gaps around tangible action. Second, there was a wide gulf between the number of
environmental actors who approach climate-security as a political tool (i.e., Theme 2)
versus the number of actors from other sectors. This latter difference reflects the
positionality of the environmental community in this discussion and, most likely, the
need for new more compelling messages related to climate change mitigation.
Reflecting discussions in the wider climate change risk perception literature
(Berkhout, 2012; Bradbury, 1989), not only did approaches to climate-security vary
within sectors, they also varied within organizations. For example, within USAID some
saw the connection between climate change and security as an important consideration
for future development efforts (and therefore mobilized the “challenge for adaptation and
resilience” theme), while others explicitly doubted whether it would have any real impact
on their individual work or the Agency’s mission (mobilizing “the topic is of limited
importance” theme). Similar disagreements were seen within the US State Department,
with some actively considering how climate change affects conflict and how that fits
within their organizational mandate, and others framing it as a distraction from their core
focus (i.e., the first and third themes). Critically, across the sample only one person
mobilized the adaptation and resilience theme and the limited importance theme,
suggesting significant differences of opinion and approach within these organizations.
Research participants within the defense sector also disagreed about how precisely to
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approach climate-security. Amongst those working for the DoD, some argued that since
climate change was an operational risk, it necessitated efforts that would prevent the
spiraling of risks in particular places (i.e., adaptation and resiliency efforts). Others
argued that the unpredictability and complexity of how climate change may affect
conflict will nullify the effectiveness of predictive actions, and therefore their most
effective path of action is to address the logistical issues that climate change produces,
such as impacts on basing, training, and supply logistics. Further, they noted that such
challenges provide a new, more emphatic message about why Americans should care
about climate change (i.e., theme 2).
These trends were largely mirrored in discussions at conference and in program
documents. For example, the 2015 Quadrennial Defense Review (Hagel, 2014b), which
outlines the DoD’s vision, priorities, and challenges, emphasizes the need to address
logistical challenges while alluding to the risks of cascading security concerns as a result
of environmental change (i.e., the first theme). For example, as noted on page 25:
The Department’s operational readiness hinges on unimpeded access to land, air,
and sea training and test space. Consequently, we will complete a comprehensive
assessment of all installations to assess the potential impacts of climate change on
our missions and operational resiliency, and develop and implement plans to
adapt as required.

Likewise, CNA’s 2014 report, ‘National Security and the Accelerating Risks of
Climate Change’ though focused largely on military readiness to climate-related threats
(i.e., the first theme), it also reflects the argument that military personnel are a more
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credible messenger for climate policy more generally. As noted in the Foreword (CNA,
2014)

When it comes to thinking through long-term global challenges, none are more
qualified than our most senior military leaders. Not only do they have decades of
experience managing risk and responding to conflict on the battlefield, but they
are also experts in geopolitical analysis and long-range strategic planning

Similarly USAID published a climate-conflict annex (Reiling & Brady, 2015) to
their Climate-Resilient Development Framework (USAID, 2014), which represented the
relationship between climate change and conflict and climate change and security in
measured terms that reflected the demand for adaptation but stopped short of advocating
for targeted adaptation and resiliency efforts. Instead, the document stresses conflictsensitive adaptation and peacebuilding opportunities. For example, as noted on page XI:
Unfortunately, there is robust evidence to suggest that a majority of the world’s
most fragile regions, countries, and communities also will likely be highly
exposed to the impacts climate change. It is therefore essential that efforts to
address climate impacts be designed to manage and reduce conflict in these
communities, and to reinforce those capacities that exist to constructively manage
conflict. It is reasonable to think that climate change adaptation and mitigation
efforts, properly designed, could serve as vehicles for reconciliation and
confidence-building.
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Summarily, approaches to climate-security are not defined by one’s sector.
Moreover, despite the prominence of the first framing, the policy making community
struggled to precisely articulate what constitutes adapting to climate-security.

Conclusion
This article is informed by and builds upon the literature examining the discourses
of environmental security (and more explicitly, climate security). In examining how the
US-based policy community tasked with addressing the connections between climate and
security frame the issue and articulate potential responses, this research offers granular
insight into the character of contemporary climate and security policy discourses and the
challenges associated with translating those discourses into action.
Climate change and security in US policy centers on a discourse that constructs
climate and change and variability as a threat multiplier. Despite this apparent coherence,
the considerable attention to climate-security paid by policy makers and implementers
alike has not produced a clear answer to the question of whether the logistical, political,
and conceptual challenges associated with climate-security linkages, and in particular
climate-conflict linkages, can be addressed through existing framings of adaptation and
resilience. While the threat multiplier is a coherent means of making a political argument
about climate change, this is but one of three themes evident in individuals’ and
organizations’ approaches to this broad discourse . While each theme is commensurable
with a broad threat multiplier framing, are not necessarily coherent across themes. This
incoherence is a source of the challenges to policy and implementation reported across
the three sectors reviewed in this article. Thus, even the framing of the threat multiplier
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as a potent political tool for elevating climate change in the policy conversation faces a
paradoxical challenge. Though it would seem framing climate change in terms of national
security – perceived as an issue relatable to a conservative audience – this assumption has
been challenged. Myers et al. (2012) demonstrate that when framing climate change as a
security issue, as compared with an issue of ecology or public health, it is most likely to
elicit anger from those who doubt or dismiss the scientific consensus of anthropogenic
climate change. In this way, while the connection between climate and security offers a
message on climate change that may be compelling to non-traditional/uninterested actors,
that message appears to be ineffective, even actively disagreeable, especially if coming
from the environmental community (Myers et al., 2012).
Without greater evidence to clarify the questions of how to adapt and build
resilience in a conflict sensitive manner, there is a significant risk that policy will
continue down a path of ineffective program promotion, uneven motivation for
engagement, and strategic mobilization of poorly understood conflict risk for political
ends. At the same time, ineffective programs might themselves trigger or exacerbate
conflict (e.g., Dabelko et al., 2013; Reiling & Brady, 2015; Rüttinger et al., 2015; Snorek,
Renaud, & Kloos, 2014; USAID, 2014). Finally, framing climate-security solely in the
idea that climate change is a threat multiplier risks ignoring themes in peacebuilding
literature (e.g., Conca & Dabelko, 2002; Matthew & Hammill, 2012) that note the
potential of climate change adaptation as a peacebuilding tool, and the importance of
climate change and natural resource management in post-conflict settings. Such outcomes
are unnecessary, but distressingly likely, in the absence of more nuanced discursive
framings.
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Introduction
As defined by Mason (2014, p. 807), “(post)conflict” describes “areas with
current or recent historical experience of violent conflict and/or foreign military
occupation.” Though, ‘post-conflict’ is a notably difficult term to define in strictly spatial
or temporal terms (Baker, 2009, p. 6), post-conflict places face two primary, but distinct
challenges: economic recovery and reducing the risk of recurring conflict (Collier,
Hoeffler, & Söderbom, 2008). As I describe below, Karamoja, Uganda is facing both
challenges. This article examines how the impacts of climate change interact with the
post-conflict political ecology of Karamoja to produce a new, challenging set of conflict
dynamics that threaten the well-being of those living there as well as its current stability.
In this article, I demonstrate that though the overall severity of conflict has
decreased in Karamoja in recent years, climate change impacts, in particular extended dry
seasons and increasing inter- and intra-annual variability, in combination with a series of
social, economic and political factors, are putting pressure on the landscape. The impacts
of this pressure, in turn, play out in the post-conflict political ecology of Karamoja, which
in enabling new resource extraction initiatives and land speculation has contributed to the
region’s exposure to the risk of climate change-affected conflict (climate-conflict), and its
inability to manage, absorb or mitigate that risk, a situation increasingly labelled fragility
(see, for example, Rüttinger et al., 2015). The result is a shift in the character of conflict
in Karamoja. Where once interethnic conflict centered on commercial-scale cattle raiding
defined large spaces in the landscape, today climate change impacts are contributing to a
new conflict environment characterized by increasing incidence of small-scale conflicts,
such as theft and localized resource conflict. As in other case studies focused on the
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relationship between climate change and conflict in nearby places with similar climatic
and economic contexts this case highlights the deeply complex spatiality and temporality
of this relationship (see, for example, Adano et al., 2012; Ide et al., 2014),.
I begin this paper with a brief review of the literature on the political ecology of
Karamoja, and the political ecology of climate change and conflict (climate-conflict)
more generally. I then describe the research methods utilized I this work. Finally, I turn to
the contemporary factors altering the conflict landscape in Karamoja and the role of
climate change in altering the conflict landscape.

Climate Change, Conflict, and Fragility
This paper is informed by, and builds upon, the scholarship at the intersection of
political ecology and environmental security (see, for example, Barnett, 2001; Barnett &
Adger, 2007; Benjaminsen, Alinon, Buhaug, & Buseth, 2012; Le Billon, 2001; Nordås &
Gleditsch, 2007; Peluso & Watts, 2001; Raleigh, Choi, & Kniveton, 2015). This body of
literature has demonstrated that without underlying vulnerabilities driven by political,
social, and economic power structures, environmental change would have only limited
impact on conflict dynamics (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Le Billon, 2001; Raleigh, 2010;
Raleigh & Urdal, 2007).
As they relate to potential links between climate change and conflict, political
ecological studies have been central in pushing back on deterministic narratives that
argue for a direct, causal relationship between climate change and conflict (see, for
example, Dalby, 2014, 2016a; Floyd, 2008; Gleditsch, 1998; Hartmann, 2010; Hayes &
Knox-Hayes, 2014; McDonald, 2013; Selby & Hoffmann, 2014a; Swyngedouw, 2010).
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Instead, this literature demonstrates how climate change affects (or fails to affect) conflict
in particular places (Ide et al., 2016; Krampe, 2014; Milman & Arsano, 2014; Snorek,
Renaud, & Kloos, 2014), and calls attention to the risks of securitizing climate change
and its impacts (e.g., Faris, 2007; Graeger, 1996; Hartmann, 2014; Selby, 2014; Selby &
Hoffmann, 2014b; Swyngedouw, 2010). Much of this work has come in the form of case
studies (Ide, 2017). These studies, which enable a highly granular perspective on the
relationship between climate change and conflict in particular places, offer insight into
the mechanisms by which climate change can alter conflict and peacebuilding outcomes
(e.g., Beck, 2014; Feitelson & Tubi, 2017; Okpara, Stringer, & Dougill, 2017), the spatial
complexities of the relationship between climate change and conflict (e.g., Busby, Cook,
Vizy, Smith, & Bekalo, 2014; Devlin & Hendrix, 2014), and the risks of negative conflict
outcomes as a result of adaptation efforts (Dabelko et al., 2013; Milman & Arsano, 2014;
Snorek et al., 2014). Using the changes in Karamoja as a case study, I utilize a political
ecological framing to understand how competing interests, large scale shifts in local
livelihoods, and climate and environmental change in Karamoja have led to new forms of
conflict related to land access and land use.
In adopting this framing, this paper builds on the literature that seeks to better
understand how environmental change affects fragility in a post-conflict environment
(e.g., Grimm, Lemay-Hébert, & Nay, 2014; Nay, 2012). Fragility offers a theoretical
perspective that sharply contrasts with the widely-adopted resilience frameworks
(Manyena & Gordon, 2015). Whereas resilience is generally accepted to mean the ability
to withstand shocks and stressors (see, for example, Adger, 2000; Manyena, 2006;
USAID, 2014; Walker et al., 2004), fragile places are marked by the lack of capacity in
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that regard (Manyena & Gordon, 2015). For example, in their study on climate change
resilient development in fragile states, Henley-Shephard and her co-authors (2017) refer
to fragile socioecological systems as being marked by poor governance, inequity, low
development, and multiple compounding shocks and stressors that can lead to complex
crisis.
Policy institutions focused on foreign policy and development, particularly those
from the Global North, have widely adopted fragility framings to organize and prioritize
their work. They make efforts to measure states’ fragility by way of indices that
incorporate a wide range of variables (see, for example, Cammack, McLeod, Menocal, &
Christiansen, 2006; Rice & Patrick, 2008). At the same time, fragility has been critiqued
for its discursive amorphousness and general malleability. For example, as noted by
Ferreira (2017, p. 1300), ‘the fuzziness of the term and the broadness and vagueness of
current definitions [of fragility] are frequently highlighted in critical appraisals’ (see also
Faust, Grävingholt, & Ziaja, 2015; Grimm et al., 2014). Moreover, the ineffectiveness of
many of the indices (S. Kaplan, 2014), the tendency to focus at the not-alwaysappropriate scale of the state (Manyena & Gordon, 2015), and fundamental questions
about the inherently political and normative framing of describing a country as ‘fragile’
(Grimm et al., 2014), highlight the need for more critical examinations of the term itself
and associated discourses.
My approach to fragility follows the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development’s (OECD) definition of fragility, which sees it as “the combination of
exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities
to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes
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including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or
other emergencies” (OECD, 2016, p. 21). This definition is productive for the question at
hand because it considers both theoretical drivers of fragility and the cyclical impact of
related negative outcomes. Places recovering from conflict are often fragile in that sense,
and therefore face a unique set of challenges related to development and natural resource
management (Kovach & Conca, 2016; Le Billon, 2008; Maxwell et al., 2010). Karamoja
is no different. It suffers from the reverberating economic effects of a prolonged conflict,
the risks of corruption, and remains vulnerable to shocks and stressors that occur
annually, if not seasonally (Karamoja Development Forum, 2017; Mercy Corps, 2016;
Stites et al., 2016). Moreover, the ability of local institutions to uphold the peace has been
called into question. Thus, the potential recurrence of conflict influenced by
environmental shocks and stressors remains an acute risk for the population of Karamoja.
Those risks are further amplified by the inherent challenges of integrating sustainable and
equitable environmental management and ecosystem services into post-conflict recovery
(Conca & Dabelko, 2002; Jensen, 2013; Kovach & Conca, 2016) and the demonstrated
risk of poorly managed post-conflict resource extraction leading to higher rates of
conflict recurrence (Rustad & Binningsbø, 2012; Suarez, Árias-Arévalo, & MartínezMera, 2018).
By examining how climate change can affect a post-conflict landscape, this article
addresses questions that bridge the literatures focused on climate change, environmental
peacebuilding, and post-conflict resource management. Therefore, beyond its illustration
of the specific situation in Karamoja, this case is of importance to the wider climateconflict and environmental security literatures because it illustrates that climate change
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impacts have become important to the success of post-conflict peacebuilding and
recovery outcomes (Conca & Dabelko, 2002; Jensen, 2013; Kovach & Conca, 2016;
Mason, 2014), and further articulates the potential of climate change to negatively alter
conflict outcomes in fragile settings.

Research Methods
The data in this article were gathered through multiple methods, including a
survey of local governance officials, participant observation, interviews, and a document
review. I also tested the findings from these sources by member-checking the work with
key stakeholders (Emerson et al., 2011). This approach enabled me to triangulate the
research findings and thus increase the internal validity of the research (Corbin & Strauss,
2008).
A survey of governance officials (n=103) was the primary data source for this
paper. The survey focuses on the perspectives of local governance officials on 1) climate
and environmental change; 2) conflict and security; and 3) non-government organization
(NGO) activity. Responses were then examined both in the aggregate via descriptive
statistics and via qualitative analysis to identify perceptions of climate change, conflict,
and climate-conflict connections. The sample was most heavily represented by local
government officials in Karamoja (n=78). The plurality of the sample (n=45) are Local
Council 1s (or LC1), representatives in the smallest administrative unit in the country.
There were also LC3s and staff members (n=13) who represent the subcounty perspective
and LC5 staff members (n=3) who represent the district level. All LCs are elected. The
sample also includes peace and security officials, a category that includes members of the
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Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), peace committee members (groups of officials
that address questions of peace and security at a range of scales) and local security
officers (n=16) and technical advisers such as agriculture and natural resource
management officers (n=9).
The focus on local government officials, in particular those who were elected and
represent smaller localities, provided insight into the shifting conflict, economic, and
physical landscapes in the region as well as the biophysical shifts perceived by this
population. However, the gender dynamic of the research sample is deeply skewed
towards men, 96-7. This ratio is representative of the general gender breakdown of local
representation in Karamoja.37 However while this sample may be representative of this
particular population, and though my experiences suggested that those I surveyed are
aware of both the issues facing individuals in their community and the more macro
aspects of policy and development in Uganda, their lens on local issues is generally
derived from the point of view of men who understand them through their particular
social positions. The mixed-methods approach and emphasis on triangulation helped
account for the data challenges inherent to a sample with a degree of homogeneity in
participants’ positionality and subjectivity. Specifically, by cross-referencing the survey
with the other forms of data, I was able to ensure a higher degree of internal validity for
the inferences drawn from this dataset (Maxwell, 1992).
The survey respondents, by nature of their roles, interact closely with
development organizations and the larger government apparatus to which they belong.

37

These data are not readily available, however, observations, and conversations with NGO workers who
regularly work with local governmental representatives suggest that this number is representative of the
wider LC1 population.
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Because of the considerable presence of development actors in the region (USAID,
2016), I explicitly considered the risk of participants simply reflecting development
discourses in their responses. Therefore, I separated inquiry about climate change from
inquiry on conflict to avoid influencing responses about the relationship between the two.
Had respondents perceived my interests to be in the relationship between climate change
and conflict, they might have emphasized this relationship in the hope of attracting more
projects or attention. Likewise, I used non-normative prompts (e.g., ranking the impacts
of climate change, conflict, and NGO activity on a Likert scale and asking for
descriptions to accompany ratings) to better understand climate change, conflict, and
development in the region. This type of questioning allowed insight into how respondents
connected questions of climate change, fragility, and conflict, and provided an effective
starting point for more nuanced questioning.
In addition to the survey, I also conducted six months of fieldwork in Karamoja
alongside Mercy Corps, an international humanitarian and development agency, allowed
me to conduct participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and informal
interview-like conversations. Participant observation included going to field sites with
Mercy Corps staff to meet with program recipients, participating in resilience
assessments, and attending meetings with governance officials, training and learning
events, and coordination and planning meetings. While engaged in these activities, I
participated in a large number of interview-like conversations, primarily with Mercy
Corps staff, partners, and program recipients. These interactions proved to be a very
fruitful source of data, as I was able to ask questions based on the immediate context.
These conversations further contextualized how Karamoja has experienced
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environmental change and conflict and how the region has evolved in the years following
disarmament. These observations and conversations served both as an important data
source and as a means of triangulating the survey data.
I conducted five formal interviews explicitly covering the relationship between
climate change and conflict. These focused on specific topics based on an individuals’
expertise, for example land use and land policy in Karamoja as a factor in climateconflict. These were done with the staff of Mercy Corps and local CBOs partnering with
Mercy Corps. Because Mercy Corps employees, in particular program officers (most of
whom are themselves from Karamoja), interact regularly with program recipients in their
efforts to understand the needs of the communities receiving programming, and because
they lived and worked through the violent clashes, the disarmament process, and the
current period of relative stability, they were able to describe their experiences well
beyond their perspectives as NGO employees. And though these employees hold
privileged and powerful positions within Karamoja, I tried to control for this by pursuing
topics couched within the context of their experiences working with communities.
Because of the increased presence of NGOs in Karamoja, there is ample gray
literature describing Karamoja, conflict, and climate change. Some of this literature was
publicly available and some, including program documents, I obtained with permission
through the Mercy Corps intranet or directly from program staff during my time in
Karamoja and Kampala. In total I reviewed 59 reports on Karamoja issued by NGOs and
learning partners spanning from 2008 to 2018. Many of these reports directly examine
climate-conflict or other topics salient to this research. Therefore, the existing gray
literature was useful not only for understanding contemporarily challenges in the region,
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but also in understanding how past conflicts and environmental change have evolved over
time.
Finally, in order to increase the internal validity of the findings I presented the
results to multiple Moroto (n=6) and Kampala-based (n=7) Mercy Corps staff, including
many staff from Karamoja or who have been working in Karamoja for the better part of
their career, as a means of member-checking the research.

Research Context: Karamoja
Physical Geography
Karamoja is the northeastern-most subregion in Uganda. It is comprised of seven
districts: Kaabong, Kotido, Abim, Amudat, Moroto, Nakapiriprit, and Napak. It is a vast
space, roughly the size of Rwanda, 27,200 square kilometers, containing semi-arid
savannah, bush, and mountains with plains in the central and mountains in the east and
wetter belts to the west. (Mugerwa, Stephen, & Anthony, 2014; Quam, 2013). Karamoja
has maximum temperatures ranging from 28-32 ℃(Mercy Corps, 2016) and rates of
evapotranspiration that generally exceed total rainfall (Chaplin et al., 2017; Mubiru,
2010). The vegetation, therefore, is dominated by species that thrive in arid environments
such as seasonal grasses, thorny plants, and small trees.
The most important component of Karamoja’s physical geography in terms of its
broader political ecology are the patterns of rainfall and aridity (Bushby & Stites, 2016;
Stark, 2011; Stites & Huisman, 2010; USAID, 2013). Speaking to the sheer size and the
climactic diversity in the region, most areas receive between 500–1000 mm per year
(Nakalembe, Dempewolf, & Justice, 2017; USAID, 2017b), however, peripheral areas of
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the region receive as little as 350 mm/year and as much as 1500 mm/year. The majority
of precipitation falls from April to June (Mubiru, 2010). The high degree of rainfall
variability – inter-annually, seasonally, and spatially – also serves as an important factor
in defining socioeconomic processes (Mubiru, 2010; Mugerwa et al., 2014; Quam, 2013).
It also underscores the need for mobility and why, historically, pastoralism and
agropastoralism were – and to a large extent remain – the most important livelihood in
the region (Stark, 2011; Stites et al., 2016).

Figure 3.1: Karamoja, Uganda, highlighted in red

Donors, NGOs, governance officials, and residents often describe Karamoja as
experiencing the impacts of climate change.38 The biophysical manifestations of climate
38

To avoid ambiguity, when discussing climate variability and change I rely upon the definitions offered
by the IPCC fifth assessment report (AR5). Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate
that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its
properties and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer (IPCC, 2014, p. 120)
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change are described largely in terms of increasing variability, a shorter rainy season, and
a longer, more intense dry season (Egeru et al., 2014; USAID, 2017a). For example,
Egeru et al. (2014), relying upon National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) (1979–2009) global climate data provided by the National Centers for
Environmental Prediction (NCEP), found increasing variability both temporally and
spatially in the sub-region, noting the existence of both extreme wet and dry periods in
the region. They also note that their results showed variation in variability intensity
within the sub-region (Egeru et al., 2014, p. 501).
Though there is agreement that the region is getting warmer with, at minimum,
1.0°C increases in mean temperature across the subregion (Chaplin et al., 2017; Egeru et
al., 2014; USAID, 2017a), the precise impacts of climate change in terms of precipitation
are difficult to pinpoint. This is in part because the natural variability of the region
complicates identifying which weather changes are driven by anthropogenic climate
change and which are driven by natural variability, and also because of the limited
weather-related data collection infrastructure in a vast area. Therefore, understandings of
climate change in the region are relatively coarse. The difficulty of documenting how
precisely the climate has changed in Karamoja, particularly in terms of precipitation is
evident in the ostensibly contradictory messages in the literature. For example, USAID
and WHO both issued reports using different time periods and found seemingly
contradictory results. USAID’s climate risk profile describes an observed 15-20%

Climate variability refers to variations in the mean state and other statistics (such as standard deviations, the
occurrence of extremes, etc.) of the climate on all spatial and temporal scales beyond that of individual
weather events. Variability may be due to natural internal processes within the climate system (internal
variability), or to variations in natural or anthropogenic external forcing (external variability) (IPCC, 2014,
p. 121).
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decrease in rainfall (USAID, 2017a), whereas a report produced by the WFP (Chaplin et
al., 2017) describes an overall increase in rainfall in the area; Egeru et al. (2014)
describes complex patterns that vary spatially and temporally but reflect increased
variability.

Figure 3.2: Average Rainfall (left), Mean Temperature (right) 1981-2000. Source:
(USAID, 2017a)
There is, however, consistency within this uncertainty: in Karamoja, while the
exact impacts may vary by locale, the region’s natural variability appears to be
increasing. In a report produced by the Ugandan Government in collaboration with nongovernmental partners (Chaplin et al., 2017), relying upon the WFP Data Visualization
Platform (WFP, 2016) for rainfall data, and Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute
(KNMI, 2016) for temperature, the authors argue:
•

Average monthly temperatures in Karamoja are increasing – noting, specifically,
that from 2001 to 2015 monthly temperatures were largely warmer than the
average.
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•

With the acknowledgment that Karamoja is prone is naturally predisposed to high
year-to-year rainfall variability, the authors also find that over the past 35 years,
year-to-year variability is increasing.

•

Average annual rainfall is increasing – for example, the authors find that on
average it rained 137mm more between 2006-2016 when compared with 1981 –
1990. However, the increased rain tends to be concentrated towards the end of the
rainy season (i.e., Sept – Nov).

Historical Conflict in Karamoja
Though currently stable, until relatively recently Karamoja had been marked by
intense conflict manifesting predominantly through interethnic cattle raids (Bevan, 2008;
Eaton, 2007, 2008; Gray et al., 2003; Howe, Stites, & Akabwai, 2015; Kurtz &
McMahon, 2015; Powell, 2010; Quam, 2013; Stark, 2011). During the peak of conflict,
in the early-2000s, small arms-related deaths happened at a rate of 60/100,000 people,
making Karamoja one of the most violent places in the world (Bevan, 2008). There were
a multitude of overlapping factors driving this violence, the most proximate being a
proliferation of small arms, the commercialization of cattle raiding (i.e., cattle raiding for
the purpose of immediate profit), and shocks such as disease and drought leading to high
rates of cattle loss. The breakdown of traditional governance systems further exacerbated
the conflict, leading to retaliations and counter-retaliations between ethnically-defined
pastoralist groups (Bevan, 2008; Eaton, 2007, 2008, Knighton, 2002, 2003; Leff, 2009;
Mkutu, 2003, 2010). This conflict took place across a large area, and involved a deeply
complex and often evolving series of alliances; it in many ways defined the landscape
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(Eaton, 2007, 2008). For example, a 2008 report issued by the Small Arms Survey
(Bevan, 2008, p. 27) emphasized the diffuse spatiality of the conflict:
Raids aimed at capturing entire herds prompted retaliatory raids of the same
magnitude. Violence itself increasingly became a factor in altering migration
routes. These routes, in turn, became less and less predictable, thereby
multiplying the potential for further raids and disputes. Warriors travelled ever
greater distances...With the increasing range of their activities, they were further
dislocated from their communities for much of the year, and as a consequence, so
too were the controls on violence that might have been exercised by clan elders.

Cattle raids have long been present in Karamoja (Filipová & Johanisova, 2017).
Until the mid-20th century, cattle raids were conducted primarily with bows, arrows, and
spears. These raids were closely governed by elders, conducted with the purpose of cattle
restocking, territorial exchange, and wealth accumulation (Filipová & Johanisova, 2017).
However, following the influx of small arms into the region following the fall of Idi
Amin’s government, and with increasing degradation of grazing land, the ability of elders
to govern raids diminished, the scope and intensity of raids intensified, and cattle raiding
became commercialized. Once rare, killings during raids became commonplace (Filipová
& Johanisova, 2017). As the conflict grew both in spatial scale and in scope, retaliations
and counter-retaliations became common (Eaton, 2007, 2008). According to Gray et al.
(2003), more than 70% of deaths for males aged 30-39 in the Bokora and Maheniko
subtribes she interviewed were the result of cattle raiding. According to (Mkutu, 2007)
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between 1996 and 2003 nearly 8000 people were killed or injured by small arms in
Karamoja, though it has been argued that this is a low estimate (Bevan, 2008).
Cattle raiding had long been perceived as a problem by both colonial and the
newly independent governments in Uganda, and had prompted disarmament campaigns
in 1945, 1953, 1954, 1960, 1964 (Bushby & Stites, 2016). The violence changed,
however, after the fall of Amin and the widespread proliferation of small arms, as well as
in the face of continuing land degradation. This new, more intense conflict dynamic was
also met by disarmament campaigns in 1984, 1987, 2001, and 2006 (Bevan, 2008; Stites
et al., 2016). The most recent disarmament campaign, which began in May 2006 under
the auspices of the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme
(KIDDP), were by most accounts successful in its intended outcomes, though extremely
violent, involving multiple human rights violations (Human Rights Watch, 2007; OPM,
2007; Stites & Akabwai, 2009).

Livelihood Strategies in Karamoja
Though historically the majority of the population of Karamoja could best
described as agropastoralists (Mercy Corps, 2016; Quam, 2013; Stark, 2011; Stites et al.,
2016; Stites & Huisman, 2010), the region’s social, cultural, and economic identity has
been long been associated with pastoralism (Levine, 2010; Mkutu, 2010).
Agropastoralism exists on a spectrum, with some households keeping only a limited
number livestock and relying primarily on agricultural activities with others
complementing a heavier reliance on pastoralism with a limited amount of crop
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production (Bushby & Stites, 2016; Mercy Corps, 2016).39 This diversification, and the
mobility associated with its pastoral components, functions as a hedge against the
climatic and economic shocks that occur in Karamoja (Bushby & Stites, 2016; Ellis,
1998; Stark, 2011; Stites et al., 2016; USAID, 2013).

Figure 3.3: Seasonal extremes in Karamoja, as demonstrated by the difference between
the rainy season, June 2016 (left); and the dry season, March 2017 (right): Photo Credit
Albin Tveitlan

Reflecting themes in a wider literature focused on pastoralism (see, for example,
Butt, 2016; Turner, 1999, 2006, 2009) there are currently two contrasting and conflicting
ideologies about livelihoods in Karamoja (Nakalembe et al., 2017). The government,

39

Common crops include maize, sorghum, millet, dry beans, oil seeds, groundnuts, cassava, and sweet
potatoes (FEWSNET, 2016)
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particularly the Central Government of Uganda, positions pastoralism as backwards and
describes sedentary livelihoods focused on crops and the expansion of cropland as the
future of the region (Nakalembe et al., 2017). Much of the local population, academic
literature on the region, and regional advocates, however, continue to argue that
pastoralism and agropastoralism are the most sustainable livelihoods for the region (see,
for example, Avery, 2014; Levine, 2010; Nakalembe et al., 2017). For instance, many
people with whom I spoke noted the calls for sedentarization by the current First Lady
and former Minister of State for Karamoja Affairs, Janet Museveni, and her dismissive,
and even outright hostile attitude towards pastoralism. Her comments, which research
participants occasionally framed as a microcosm of the Ugandan government’s treatment
of pastoralists and Karamoja more generally, were raised with emotional intensity, and
occasionally anger. For example, as described to me by a research participant who works
for an international NGO:
I have been in many meetings with the First Lady when she was district chair and
it was always “ag, ag, ag! These people need to put clothes on and stop walking
around with their silly cattle!” And everyone clapped! And the donors, and
therefore the NGOs, they bow to the pressure. And, [therefore] they push
agriculture [as their programming].

Similarly, at a program update meeting, a mid-level government official from
Karamoja emphatically raised what she believed were unjustified stereotypes of the
Karamojong and drew considerable applause, arguing “There are too many preconceived
notions about the Karamojong. But we do grow things! We don’t walk around naked!
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And we are not just pastoralists!” In other words, the First Lady’s comments were seen as
part of the reason why Karamoja is marginalized; there is limited appreciation and
consideration for why pastoralism defines the social and economic landscape.

Contemporary Development in Karamoja
In the gray literature focused on Karamoja, particularly that associated with
development organizations, the region is often described as being a forgotten or ignored
part of Uganda, a place struggling to recover from years of conflict that is now vulnerable
to the extreme local environment (see, for example, Mubiru, 2010; Powell, 2010; Stark,
2011). For example, the Famine and Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET)
offers the following description (FEWSNET, 2016, p. 19).
Plagued by decades of conflict, instability, cattle raiding, and inconsistent
climatology, the region is marginalized and underdeveloped. Interethnic conflict
has historically driven insecurity, instability, and lagging socioeconomic
advancement. Control for limited resources (water, pasture, etc.) and political
dynamics are underlying drivers of the poor human development in the region

Given these framings and the area’s overall fragility but relative stability, which
creates an environment in which development is both needed and possible to implement,
it is not surprising that Karamoja has seen considerable international development
funding and activity in recent years. According to the Karamoja Donor Report (USAID,
2016), which mapped upcoming development activity in the region, development
agencies had allocated 89.2 million Euro (roughly $110 million US) to be spent in
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Karamoja in 2017.40 Moreover, Karamoja has undergone considerable change in the past
decade. Roads have been built, as have dams and other forms of infrastructure; mobile
phone coverage is now widespread and town centers have relatively consistent electricity
(Mercy Corps, 2016). As a result of these changes, present-day Karamoja was often
described by residents and governance officials as being in a period of development. In
this framing, however, development is not a narrow reference to international aid
implemented through formal institutions, but a set of broader changes to the economic
landscape that include but go beyond development aid.
Though ongoing development changes are generally presented in a positive
manner, particularly by governmental and non-governmental agencies, they also have
serious consequences. For example, this period of development, during which access to
Karamoja has rapidly expanded through an increasing network of paved roads, has
contributed to the enabling environments that lead to increased land grabs and resource
extraction, key pressures on the post-conflict landscape (Howe et al., 2015; S. Levine,
2010; Pecquet, 2014). In addition to being a common refrain amongst research
participants, this challenge is often reflected in the gray literature. For example, as
described in Mercy Corps’ assessment of Karamoja’s resilience (Mercy Corps, 2016, p.
13), “Yet peace has also brought new restrictions on livestock movement, as stability
encourages land grabs, mining, and expansion of agricultural activities.”
Moreover the socioeconomic changes have had differentiated impacts on adaptive
capacity and vulnerability across different groups, most directly having a negative impact
on men who traditionally would have been pastoralists (Mercy Corps, 2016; Stites &
40

Though this report was published in late-2016, it accounted for planned spending by major NGOs in
2017
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Akabwai, 2010; Stites et al., 2016). Mercy Corps staff would occasionally point out
instances where men were brewing beer, traditionally a job performed by women, as
evidence that men were increasingly ‘dropping out’ of pastoralism. These impacts,
however, were not limited to men. They had reverberating effects that in some cases led
to alcoholism and household violence. Twenty-three survey participants explicitly
described household violence and alcoholism (often in tandem) as being a socioeconomic
effect of climate change (see Figure 3.5).
Furthermore, many survey respondents framed Karamoja’s development in
explicitly negative terms. They argued that development only helped those they described
as ‘educated’ or ‘elite’, who understood and could manipulate the new ‘developed’
Karamoja in a way that those without more formal education or relative wealth could not.
For example, an LC1 from Moroto District argued:
Development has enlightened us to an extent, but it ends at educated people. It is
you people who have this pen and paper. Things are better for you. You benefit
from our thumbprints and do very little for us (see Figure 3.4).

Government officials and NGO workers agreed that new vulnerabilities and forms
of insecurity followed disarmament. As a result of rapid economic shifts, certain
populations, most notably those who have relied on skills once essential for living in
Karamoja, such as pastoralism, firearm proficiency, and indigenous knowledge, have
been thrust into a system and a landscape that is, to a large degree, unrecognizable and no
longer values these skills as highly. Survey respondents described a shift in the economic
landscape following disarmament that seemed to not simply ignore them but actively
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inhibit them. For example, in a discussion about how the region has changed in his
lifetime, an LC1 was both dismissive of and frustrated with what many more senior
politicians describe as ‘progress’ or ‘development’:
People say there is development. I see the iron sheets. I see the tarmac. But I am
pale. My muscles are thin. I don’t take milk. Those days, even when there was the
gun, we were under trees and I looked healthy. I was strong. We were taking
milk. We were taking meat. I had cattle; I was a rich man. Now we are vulnerable.

Figure 3.4: Because most of the population is illiterate, attendance sheets are often
signed with thumbprints. This was why the survey respondent above described giving
thumbprints; he understands their value, that educated Karamajong who work for NGOs
such as my such as my research assistant, and ‘mzungus’ (a common term for white
foreigners are judged, in part, by how many people come to their meetings. But he
explicitly questioned what all those thumb prints has brought him).
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In other words, despite all the funds and innovations coming to Karamoja,
vulnerabilities exist in spite of – or perhaps because of – these changes. Though this LC1
did not discount the dangers or seriousness of past conflicts in Karamoja during the peak
of conflict, what is often referred to as ‘those days’ by residents of the region, at that time
he possessed the agency to build resilience to those shocks. The challenges he faces now
are insidious, difficult to comprehend, and call into question his agency and identity.
These challenges have led some residents to describe the peace in paradoxical terms:
while their safety has improved, they have been left exposed to new risks that they are
less-prepared to face. Climate change, though exogenous, is both representative of and
embedded in those challenges. In combination with other changes to the landscape
including large-scale shifts to sedentary agriculture, increasing land grabs, and the
lengthening of the dry season, his ability and the people in his village’s ability to adapt
their livelihood to climactic and economic shocks and stressors are diminishing.

A Fictitious or Sustainable Peace?
Before turning to the ways in which climate change currently affects conflict in
the region, I outline Karamoja’s fragile stability. As described above, Karamoja’s conflict
landscape has shifted in recent years. The severity of inter-ethnic conflict has declined via
the disarmament and the strategic use of the UPDF and local police (Eaton, 2008; Mercy
Corps, 2016; Powell, 2010). As a result, both the data collected for this research and the
gray and academic literature reflect a safer, more stable Karamoja (Howe et al., 2015;
Nakalembe et al., 2017; Stites et al., 2016; USAID, 2017a). However, both the data and
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the literature also reflect that new types of conflict are emerging and that Karamoja is a
place highly vulnerable to shocks and stressors. For example, as noted in a USAID report
(USAID, 2017b, p. 10):
Conflict and violence are endemic in Karamoja, although the conflict dynamics
are changing. Historically, inter-ethnic conflict, particularly cattle raiding, was
the primary threat to personal security in the sub-region. Although inter-ethnic
tensions are improving, conflicts over land are increasing in frequency, concerns
about theft and violence within communities and households are on the rise, and
sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is reportedly common.

Further, as noted by Mercy Corps (2016, p. 7):
Cattle raiding is no longer a common source of conflict in Karamoja; however,
violence has shifted toward the private sphere in the form of gender-based
violence (GBV) and petty theft. In addition, natural resource conflict, particularly
over land, has also increased and is likely to intensify with growing competition
for land, water, and minerals.

These descriptions align closely with the data collected for this paper. For
example, small arms and cattle raiding, which were the defining factors of conflict in the
region, barely register amongst survey respondents describing their current security
concerns (see Figure 3.5, below). Only 11% of respondents listed small arms as a security
concern, and only 6% identified cattle raids. Instead, new forms of conflict, many with
roots in land use, environmental change, and decreasing livelihood options for men who
had traditionally been pastoralists are becoming more prevalent, particularly theft (56%),
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resource conflicts over pasture and water (55%), and land conflict (52%). Paradoxically,
many of these forms of conflict have direct links to the prevailing peace. As noted above,
the conflict in the region had suppressed interest in extracting resources from the region,
but the relative peace has given rise to pressures now manifest in land grabs and demands
for resources. Simultaneously, the lingering effects of disarmament and the governmentled push for sedentarized forms of livelihood have negatively affected the region’s
overall food security by pushing the population towards agriculture in an area better

PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDANTS

suited for pastoralism (S. Levine, 2010; Nakalembe et al., 2017).
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Figure 3.5: The most prevalent contemporary security concerns as reported by survey
respondents (n=103): Only those with greater than 20 responses listed. Small arms and
cattle raids, which defined the previous conflict, are included for purposes of
comparison.
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These shifts create contention not only around whether the current stability is a
positive or negative outcome, but also whether it is a ‘lasting’ or ‘fictitious’ peace. This
debate was evident at a monthly coordination meeting of peacebuilding officials I
attended in Karamoja in October of 2017. The purpose of the meeting, which was held at
the offices of a Moroto-based CBO, was to ensure different organizations’ efforts were
not redundant, either topically or geographically. In attendance were 17 representatives
from NGOs, CBOs, the local government, the central government, and law enforcement.
During the meeting there was a revealing exchange between participants representing
different interests. The police representative described the security situation as follows:
“There have been a few animals stolen here and there, but things are stable. We have
deployed soldiers at many of the places where there is cattle raiding.” This led to a
comment by the chair of the working group, who represents a local CBO: “Land grabbing
is the bigger concern now [bigger than cattle raiding]. And my compliments to the UPDF
for doing a good job keeping a lid on things.” At this point a senior peacebuilding officer
with an international NGO replied: “It is a fictitious peace. If UPDF leaves, the peace
will go with it.” By this, the peacebuilding officer meant there are pillars supporting a
stable Karamoja, namely a reduction in weapons (via the disarmament) and a presence of
the UPDF, and that those factors are artificial, or at least temporary, and obscure
underlying challenges. Furthermore, should any of these pillars falter, so too would the
peace. This was a common viewpoint amongst the peacebuilding representatives in the
area.
This exchange lays out the multiple ways the current stability can be interpreted
among those tasked with promoting and/or enforcing it. First, the chair’s comment
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demonstrates there is a general consensus that conflict has shifted from cattle raids and
retaliations to issues over land, a central theme in the remainder of this paper. Second,
law enforcement officials who, by the nature of their job, are focused on present-day
enforcement see stability; peacebuilding and conflict mitigation-focused officials,
focused on threats to mid- to long-term peace, see new sources of conflict under the
surface that will require further peacebuilding. Though this disagreement was left
unresolved as the chair raised the next item on the agenda, it reflects a stark and
unanswered question facing governmental and non-governmental institutions tasked with
enforcing and maintaining a peace in stability: to what extent is Karamoja vulnerable to
widespread conflict?
The peacebuilding officer’s observation underscores the sense that the current
stability is fragile. This was also evident in Mercy Corps’ peacebuilding programming.
For example, while developing an annual work plan, Mercy Corps officials, many from
the region and all with years of experience in peacebuilding and conflict mitigation in
Karamoja, outlined what they saw as key threats to the region. The came to a quick
consensus that a loss of funding for the UPDF, a significant influx of arms (for which
there are multiple pathways, most likely South Sudan), electoral violence, or even an
extreme enough climatic event could collapse the region’s stability. Furthermore, when I
asked a senior Mercy Corps employee focused on peacebuilding in the region his opinion
on the exchange referenced above, he emphatically supported the fictitious peace
argument. He stressed that the current stability is an illusion that makes peacebuilding
efforts harder as the central government, which holds considerable authority, conflates
peace and stability. Therefore, in the context of apparent regional stability, peacebuilding
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efforts (and associated budgets) are ignored by central authorities. He described the
current focus on law enforcement as a pathway to peace as having great potential to
backfire as it leaves unresolved current and past grievances in its suppression of the
population. He argued that the only way to a ‘sustainable peace’ is a concerted effort
focused on dialogue, truth and reconciliation sessions with the backing of the central
government, and explicit efforts to address the livelihoods challenges that followed
disarmament. He pointed to the increased incidence of cattle theft during the most recent
election as evidence of this fragility – when the police were focused elsewhere, there
were raids in areas that had, until then, been peaceful.

Pressures on the Landscape
In this section I outline the different factors that are putting pressures on the
landscape in Karamoja. Though climate change is one of those factors, to understand the
place-specific connection between climate change and conflict in Karamoja, it is critical
to situate the impacts within a wider political economy (see, for example, Barnett &
Adger, 2007; Benjaminsen, 2016; Peluso, 2008; Raleigh et al., 2015; Raleigh & Urdal,
2007). I begin this section with descriptions of the socioeconomic factors that are
interacting with climate change and altering conflict outcomes before turning to a
discussion primarily focused on climate change as a factor in conflict in Karamoja. In
doing so, I frame climate change not as an independent variable that can be understood as
a driver of conflict, but part of a broader tapestry of factors that alter conflict outcomes in
this region.
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Land Conflict in Karamoja: Land Rights and Land Access
As described above, in Karamoja the cause of insecurity, conflict, and violence is
no longer experienced predominantly through intertribal conflict, cattle raids, and small
arms, but instead through the competing interests in and demands on the land. Or, as
succinctly explained by a Mercy Corps program manager who is from Karamoja, “Land
is now the biggest gun.” He made this comment in a matter-of-fact tone, stressing that
what followed disarmament wasn’t a clean shift to progress and prosperity, but instead a
fragile state ironically enabled by the peace.
Research participants across all positionalities consistently framed land (broadly
conceived) as a common denominator in contemporary conflict in Karamoja. These
concerns exist at scales ranging from the local to the regional, with a wide range of
intersecting conflict drivers. Survey participants most commonly referenced land grabs,
commercial land acquisition, border conflict, and conflict with the Uganda Wildlife
Authority (UWA) as manifestations and/or drivers of land conflict.41 For example, an
LC1 from Moroto District, in the context of a discussion of his primary security concerns,
described how land grabs of what had traditionally been communally-owned land
represented an existential threat to his and his constituents’ security. In a resigned, even
exasperated tone, he explained, “Land conflict between companies and communities is
my biggest concern. The companies come with licenses that you, the owner of soil, you
don’t know about and you can lose your rights to the land.” However, reflecting points
made by Li (2014), research participants often described ‘land’ and ‘land conflict’ in

41

An in-depth examination of the complexities of land rights and land tenure systems is outside the scope
of this research. For a more in-depth discussion of land and land rights in Karamoja, see, (FAO, 2015;
Filipová & Johanisova, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2014; Omolo, 2010; Pecquet, 2014).
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wide-ranging terms that often alluded not only to the land itself, but also to particular
resources associated with land – most often water and pasture. Residents, government
officials, and NGO officials all used ‘land conflict’ as a catchall term for the different
conflicts that take shape around land use, land rights, and land access. For example, when
asked about his primary security concerns, a UPDF official described how the effects of
climate change, coupled with decreasing mobility, can lead to localized conflict over
resources, saying “Land conflict is the biggest security concern, because every person
will try hard to get greener and moist places for his family to cultivate crops, which may
not be enough since greener paces are now reducing.”
These two quotes reflect how the security landscape is changing in Karamoja.
There are new drivers of insecurity largely embedded in threats related to land access and
land use. Though the resultant conflicts are far less severe than conflict in the past, these
risks reflect the fragility of the region. Moreover, the observations of both the UPDF
official and the LC1 display the paradox that post-disarmament stability has contributed
to the contemporary fragility and the land-related manifestations of insecurity. As
described by a Karamajong Mercy Corps employee whose job focuses on land and rights:
Now people are appreciating the value of land, and there are people who are
taking advantage of the peace in Karamoja to come and grab land and utilize it.
They could not come during those days because they knew Karamojongs were
wild people and we were armed, so they could not enter the area. Now that there’s
peace, now they also have access to come inside. Because those days they could
not. People used to fear to enter Karamoja.
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Resource Extraction
Closely related to land access and land rights is resource extraction. The Mercy
Corps program manager who argued that land is now the biggest gun went on to describe
how companies focused on mineral extraction, and those looking to take advantage of the
increasing marketability of the land, coupled with the exploitability of the land rights
system in Karamoja, led to land grabs in region, emphatically described:
All these land problems in Karamoja started after disarmament. Before
disarmament, people in Karamoja didn’t have interest in land. They were
typically nomads; pastoralists. No one was thinking of the value of land. After
disarmament, speculators came in, people started prospecting that there are
minerals in Karamoja. Secondly, even internal investors, the biggest land grabbers
were the elite class, the educated class, fellow Karamojongs.

Karamoja is endowed with gold, limestone, uranium, marble, graphite, gypsum, iron,
wolfram, nickel, copper, cobalt, lithium, and tin (Human Rights Watch, 2014; Mercy
Corps, 2016; UIA, 2016). Like many post-conflict areas rich in resources, the discovery
of valuable resources has led to high rates of land speculation and the granting of
concessions by the government to both foreign and domestic mining companies such as
Dow Marble, Tororo Cement, Jan Mangal, and East Africa Gold (Human Rights Watch,
2014). As a result, Karamoja has experienced high rates of extraction following the
establishment of a relative peace (Bruch et al., 2009). This has, in turn, exacerbated
conflict risk by producing a new set of challenges for the area. As described by a senior
member of the Mercy Corps team, and further reflecting the paradox of insecurity
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following the stabilization of Karamoja “our land was secure from insecurity because of
the insecurity.” Typical of post-conflict contexts, Karamoja’s management of resources is
both pivotal and perilous (see, for example, Bruch et al., 2009; Le Billon, 2001; Rustad &
Binningsbø, 2012; Suarez et al., 2018; UNEP, 2015 for broader discussions on postconflict resource management). It is pivotal because resource governance is an important
determinant of the durability of peace and stability and the reoccurrence of conflict
(Rustad & Binningsbø, 2012). But it is also perilous because in post-conflict development
settings there is often a low prioritization of environmental management over
socioeconomic recovery, a reliance upon primary production, and contestation over land
rights and land management. Therefore post-conflict areas are prone to high rates of
environmental degradation, land grabbing, and resource extraction
(Beevers, 2012; Bruch et al., 2009; Rustad & Binningsbø, 2012; Suarez et al., 2018;
Unruh & Williams, 2013).
The pursuit of resources and the ability to take advantage of nebulous land rights
has served as a powerful draw for large scale land grabs. Land grabs conducted just
within the boundaries of Ugandan law have had two notable impacts as it relates to the
shifting conflict landscape. First, they increase discontent with what is often described as
the elites (foreign nationals and educated Karamajong), who are perceived as taking
advantage of the land system to their advantage. Second, they act as a form of pressure on
the landscape that, when coupled with other challenges, affects localized conflicts such as
theft, resource access and conflict. Survey respondents and NGO officials described the
ways in which land grabs limited mobility for pastoralists and/or led to encroachment of
pastoralists onto agricultural land, contributing to increased incidence of theft and
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localized conflict in Karamoja. A Mercy Corps employee, whose job is focused on
mobilizing and training communities on land rights, described the frustrating and, at
times, overwhelming challenges facing community mobilization when there are so many
land-related pressures:
[Outside companies are coming] because of the mining and minerals: powerful
interests from Kampala come in and secure the land rights because up until now it
has been communal. [Sometimes] people will migrate due to the harsh climate
and that they will go 50 km and then set up in a new place where they have
resources for their cattle. The risk, though, is that while they are gone powerful
interests become interested in what is underneath the land. Then they become
squatters on their own land, with only limited rights.

Shifts in Livelihoods
A fundamental change in the region over the past decade is a rapidly growing
population focused on sedentary livelihoods, most often agriculture (S. Levine, Peters, &
Fan, 2014; Mercy Corps, 2016; Nakalembe et al., 2017). Multiple factors have combined
to push the population of Karamoja toward sedentary forms of livelihoods. This includes
land use policy related to modernization (Nakalembe et al., 2017) and shifts of customary
land to state use for mining, forestry, wildlife conservation and mineral exploration
(Human Rights Watch, 2014; S. Levine, 2010; Stites & Huisman, 2010). For example, as
described in an assessment of Karamoja’s resilience, Mercy Corps (2016, p. 6):
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Karamoja’s main livelihood strategies and the social, ecological, and economic
systems that underpin them are in transition. While the government’s most recent
disarmament campaign brought relative stability…this period also witnessed a
catastrophic decline in Karamoja’s livestock population on which communities
have traditionally depended for food, income, and collective identity. Largely out
of distress, households are turning towards agriculture, natural resource
extraction, urban livelihoods, and out-migration to meet basic needs.

These shifts, however, have potentially hindered overall food security in the
region. Despite a 299% increase in cultivated cropland between 2000 – 2011, there has
been no increase in per capita food production (Nakalembe et al., 2017, p. 9). But the
conversion of land to agriculture has limited pastoralists’ mobility and productivity,
(FAO, 2015; Mercy Corps, 2016; Nakalembe et al., 2017) enflaming land-related
tensions and increasing the risks for competing claims to land (Mercy Corps, 2016).

Placing climate into conflict in contemporary Karamoja
The perception of atmospheric changes in Karamoja amongst the research sample
of the, aligned with the literature reflecting biophysical change in Karamoja (Chaplin et
al., 2017; Egeru et al., 2014; USAID, 2017a). Namely, survey respondents described the
impacts of climate change largely in terms of when the rains come: 88% of the sample
described the primary effect of climate change as drought and 100% of the respondents
noted either the increased unpredictability of precipitation or drought. These impacts
were described in distinct but overlapping terms. Both focused on water access, and for
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some, pasture availability, but drought emphasized a shortening of the rainy seasons
while unpredictability emphasized uncertainty about when the rains would start and the
means in which they would fall (e.g., intense and short vs sporadic and long). For
example, as noted by an LC1 from Moroto District who described a feeling of frustration
with increasingly unpredictable weather patterns:
Those days, people start clearing and planting in February because good rains
started at that time or the beginning of March. By May or June we would start
eating fresh foods like beans. But these days, rains begin in May, worse this
year it started in June. These are great changes happening now.

Perceived Biophysical Changes
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Figure 3.6: Perceived Biophysical Changes (data source: survey questions focused on
biophysical changes in Karamoja, n=103).
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Socioeconomic Change and Conflict Outcomes
These biophysical changes create acute pressure on social and economic systems.
Because erratic rainfall and extended dry seasons are seen as the primary climate-related
challenges in Karamoja, it is not surprising that the most commonly-listed socioeconomic
effects of climate change reported by survey respondents revolve around food insecurity
and relate directly to these biophysical shifts. These include impacts on the productivity
of agriculture (reported by 69% of respondents) and/or pastoralism (57%), migration
(largely in search of resources) (69%), and resource conflict (largely over pasture and
water) (56%).

Socioeconomic Effets of Climate Change
Percentage of Respondants
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70%
60%
50%
40%
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Figure 3.7: Socioeconomic Effects of Climate Change (n=103)
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Whereas the literature on Karamoja demonstrates that the larger, sprawling
conflicts of the past reflected the overlapping challenges of a breakdown of the traditional
systems governing cattle raiding, an influx of small arms, and escalating retalitions and
counter relations (see, for example, Eaton 2007, 2008), the data collected for this paper
suggest that the new manifestations of conflict, which are far more localized and far less
severe, are linked to increasing pressures on the landscape that have followed the
stabilization of Karamoja. Insofar as climate change produces biophysical impacts that
exacerbate such pressures, for example by increasing the intensity of climate variability,
it is another source of pressure. For example, a Chief from Kaabong described the most
pressing security changes in his community as theft, which he believed could be
explained by the changing weather patterns, saying:
Due to lack of anything to eat because the drought affects crops, people are forced
to steal from other. This results in revenge and increasing conflicts and animal
theft.

Local government and NGO officials described how these pressures have
produced increases in theft, clashes between pastoralists groups, clashes between
pastoralists and agriculturalists, and in some cases, the pastoralists and the state (i.e.,
UWA). For example, an LC1 from Moroto district noted how communities from drier
areas tend to migrate to places of relative abundance, saying:
This year and last year [2016 and 2017] were terrible. Many Turkana, Pokot, Pian
moved to Nakonyen for pasture and water. This created struggle of these
communities over for pasture and water.
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And as described by a UPDF official based in Kaabong describing a similar phenomenon
but in a different area:
People get poor harvest due to delayed rains and long dry spell which affects crop
performance. With this, people are now forced to turn to environment for survival
and also moved to other areas like Kitgum, South Sudan which has led to
increased conflicts over land in those other areas. These are people who have
become enemies and thieves, because they steal in Karenga and then run to South
Sudan, just as they steal livestock or kill in South Sudan and then move to
Karenga. It becomes hard for the security to trace them because they keep
switching places

These claims, and the data more generally, speak to the considerable overlap in
survey respondents’ reporting of security risks and the socioeconomic outcomes of
climate change. As seen in Figure 3.9, theft, resource conflict, and even household
conflict were consistently, yet independently, described both as security concerns and
climate change impacts. This overlap suggests that the many stressors that residents of
Karamoja must navigate are deeply intertwined. This, in turn, suggests a connection
between the stresses and insecurities produced by climate variability and the stresses and
insecurity produced by changes to the wider political economy. Despite discourses that
often frame climate change as driving conflict there is not necessarily a clear chain of
causality. Nor is it clear that the wider political economic changes are having a larger
impact on conflict dynamics when comparted the effects of climate change. Rather, in
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Karamoja, the relationship between climate change and insecurity is best understood as
one defined by overlap and interaction resulting in a spiraling fragility and insecurity.
For many government officials, NGO workers, and residents in Karamoja, climate
change impacts were an important part of the new forms of localized conflict manifesting
in post-conflict Karamoja. For example, when asked about how weather changes were
being experienced in his village, an LC1 from Moroto District described how, in ‘those
days’, violent conflict was the biggest challenge to food security. In a resigned tone, he
described how, at present, extended, more intense dry seasons and unpredictable weather
were his biggest challenges. This LC1, like those who questioned the outcomes of this
period of development, was happy to see conflict decreasing in severity, but was deeply
concerned that new forms of vulnerability were manifesting. Strikingly, he, like the
Mercy Corps program officer, used language that compared the contemporary changes to
‘the gun’:
In the past, rains were okay. People used to get fruit but it was only the gun which
prevented people to cultivate, but now, the sun has become another gun. I think
the witch doctor who used to refuse with rain might have died, because the rain
has just come to wash the ground at the wrong time.
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Figure 3.8: Current Security and Current Socioeconomic Concerns in Karamoja (n=103)

The gun as a metaphor brings to the fore the fact that recent changes in Karamoja,
including climate change, are what Nixon, (2011, p. 2), describes as ‘slow violence’, or
‘violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is
dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as
violence at all.’ In the eyes of many residents, contemporary environmental change has
become part of a complex of challenges that together are at least comparable to the
extreme violence experienced in the region.

Conclusion
In this article, I demonstrated the ways in which climate change interacts with,
and potentially alters, contemporary conflict outcomes in Karamoja. In doing so, this
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paper provides a lens into the ways in which environmental change can interact with
post-conflict fragility. Where Karamoja once experienced sprawling, severe conflict with
high rates of violence, disarmament and the subsequent pressures on the landscape have
produced a new conflict dynamic which manifests in much more localized terms. These
shifts are driven by an interwoven set of issues including shifts to sedentary agriculture,
commercial resource extraction, and increasing climate variability/shifting weather
patterns being driven by climate change.
Central to understanding the shifting forms of conflict in Karamoja is an
acknowledgement that these manifestations of conflict are paradoxically linked to the
prevailing stability in the region that followed the disarmament. As such, the example of
Karamoja further highlights the importance of post-conflict environmental and resource
management, including addressing potential climate change impacts in post-conflict
settings (Conca & Wallace, 2009; Kovach & Conca, 2016). As is clear in this research,
ignoring the risks of climate change and resource management risks jeopardizing
peacebuilding efforts and could potentially shift how conflict manifests in the context of
place.
Finally, this article raises difficult questions about the deeply complex scales of
climate-conflict. The case of Karamoja illustrates the observation made in the wider
climate-conflict literature that the location of acute climate change impacts is not
necessarily where (or when) associated conflict outcomes emerge (Detges, 2014;
Gemenne et al., 2014; Ide et al., 2014; Salehyan, 2014). This research, therefore,
redoubles these calls for a more concerted examination of the spatial and temporal scales
of climate-conflict. Interventions that seek to address the joint challenges of climate
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change, conflict, and fragility, require the ability to discern locally-specific pathways
from climate change to conflict. Without these place-specific pathways, our
understandings of the relationship between climate change and conflict are limited to
broad terms and imprecise framings that cannot productively inform efforts to address
this connection in the places where such conflicts manifest.
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Introduction
Over the past decade, both academic and policy communities have given
significant attention to the potential connections between climate change and conflict
(e.g., Adger et al., 2013; Department of Defense, 2015; Gleditsch, 2012; Gleditsch &
Nordås, 2014; Hagel, 2014; McDonald, 2013; Obama, 2014; Reiling & Brady, 2015;
Salehyan, 2014; Stark, 2014; UNGA, 2009). And though much has been written on the
degree to which climate change does or does not affect conflict (e.g., Buhaug et al., 2014;
Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2013; Hsiang & Meng, 2014; Selby & Hoffmann, 2014), there
has been considerably less attention to understanding what it means to respond to the
joint challenges of climate change and conflict in development practice. That is despite
explicit efforts to integrate climate-conflict and climate-security concerns into policy
(see, for example, Obama, 2016; UNGA, 2009). This paper addresses this gap by
examining the barriers facing development practitioners in their efforts to address the
links between climate change and conflict.
I ground this research in the efforts of Mercy Corps, an international NGO that is
largely focused on complex crises (Levine, Wolfe, & Nicholson, 2016; Mercy Corps,
2018; Sagara & Hudner, 2017), as they sought to address the joint challenges of climate
change and conflict. Specifically, I focus on two programs Mercy Corps implemented in
Karamoja, Uganda: Building Resilience Against Climate Extremes and Disaster
(BRACED) and the third iteration of Peace in East and Central Africa (PEACE III).
Those programs offer a contrast: BRACED is a climate change-centric program that
exists in the backdrop of conflict/post-conflict dynamics; PEACE III is a conflict
mitigation and peacebuilding program that is seeking to integrate climate change into the
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core goals of the program, namely peacebuilding and conflict mitigation. The focus on
these specific programs allows me to trace how contemporary policy discourses of
climate change and conflict produce barriers to the design and implementation of
effective interventions on the ground. Activities within these projects also demonstrate
that when the climate-conflict nexus is reframed more broadly than just as a threat
multiplier, development implementers are able to address climate-conflict with programs
focused on cooperation and peacebuilding (e.g., Beck, 2014; Gemenne et al., 2014; Ide,
2018; Krampe, 2014; Matthew, 2014; Matthew & Hammill, 2012; Wolf, 2009)
In this paper, I demonstrate that the disparity between demand for development
programming addressing the conflict risks of climate change and the distinct lack of
clarity regarding what such programming might entail can largely be explained by three
overarching challenges. First, the near-ubiquitous ‘threat multiplier’ discourse represents
the relationship between climate and conflict in a unidirectional manner that closes off
discussion of alternative understandings of and approaches that might generate
productive interventions. Second, the climate-conflict relationship operates at multiple
scales, with climate impacts often occurring in one place, producing conflict outcomes in
another, and with most project scales too small to encompass these complex and often
disconnected geographies. Third, the inherent complexity of any climate-conflict
interaction, coupled with the unique challenges of program governance in conflict and
post-conflict settings, leads to a series of logistical and conceptual barriers that
complicate program design and implementation.
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Within these three overarching challenges are more specific – and overlapping –
barriers that plague efforts to address the relationship between climate change and
conflict have produced a series of overlapping barriers to learning and action, including:
•

The complexity and ambiguity of conceptualizing climate-conflict responses in
traditional framings of development

•

The potential incongruence between the scope of the issue and the scope of
implementing capacity

•

The temporal divide between acute and longer-term environmental change

•

The impact of metrics and measurements as factors steering programming

•

The logistical and security concerns inherent in conflict-related programming

This paper is organized as follows, I begin by briefly situating this research in the
climate change and conflict and development literatures before turning to the research
methods. I then describe the spatial, logistical, and conceptual barriers that complicate
development efforts targeting climate-conflict utilizing detailed examples to illustrate key
findings. These descriptions are illustrated by empirical examples drawn from fieldwork
conducted alongside Mercy Corps. I conclude the analysis with a discussion of the clearer
paths for development intervention that emerge when the narrow “threat multiplier”
framing climate change and conflict is widened.

Background: Climate-Conflict, Discourses, Barriers, and Scale
In 2007, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) issued a report entitled, National
Security and the Threat of Climate Change that described climate change as a ‘threat
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multiplier’ (CNA, 2007). That term, and the associated discourse, are now nearly
ubiquitous in the wide-ranging US Government policy communities tasked with
addressing climate-conflict interlinkages (Abrahams & Carr, 2017; Gemenne et al., 2014;
Gilmore, 2017).43 The threat multiplier framing suggests that climate change will not
independently cause conflict, but can hasten, trigger, and/or exacerbate conflict and
conflict risk (CNA, 2007; Johnstone & Mazo, 2011; UNGA, 2009). The threat multiplier
discourse, while helpful in moving away from simplified causal arguments which can
overemphasize the role of climate change impacts in a particular conflict, has been shown
to be limiting as it ignores other ways climate change and conflict interact (Abrahams &
Carr, 2017). These include that climate change impacts can serve as an impetus for
peacebuilding (Conca & Dabelko, 2002; Conca & Wallace, 2009; Dinar et al., 2015;
Gemenne et al., 2014; Ide, 2018), the role of conflict in climate change vulnerability
(Adger et al., 2014; Gemenne et al., 2014) and the potential of adaptation efforts to
trigger conflict (Dabelko et al., 2013; Milman & Arsano, 2014; Snorek, Renaud, &
Kloos, 2014).
The literature on climate change and conflict can be conceptualized as a subset of
the wider environmental security literature (Floyd, 2008). It invokes the branch of
political ecology that examines how environmental degradation does – or does not –
affect conflict (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Le Billon, 2001; Peluso & Watts, 2001), and how
the sources of that degradation are themselves shaped by larger political-economic
processes (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Blakie & Blaikie, 1985; Carr, 2013). As has been
demonstrated across a wide range of political ecological studies, the spatial and temporal
43

CNA recently reframed climate change to a ‘conflict catalyst’ (CNA, 2014). Despite this change, the
threat multiplier framing continues to dominate the policy landscape.
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scales at which a particular topic or case is examined alters how that topic or case is
understood (e.g., Barnes, 2015; Brown & Purcell, 2005; Carr et al., 2015). The
relationship between climate change and conflict is no exception, as it engages myriad
stakeholders and processes that operate across diffuse spatial and temporal scales
(Barnett & Adger, 2007; Busby, 2008; Gleditsch, 2012). Therefore, meaningful
understandings of climate-conflict relationships require a nuanced appreciation of the
ways in which these processes and people interact in particular contexts and across
particular scales (Carr et al., 2015; Detges, 2014; Gleditsch, 2012; Ide & Scheffran, 2014;
Meierding, 2013; Salehyan, 2014; Scheffran et al., 2012).
This conceptual framing of the geographic and temporal specificity of climate
change and conflict relationships highlights a critical lack of evidence to inform the
productive design of programs and interventions in particular contexts. While there is
general agreement that climate change will not lead to conflict between states, at other
scales of analysis there is limited agreement about the extent of climate-conflict
relationships (Adger et al., 2014; Gemenne et al., 2014; Salehyan, 2014). Furthermore,
arguments both emphasizing and refuting the impacts of climate change on conflict are
either framed at a very broad scale without considering how their scale of analysis might
shape research findings, or extrapolated from one context to another without adequate
consideration of the validity of such a practice (Ide, 2017; Ide & Scheffran, 2014; Lewis
& Lenton, 2015). As argued by Buhaug (2015, p. 4)
Over-aggregation in time and space implies blending important data signals with
noise and obstructs the detection of systematic co-variation patterns in the data—
if such exist at a finer spatiotemporal scale.
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Despite calls for more explicit consideration of scale in academic research
examining the relationship between climate change and conflict, the consideration of
temporal and spatial dimensions in this literature, in policy formation, and in
implementation, remains sporadic at best (Gemenne et al., 2014; Salehyan, 2014). As
noted by Salehyan (2014, p. 2), “Much of the confusion in the literature stems from the
fact that analyses are often conducted at different scales, making comparisons across
studies quite difficult.”
This paper addresses multiple gaps in the climate-conflict and climate-security
literature. First, this paper provides direct insight into the quotidian processes by which
broad discourses are translated directly into development programming. Second this
research offers insight into how the complexities of scale inherent to climate changeconflict relationships present a fundamental barrier to the design and implementation of
adaptation efforts aimed at minimizing the risk of conflict. Third, by outlining the
conceptual and institutional barriers to addressing the relationship between climate
change and conflict, this paper provides direct insight into more productive means of
designing and implementing meaningful interventions that address place-specific threats
of conflict and climate change vulnerability (Biesbroek et al., 2013).

Research Methods

I utilized a mixed-methods approach for data collection. Data sources included
participant observation, interviews, a survey, and a document review focused on gray
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literature and program documents. Participant observation was the primary method used
in this research. Because this paper is focused on the identification of barriers to
development efforts targeting the conflict threats associated with climate change, the
research findings draw heavily from approximately nine months working alongside
Mercy Corps staff in various offices.44 A central premise of the research design was that
development does not happen solely at the field site. As such, fieldwork extended beyond
Karamoja to Mercy Corps offices in Kampala, Nairobi, Washington, D.C., and
organizational headquarters in Portland, Oregon. Spending time at multiple offices
enabled me to understand how the discourses of climate-conflict travel across time and
space to become policy, programming, and ultimately something that exists on the
ground.
While observation-based data are central to this article, I triangulated that data
with data gathered through a suite of other methods. Though I conducted some formal
semi-structured interviews with key informants (n=10), some of the richest data came
from interview-like informal conversations that emerged in the context of project
activities I was observing. This proved very fruitful as I was able to ask questions and
engage in conversations based on the immediate context. Due to their informality and
unplanned character, those interactions resemble unstructured interviews, though their
spontaneity suggests they are better characterized as conversations. The data were also
supplemented with interviews with government and policy officials (n=29) on US
governmental approaches to climate security (Abrahams, forthcoming).

44

February 2016 – March 2016 – primarily in Nairobi, KE; Wajir, KE and Moroto, UG; October 2016–
November 2016 – primarily in Moroto, UG and Kampala, UG; January 2017 – March 2017 – primarily in
Moroto, UG and Kampala, UG; October – November 2017 – primarily in Moroto, UG and Kampala, UG.
Additionally, I conducted two different visits to Portland, Oregon in June of 2017 and January 2018.
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In order to better understand the Karamoja context, I conducted a survey focused
on government officials in the region (n=103). The survey focused on the perspectives of
local governance officials, primarily Local Council 1s (LC1s)45, on 1) climate and
environmental change; 2) conflict and security; and 3) NGO activity. The focus on local
government officials was purposeful. My experiences suggested that this population is
aware of both the issues facing individuals in their community and the more macro
effects of policy and development. Moreover, because the majority of LC1s live in their
respective communities, they could speak to both the day-to-day and the existential
challenges facing their areas as well as how climate change, conflict, and development
relate to those challenges. This allowed considerable insight into the shifting conflict,
economic, and physical landscapes in the region. Furthermore, their roles required
interaction with my primary research topic: the development apparatus in the region.
The gray literature utilized in this research includes internal documents from the
two Mercy Corps programs, such as quarterly and annual reports, initial grant documents,
internal memos, and documents from partners. Many of those documents were provided
to me directly by Mercy Corps. I was also given access to Mercy Corps intranet, which
allowed me to download these reports and other Mercy Corps material. I collected
artifacts such as handouts at meetings, attendance lists, and program activity summaries
used in reporting. Finally, I utilized reports, briefs, and policy documents available on the
Internet related to the research topic. Taken together, these documents and artifacts

45

LC1 stands for Local Council 1. It is the most localized elected representative within the Uganda system.
They represent villages and report to an LC3 (who represents the sub-county) who in turn reports to an LC5
(who represents the district). The LC1 can be conceptualized as a combined village mayor and
representative.
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provided insight into the organization’s approach to the relationship between climate
change and conflict, and development more generally.
To facilitate my analysis of why certain barriers existed, how they affected
programming, and the extent to which they affected climate-conflict response, I utilized
qualitative software (MAXQDA). I used this software to organize the data, which
included detailed field notes, gray literature, interview transcripts and program
documents, by different themes such as the different pressures facing the organization;
the different types of interactions amongst different types of stakeholders; the role of
scale in responding to climate-conflict; and different perspectives on climate-conflict.
This enabled me to identify key patterns across the different data sources, and, as needed,
further refine data analysis.
The codes were developed deductively during an initial review of the data, then
refined to create a simpler schema (Emerson et al., 2011). This process was done twice.
The coding structure was then utilized to review specific combinations of topic whereby I
created a more granular set of codes. From there, key patterns were identified and
examined based on specific criteria. In total there are 20 primary codes, each with a
range of 1-17 sub-codes. The data were coded for descriptive factors (e.g., location and
program), local variable (e.g., hazards and conflict patterns), relationship dynamics (e.g.,
central government interactions with implementing agencies), and a host of themes that
relate closely to the papers in this dissertation (e.g., pressures on the landscape, barriers to
implementation, scale, and Mercy Corps processes).
To enhance the validity of the findings, I member-checked the research after
completing data collection by presenting my preliminary findings to key Mercy Corps
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personnel in the Moroto, Uganda and Kampala, Uganda offices, as well as domestic
offices in Portland, Oregon, and in Washington, DC (Emerson et al., 2011). In all cases, I
presented the work and then facilitated a discussion with the staff on hand. While there
was only limited disagreement with the research findings, this proved useful as it always
led to nuanced conversations between people in the room that clarified my
interpretations. In addition to confirming the findings, this process also helped clarify the
differences in Mercy Corps perceptions of climate-conflict across different institutional
positionalities.

Climate Change and Conflict: Spatial Complexity and Implementation
Challenges
Throughout data collection, research participants from different sectoral,
geographic, and disciplinary perspectives expressed a common framing of climateconflict linkages: climate change was negatively affecting conflict outcomes (usually
framed as a threat multiplier). This framing was followed by an explanation of a need to
address the link (often expressed in terms of ‘threat mitigation or ‘threat minimizers’) and
uncertainty as to how and where to ‘minimize’ or ‘mitigate’ climate-conflict links.
The discursive framing of the climate-conflict relationship rests upon two implicit
assumptions, both of which are called into question in this research. The first is the notion
that scarcity is always a driver of conflict. The second is that scarcity and conflict overlap
spatially and thus can be addressed with geographically targeted programming. The
former is a long-contested issue in the broader environmental security and political
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ecology literature (e.g., Dalby, 2009; Peluso & Watts, 2001). The second, though
challenged (e.g., Detges, 2014), has received less attention from the academic
community.
In most documented instances of climate-conflict interactions, there is little
spatial continuity between climate change impacts and the sites in which those impacts
contribute to conflict. Rather, at the scales typical of development practice, climate
change impacts are experienced in place A, conflict outcomes are experienced in place B,
and, in some cases, key social, economic, and political processes that translated climate
impacts into conflict outcomes extend across and transcend both the sites of impact and
conflict (Gemenne et al., 2014; Salehyan, 2014). Those spatial patterns were evident in
Karamoja, where climate change is part of an tapestry of political ecological factors
exerting pressure on the landscape and leading to localized small-scale conflict. The
effects of climate change have led to a longer dry season and a shorter, more intense
rainy season. Those biophysical impacts, taken in combination with changes in land use
and land access, have led to increasing pressure on the landscape, which has produced
localized conflicts largely centered on resource access and theft (Mercy Corps, 2016;
Powell, 2010; Stites & Akabwai, 2009). However, it was often not the places that most
acutely felt the effects of climate change where there was conflict, rather it was in
proximate places of relative abundance (see also Detges, 2014). For example, survey
respondents consistently noted a preponderance of conflict and theft during the dry
season in and around Teso, an area on the border of Uganda’s greenbelt as well as
localized conflict in areas of relative abundance near the Kenyan border (which receives
considerably less rainfall) between the Turkana (of Kenya) and Ugandans.
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All of which raises an important question: if scarcity is what translates environmental
change to conflict, why is it that the sites of scarcity are often not the sites of conflict?
Indeed, how is it that sites of relative abundance seem to experience resource conflicts?
These questions are germane to the organizations tasked with addressing climate-conflict,
as it speaks to their ability to identify the sources of conflicts they seek to minimize or
mitigate, and therefore to design appropriate interventions that might achieve such goals.
In the following subsections I describe the specific barriers that produce uncertainty and
complicate development efforts targeting the joint challenges of climate change and
conflict.

Conceptualizing Climate-Conflict Response: Complexity and Ambiguity
In October 2016, PEACE III convened a two-day meeting in Kapenguria, Kenya,
to train stakeholders and partners on how to integrate climate change and conflict into
their peacebuilding work. The meeting, entitled Integrating Climate Change Adaptation,
Natural Resource Management in the Karamoja Cluster: A Roll-Out and Sensitization
Workshop for Stakeholders, had the stated purpose of identifying the ways in which
PEACE III could address climate change and conflict. In attendance were elected
officials from Kenya and Uganda, including the PEACE III-defined zones of Amudat,
West/North Pokot, Turkana, South Omo, and Karamoja, representatives from Ugandan
governmental agencies, Mercy Corps employees, and staff of partner NGOs and CBOs.
In total there were 27 participants packed into a hotel meeting room. For two days, the
organizer walked the group through exercises, presented on the risks climate change can
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pose for conflict, and occasionally sought to energize the group with dances and icebreakers.

Figure 4.1: PEACE III Areas of Operation, Source of Figure (PEACE III 2016)

At the end of the second and final day of the workshop, the moderator broke the
attendees into four groups based on geographic zones. He then tasked each group with
identifying initiatives that would address the links between climate change and conflict in
their communities – this was done with the intent of identifying locally appropriate
interventions that might then be funded. All four groups, despite working independently,
came up with the same intervention: sensitize their community to charcoal extraction as a
means to curb deforestation. This, each group explained, would limit deforestation and
therefore the biophysical changes that are shifting weather patterns and are driving
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conflict. In other words, they had attributed local conflict to environmental change, and
the environmental changes in question not to global commerce or carbon emissions from
the Global North, but to their own activities.46
INTEGRATING CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION, NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT
DRAFT MOROTO DISTRICT STAKEHOLDERS INTERVENTION ACTION PLAN
MAY, 2016 - MARCH, 2017

ISSUE

STAKEHOLDERS

OBJECTIVES

TACTICS

Charcoal
burning

Stakeholder 1: Moroto
District Local Government
Council

Objective 1:
Integrate climate
change, natural
resource and conflict
into the district
development plan

Tactic 1:
Letter to LDC and NRM Office
By-law drafting Workshop with key stakeholders

Objective 2:
Promote the
Adoption of energy
saving options

Tactic 2:
Meetings with the community and other stakeholders
Establishment of Karamoja conflict,C.C & NRM reduction days
Exposure/exchange visits

Stakeholder 2: CSOs

Stakeholder 3:
Community Leaders

Objective 3:
To build community
awareness on the
interrelatedness of
natural resource,
conflict and climate
change.

Tactic 3:
Stakeholder trainings
NRM, C.C & conflict mitigation consultative meetings
Community sensitization forums
Tactic 4: Mass media campaigns

Figure 4.2: A completed template from the PEACE III workshop. Note that the issue
identified is charcoal production, not larger drivers of climate change that might present
conflict challenges
While I do not question that there are social and/or environmental benefits to limiting
timber extraction or charcoal production, there is little evidence to suggest that
sensitizing communities to charcoal production would do anything to address climate
46

It is of note, PEACE III did not follow through with these interventions. A PEACE III official asked me
to review the action plans; I expressed my concerns regarding its possible limitations and the focus on
charcoal. He largely agreed with me, noting that this conceptual challenge is a common problem they have
faced since being tasked with addressing climate change, specifically a lack of personnel with climate
expertise, and a general lack of understanding of the issue. Aligning with my experiences in the region, he
further noted that they often see a conflation of charcoal and climate change. I later asked a senior
BRACED official about this conflation, she explained to me that contextualizing climate change for the
community had been difficult and it was often framed by development agencies in the context of
deforestation.

293

change, conflict, or any connections between the two. The carbon emissions from
community-scale production are negligible in the scheme of global emissions, the amount
of land cover change is likely less than the changes that result from commercial resource
extraction and pressures to shift into sedentary agriculture.47 It would seem unlikely that
charcoal is bringing about changes in the hydrological cycle extreme enough to alter
conflict outcomes. Therefore, sensitization offers little, if any, climate-conflict benefit
and increases the risk of further marginalizing the already economically-marginal girls
and women who dominate charcoal production. As described by a senior PEACE III
official in reference to past efforts to sensitize communities to charcoal production:
They [communities reliant upon charcoal production] were asking us, ‘you are telling
us to stop cutting trees to burn charcoal!?’ Where do you want us to get money
from!? And it’s not even us. It’s people who come from Nairobi with trucks to come
and ferry this charcoal. It’s not us, it is them who are bringing us money.’

I use this example not to criticize the group, the facilitator, or the program, but to
highlight how the threat multiplier framing of climate change’s role in conflict,
particularly the ways in which it implicitly assumes a spatial overlap between the sites of
scarcity/environmental challenge and the site of conflict, creates challenges in
conceptualizing place-specific programming. This example also further demonstrates that
when a particular conflict is attributed to climate change, one must understand not only
the sources, magnitude, and severity of any changes and their associated impacts, but also
the pathways by which those impacts affect conflict outcomes or create opportunities for
47

For a broader discussion on land use change in Karamoja see, for example Nakalembe, Dempewolf, &
Justice, (2017).
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peacebuilding in a particular place. Without this understanding, responding to climaterelated conflicts becomes extremely difficult. In the case of this workshop, the facilitators
and the group did not explore either the biophysical changes or the pathways by which
those changes were translated into conflict. Further, their task – address climate-conflict
in their community – explicitly bounded their spatial framing of climate change-conflict
linkages. As a result, the participants, partners, and indeed Mercy Corps found
themselves focused on the challenges that they could see in their community. Further,
reflecting pressures I will discuss below, they all described achievable (and quantifiable)
programming very typical of ongoing development efforts in the region.

Scale of the Issue, Scales of Implementation
I presented the preliminary findings of this research at Mercy Corps headquarters
in Portland, Oregon in January of 2018. In attendance were eight senior members of
Mercy Corps, representing technical support teams, geographically-focused senior
programmatic management, and organizational leadership. I described how, in Karamoja,
there had been widespread attention to charcoal as a driver of climate change in
Karamoja. I also explained that there had been very limited discussion of the impacts of
commercial resource extraction that followed the prevailing peace in the area, even
though commercial resource extraction is likely having a greater effect on landscape
degradation when compared to charcoal-driven deforestation. I argued that, based on my
time in Karamoja, it might be unreasonable to expect an NGO that focuses on groundlevel vulnerabilities and works directly with communities to address an issue as complex
and wide-ranging as land grabs that were being driven, in part, by commercial resource
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extraction pressures that transcended Karamoja. That notion was questioned by multiple
members of leadership and led to a detailed discussion regarding the organization’s
vision for its work, whether the organization can resolve this sort of multi-layered
problem, and the varied pressures Mercy Corps staff feel from a wide range of
stakeholders, including donors and the intended beneficiaries of their work. In arguing
that the organization can and should take on such challenges, a member of the Energy,
Environment, and Climate (EEC) team emphasized the organization’s often-expressed
focus on being innovative and its lead-do-not-follow ethos, arguing “even if we’re taking
a risk, we need to be trying to address issues at scale, because if we’re not thinking about
this issue, no one else is.”
This discussion with Mercy Corps staff illustrates the gap between the wide
variety of ways in which vulnerabilities emerge in particular places and the constrained
means NGOs, and development more generally, have to address them. Some of Mercy
Corps’ leadership expressed the view that if commercial resource extraction is creating
vulnerability to environmental change, which in turn was contributing to humanitarian
crises, then commercial resource extraction is what they ought to target with
interventions. Others noted that their traditional focus, and their strength, is at the
community level, and focusing on large-scale challenges risks jeopardizing their efforts
to address the most vulnerable groups within populations. Moreover, there was
uncertainty about donor willingness to fund high-risk but potentially high-impact
initiatives, in part because of difficulties of reporting on the progress of such work and
the donor demand for achievable projects – an issue further examined below. Finally, as
was also expressed to me in the different Uganda offices, though they would like to work
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to address resource extraction, it is a sensitive topic and one that could jeopardize their
relationships with key government officials – relationships needed to operate in
Karamoja. Thus, it was clear, that even within a single development organization with a
broadly shared ethos, notions of agency, ‘the socioculturally mediated capacity to act’
(Ahearn, 2001, p. 112), were subjective, political, and contestable (see also Barnes,
2015).
While demonstrating that views within Mercy Corps are far from monolithic, this
discussion also illustrates how efforts to identify appropriate development responses do
not happen in a vacuum. Questions about scale (social, temporal, and spatial),
institutional priorities, and the balance of achievability and effectiveness govern the
selection and design of interventions. Those institutional questions become particularly
acute in the context of climate change and conflict, where there may not be enough
information to allow for clear answers that inform the character of programs on the
ground and address whether such programs should be undertaken in the first place.

Temporal Divides: Climate Change and Conflict
Much was discussed and debated during the annual planning meeting of Mercy
Corps’ Environment, Energy, and Climate (EEC) Technical Support Unit (TSU) team in
June of 2017. The meeting, which was held in a bright comfortable space in Mercy
Corps’ headquarters in Portland, covered topics ranging from the most efficient use of
internal communication tools, the impacts of biophysical change in places where they
work, partner performance, and the impacts of personnel changes in the organization.
Steering much of their discussion, however, were the myriad challenges and frustrations
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facing the TSU in their efforts to integrate ecosystem and environmental-centric priorities
into an organization that focuses primarily on complex crises, including, increasingly,
conflict and post-conflict settings.
The EEC team is spread across offices in multiple cities, therefore these sorts of
meetings are rare and valuable opportunities for them to convene in person, plan, and
discuss strategy. That the team spent much of their time discussing how to best message
and sell their expertise within Mercy Corps as well as to external stakeholders speaks to a
wider challenge in the humanitarian aid community. Despite the organization’s
acknowledgement of the importance of environmental sustainability in complex crisis,
and its adherence to do-no-harm principles (e.g., Mercy Corps, 2018), for Mercy Corps,
and development and relief organizations more generally, there exists a series of factors
that push the organization away from longer-term environmental issues toward shorterterm concerns and outcomes (Henley-Shephard et al., 2017). These factors include
community priorities in the backdrop of acute crisis, the complications of measuring
environmental change and adaptation to that change, the role of metrics-driven
evaluation, funding silos, and a lack of personnel with environmental backgrounds.
Moreover, for Mercy Corps, an organization that conducts a significant amount of work
in conflict and post-conflict contexts, there is also the core challenge that the immediacy
of conflict often relegates climate change (and environmental priorities, more broadly) to
a lower institutional priority, even if the environment is seen as the root of a particular
conflict (see Abrahams, 2014 for a discussion of similar challenges in post-disaster
recovery).
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Figure 4.3: Example of Resilient Design Agriculture
The conceptual challenges that emerged in the meeting in Portland could be seen
quite clearly on the ground in Karamoja. The following example illustrates the BRACED
project’s challenges with resilient-design agriculture in Karamoja, particularly how the
temporal immediacy of acute stresses can push community priorities out of alignment
project goals that include longer-term environmental benefits. On February 07, 2017,
near to the peak of the dry season, John (a pseudonym), a BRACED program officer on
the natural resource management (NRM) team, returned from the field. The project he
was then implementing, known as resilient-design agriculture, seeks to increase the
productivity of agriculture by manipulating the land to retain water and increase
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agricultural output. John’s focus on this project was to work with the community to
prepare the site for the upcoming rainy season in order to be ready for planting season in
March. On this day, he was uncharacteristically visibly frustrated. When we spoke, he
described how around that time of year, communities become extremely focused on
short-term challenges. As a result, programming focused on mid-term or longer-term
time horizons became more difficult to implement.
John’s core frustration was that despite the community previously expressing
excitement for the project, he struggled to recruit community members for its final stages.
John believed this challenge could be explained by the lack of immediate benefits of the
project in the face of acute crisis (i.e., food insecurity). This made selling the long-term
benefits of the program a largely uphill battle, despite the fact that it was designed to
address the dry season challenges that drove the community’s focus to the short term.
John, who is Karamajong, was sympathetic to the community’s challenges during the
extended dry season, noting, “During this time, they may only be taking water.”48 Yet he
saw this lack of participation as flawed reasoning, noting “it is short-term thinking”
driven by both acute crisis and structures of remuneration within Mercy Corps and
development more broadly.
By no means are these temporal challenges specific to Mercy Corps or Karamoja.
In fact, Karamoja, which is accessible and relatively stable, likely represents a best-case
scenario for addressing climate-conflict linkages through development programming. It is
therefore telling that the challenges described above were experienced across
humanitarian organizations in the region. A research participant who worked on climate

48

The verb ‘taking’ in the context refers to both eating and drinking; it is synonymous with ‘consuming’.
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change for a different humanitarian agency described her challenges integrating climate
change into their work in a similar manner. Specifically, she described how places with a
history of conflict or actively experiencing conflict are more vulnerable to climate-related
shocks, but the ability to implement efforts to mitigate those shocks are impeded by those
very contexts:
Humanitarian [agencies] who respond to the immediate disaster have been very
reluctant to go beyond their immediate mandate: To be reactive and responsive…
And the climate change programming that is happening in those countries is not
necessarily linking up to that. First of all it’s not necessarily occurring in
countries, the LDCs [least developed countries] have the lowest capacity to get
funding, right, to do these types of programs. It’s the middle-income countries,
like the Philippines, who are really good at getting funding for climate work; for
having climate change adaptation plans. It’s fragile, poorly functioning countries
that have very poor governance, that are not getting a lot of climate change
funding. There is not a lot of programs going on because of security issues, but
yet they are the ones where the impacts of climate change are the worst on
humans.

Another version of this challenge was evident amongst policy officials working
on the relationship between climate change and conflict. A wide range of research
participants, including people working for development donors, development
implementers, and defense organizations, noted that in the context of conflict, climate
change is not going to be a political priority relative to the more immediate need to
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respond to or otherwise mitigate conflict. For example, as described by a policy official
working for a research institute heavily involved with climate-conflict:
The challenge is that these are generally, [though not always] high-likelihood and
low-risk events. They are gradual and insidious and there are other things
garnering peoples’ attentions. This ranges from the risk of nuclear attacks to the
issues ongoing in Syria, Israel, Russia, etc. And basically, we [the policy and
defense community] tend to skew towards headlines and not trend lines. Climate
change and security is about trend lines. It gets pushed to the back burner because
it can be dealt with on somebody else's watch. People are going to worry about
what is nipping at their heels, not gradual, more opaque issues.

Development programs and interventions are designed to address challenges
facing particular communities over well-defined spatial and temporal scales. The
complexity of the relationship between climate change and conflict render such temporal
and spatial definition very challenging. But the urgency of acute complex crises,
including conflicts that are seen as enhanced or triggered by climate change impacts,
drive the focus of communities and agencies towards spatially and temporally confined
outcomes. Rather than attempt to program around a spatially complex challenge that
might not fully manifest for decades such as climate change, organizations will prioritize
addressing immediate concerns in specific places, even when climate change or other
environmental stressors are perceived to be at the root of a particular conflict, (Abrahams,
2014; Kovach & Conca, 2016). Those responses create institutional expectations and
implicit priorities that, in turn, limit agencies’ ability to build and employ political and
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financial capital to address the biophysical shift that might be at the heart of the acute
crisis at hand.

Program Governance: The Governmentality of Metrics
In February of 2017, we arrived at what is known as a ‘model village’ where the
many components of the BRACED – gender, governance, markets, natural resource
management, and land-focused advocacy – were being implemented. After the roughly
30 minute car ride, BRACED program staff, senior BRACED personnel, and
representatives from the donor and fund manager hopped out of the land cruisers and
were immediately greeted by no less than 100 community members. The community
sang and danced to celebrate our arrival, an event that was notably well-choreographed
(Figure 4.4). The donor visit, long-planned and logistically complex, consisted of
presentations from program staff, meetings with government officials, demonstrations of
how R&D and permagardens were implemented, and sit-downs with representatives from
land committees. Like the performance that greeted our arrival, the visit was also wellchoreographed. Throughout their visit, the donor representatives visited field sites,
chatted with program staff, asked questions of program recipients, took pictures, and
audited supplies. By the end of their visit, the representatives were visibly exhausted and
sunburnt.
Among Mercy Corps’ BRACED staff, there was widespread agreement that the
visit had gone well. The reports that followed suggested that the donor organization was
indeed impressed. Multiple BRACED staff members beamed about an email they
received from the country director that lauded their efforts. The team’s considerable
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effort to run a smooth, effective donor visit was further validated when they were
awarded BRACED 2.0, a follow-up award to the original program.

Figure 4.4: The Choreographed Dance at the Model Village Visit

This outcome, however, was far more than the product of one good field visit.
Long before the donor visit, in a board room in Nairobi, an evaluation specialist
representing DfID described the sort of programming that would best achieve the goals
defined by DfID and lead to Mercy Corps being judged positively. He stressed
achievable, cross-cutting programs that would speak to the broad goals of the program
and allow resilience to be measured in the timespan of the grant. He described the
clusters, outcomes, and results that Mercy Corps ought to target though never giving
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direct instructions. By the end of the meeting, a whiteboard had been filled with the sorts
of targets, outcomes, and results that would lead to Mercy Corps being judged positively
by the evaluators and donor.
Mercy Corps program staff were then tasked with developing specific and
measurable ways to judge the efficacy of the programs. They did so in consultation with
field staff and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) officers. Thus, the outcome of the
discussion in Nairobi functioned both as guidelines and confines by which program
directors, managers, officers, and M&E specialists positioned ground-level work. Over
the following months, the program was revamped and reorganized following shifts in
personnel and changes in geographic focus. There was considerable focus on achievable
and measurable outcomes that spoke to the goals outlined in this meeting. The
whiteboard’s influence, therefore, continued throughout the life of the program.
In the weeks leading up to their arrival, I traveled with multiple BRACED team
members to find sites that, with these revamped goals in mind, would best demonstrate
the effectiveness of the program to the donors and evaluators during their time in Moroto.
Program officers checked programmatic progress and met with program recipients to
help ensure that the donors were taken to sites where BRACED funds were being
effectively implemented. Places lacking visible progress, or that had struggled to properly
implement programs, were deemed best to avoid. Thus, the on-the-ground choreography
of the donor visit was not a one-day performance, but the outcome of a series of decisions
and prioritizations that informed the particular sites to visit and outcomes to emphasize.
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Figure 4.5: Following a meeting with an evaluation consultant, a white board in Mercy
Corps’ Nairobi Office is filled with ideas and categories that were intended to steer
programmatic efforts towards positive evaluation

When placed into the larger context of program management, the donor visit
reveals a great deal about how both donors and implementers understand the challenge at
hand, how best to address it, and how to measure the impacts of efforts to address the
challenge. The goals of the donor, the fund manager, and the evaluator all coalesced
around the development of a shared understanding of what the effective use of program
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funds looks like. Or, as plainly stated by one of the fund manager representatives in an
interview, ‘our role is to ensure delivery of the projects and that taxpayer money is well
spent.’ Behind this statement, however, are many assumptions, including that a project
can be measured and judged effectively.
Identifying and measuring effectiveness is a ubiquitous yet nebulous challenge
facing development organizations. Andrew Natsios, a former Administrator of USAID
(from 2001-2006), describes how ‘obsessive measurement disorder’ complicates
development and leads to more risk adverse forms of programming (Natsios, 2010).
While considerable resources are dedicated to understanding, measuring, and reporting
on program efficacy (Carr-Hill, 2013; Natsios, 2010), those metrics can, intentionally or
unintentionally, function as tools of coercion governing how a program is translated from
concept to implementation (Carr-Hill, 2013; Carr, 2013). In particular, as Natsios (2010)
notes, if the outcomes of monitoring and measurement are punitive, obsessive
measurement can lead organizations and individuals to emphasize programs that are
likely to meet measurement targets (thus protecting their funding and jobs) whether or
not particular interventions actually achieve development goals or deliver meaningful
benefits to target communities.
Adding to challenges of program governance is the question of how policy
communities, development in particular, approach and fund cross-sectoral issues. In
interviews, multiple policy-focused officials stressed that because climate-conflict
connections cross sectors, agencies, and priorities, the cross-sectoral nature of climate
conflict was, in and of itself, a fundamental barrier to addressing the nexus. For example,
as described by a State Department employee regarding climate change, water, and
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security, framing it as an issue that will be hard for the organization to address with
policy, in large part, due to the cross-sectoral nature:
You know it’s a tough thing to focus on, obviously it’s a security issue, it’s an
economic issue, it’s a human rights issue, for many, it’s a gender issue; but it is
incredibly cross-cutting and its non-standardized. So it’s not exactly an easy topic
to internalize within this building.

The cross-cutting character of climate-conflict challenges creates institutional
issues because, as explained by a USAID employee, this issue lacks a clear funding
source due to the ‘stove piping’ of development funding structures.
One of the more bureaucratic, but most common problems is that it [climate
change and conflict] is a really cross-cutting set of issues. And we aren't really
well-funded and our ways of allocating money aren't really well designed to cope
with cross-cutting issues. We have an ear mark for climate adaptation work and
the work that happens under it has to be attributable explicitly to a certain set of
criteria which defines what adaptation looks like to climate drivers. Right? That’s
what the money is for. And it’s what you have to do. So blending that with other
objectives is tough.

Development outcomes are influenced by efforts to quantify and measure their
efficacy. Climate-conflict challenges, by nature of their complex scales and crossdisciplinary character, present unique challenges for developing and implementing policy
and programming targeting this specific issue. Moreover, as a result of the inherent
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complexity of climate-conflict connections, and the malleability and interpretability of
the threat multiplier framing, there exists considerable space for metrics and reporting
requirements to influence development inputs and outcomes. Thus, perhaps more than
other topics with more straight-forward spatial and temporal dynamics, programming
targeting climate-conflict both complicates and is complicated by efforts at program
governance.

Logistics and Security
In October of 2017 members of the PEACE III team, myself, and a handful of its
partners were en route to a program site in northern Karamoja, when about one hour into
the drive the Land Cruiser began bumping along the dirt road. The seven of us in the car
immediately knew what had happened: a flat or ‘punctured’ tire. In Karamoja, punctures
are little more than an unavoidable annoyance, not unlike traffic in Kampala. The dirt
roads strewn with sharp rocks and (according to the drivers) the poor-quality tires that
suffer at the combination of friction and heat combine to make this sort of event
inevitable. We pulled over and the driver, who is notably practiced at changing tires,
climbed to the roof, passed down the jack, threw down the spare tire, climbed down, and
within moments, the car was jacked up. However, this time something had gone wrong: a
lug nut was stuck (Figure 4.6). The nut lay obstinately motionless as we each tried our
hands at solving the problem – brute force proving inadequate. With no feasible ride
coming soon, for the next hour we improvised, brainstormed, and exhausted our
shoulders trying to pry it off. Finally, with the aid of some extracted engine oil and all the
torque two of us could muster, the nut slipped off. Minutes later, we were back on the
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road. In total, this process took 85 minutes. In my experience, tires normally were
changed in under eight minutes.49
This incident was annoying and slightly inconvenient – it turned a 3.5 hour ride
into 5 hours, but it was little more than a reality of being a development organization in a
place with poor infrastructure. Karamoja is currently stable (Stites et al., 2016), if it had
been 10 years prior, however, this incident would have been something far more serious.
Prior to disarmament, Karamoja was a dangerous place for NGOs operating in the region.
And, as described by Barclay (2018), implementing in a conflict zone requires many
considerations and contingencies due to the inherent risk of operations. Demonstrating
the seriousness and dangers of working in Karamoja in years past, multiple people in the
car had been attacked in ambushes, and at least one of them had been shot. When we
returned from the field visit, I asked one of the senior staff members what it would have
meant if we had gotten the flat tire 20, 10, or even 5 years ago. He sighed, shook his
head, and said, “It would have been a disaster. It would have been a complete disaster.”
Senior PEACE III personnel stressed to me that different precautions would have
been taken in years past or in different PEACE III operational zones. Field teams would
have driven in a convoy, they would have worn flak jackets, satellite tracking would have
been on the car, they would have had a satellite phone, and they likely would have taken
another route (the flat occurred in what was once a notably dangerous area). It is also
likely we would not have been in the car in the first place. In large part because of
security risks, field visits in areas experiencing conflict are tightly monitored. In the past,

49

In my experience that field visits over two hours were more likely than not to result in flat tires. Though
not technically part of the research, upon seeing how fast the drivers were at changing flats, timing them
became a custom.
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staff based in the Moroto office would not go to the field unless it was deemed absolutely
necessary. Because organizational security concerns, which are issues for which the
country director is responsible, can limit the mobility of project staff, local partners with
greater mobility are a central component to operating in conflict zones.

Figure 4.6: The Stuck Lug Nut

All of these concerns, costs, and preparations embodied in the risk of an
inevitable flat tire raise important questions about where NGOs can effectively and safely
operate when addressing climate-conflict concerns. I spoke with multiple organizations
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who posited that climate change was exacerbating conflict related-challenges and/or
programming in particular places – Somalia, Yemen, and Chad being the most
referenced – but had low confidence in their ability to implement in these places, in large
part because of the complications of security and access.
Staff working on PEACE III also described the psychological toll of working in
the field. In their annual reflection meeting, which was attended by about 40 people, all
either directly employed by the grant or working in direct partnership with the program
implementers. The focus of the meeting was to describe key lessons and challenges over
the initial implementation stages of the program. Strikingly, many were rooted in the
fundamental challenges of working in places where conflict is inherent, though some of
these were logistical (e.g., working within the security policies of individual
organizations), the team long reflected on the psychological challenges and dangers of
their work. For example, a senior member of Mercy Corps with more than a decade of
peacebuilding and conflict mitigation who was working on Kenya-centric
implementation, described the fear of going to specific field sites, emotionally confessing
to the group “Whenever there are guys with AK-47s, it can be scary. I don’t want to be a
martyr.”
Though logistics and security are obvious challenges, they are worthy of explicit
consideration as they raise important questions about how policy framings of the
relationship between climate change and conflict are translated into particular
interventions. How, where, and, indeed, whether there is a window to address climateconflict are central questions in assessing an organization’s ability to address the conflict
challenges associate with climate change. For example, if the design of effective
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interventions requires understanding context-specific pathways from climate change
impacts to conflict outcomes, but systematic research on these contexts cannot be
conducted as sites cannot be safely accessed, how can an organization proceed? Far from
rhetorical, this question was often discussed and complicated PEACE III efforts in South
Sudan and southern Ethiopia.

Opportunities: Climate change as an opportunity multiplier
The dominant policy discourses around climate change and conflict frames
climate change as a threat multiplier. This framing defines climate change as having only
one sort of effect on conflict: exacerbating conflict risk or impacts. Implementation
efforts targeting the relationship between climate change and conflict are, in turn,
challenged by the ability to both conceptualize and respond to climate change as a threat
multiplier. These discursive and logistical barriers interact closely with the spatiality of
the issue and highlight why despite high demand to ‘mitigate’ or ‘minimize’ climate
change as a threat multiplier, the complex scales that the issue raises directly challenge
agencies’ ability to do so. Yet in the climate-conflict literature, the connection between
climate change and conflict is clearly defined as a multidirectional phenomenon that does
not only result in conflict, but also can also lead to cooperation, or have no effect at all on
conflict outcomes (e.g., Abrahams & Carr, 2007; Adger et al., 2014; Dabelko et al., 2013;
Dinar et al., 2015; Gemenne et al., 2014; Tubi and Feitelson, 2016). Recognizing that
climate change might present opportunities for cooperation and peacebuilding opens up
both policy and implementation approaches to the conflict risks of climate change, and
offers a path forward for development and adaptation programming.
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Opportunities in peacebuilding and post-conflict NRM
In Loyoro, a town in Northern Karamoja roughly 10km from Kenya, hand-dug
holes pock the landscape. They range from approximately 20 – 30 feet deep and 10 – 40
feet across. Some have collapsed, others stand dormant, and a handful have
approximately six to eight girls and women standing and sitting upon tiered layers
(Figure 4.7). The holes are dug every dry season and fill back in with the seasonal rains.
The women in those holes had formed a make-shift assembly line whereby one would fill
a jerrycan with water, pass it up to the next, to the next, until the water was eventually
dumped into shallow pots that were then used to water cattle. This process went on for
hours as cattle were steadily corralled to the water.

Figure 4.7: Turkana Women Extracting Water in Northern Karamoja
These efforts to water cattle have peacebuilding implications. The women who
were extracting the water are Turkana, from western Kenya, but the land belongs to the
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Dodoth, an ethnic group who reside predominantly in the northern reaches of Karamoja.
The two groups had historically been rivalrous and both groups are still prone to localized
conflict and rhetoric that frames the other as a source of insecurity (Howe et al., 2015).
For example, the Kaabong LC5 (the senior-most district official) was elected in 2016 on
a campaign focused on efforts to keep the Turkana out of the district. Furthermore, the
Turkana, being from Kenya, were not subject to the disarmament and therefore remain
armed, while the Dodoth were subject to the disarmament process. This arms imbalance
also adds tension to the relationship. However, while the Turkana women and girls
painstakingly pulled water from the sunken earth in Dodoth territory, Dodoth and
Turkana community members and members of the Uganda People’s Defence Force
(UPDF) wandered past without incident. Those outcomes were built on a multitude of
peacebuilding efforts, including a resource sharing agreement (RSA), which PEACE III
staff helped broker (see Figure 4.8).
This agreement speaks to how framing climate change as an opportunity for
peacebuilding can open new implementation lenses that better address the complex
spatiality and temporality of climate-conflict. By focusing on cooperation, this agreement
speaks to the different climate-related needs of groups from different places in essence
bridges the separate spaces that experienced the most acute climactic and conflictual
impacts. The structure of the RSA is such that the Turkana essentially rent access from
the Dodoth, thus providing a more controlled mechanism for resource sharing and
management. The Turkana then have the right to dig the holes in order to access the
water for their cattle. At the time of my field visit, the agreement had been in place for
roughly one year and, according to PEACE III staff, has had a central role in maintaining
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the peace between those communities. This observation is not to suggest RSAs are a
panacea to climate-conflict connections. There are challenges, such as knowing who to
include in the agreement and maintaining and adjusting agreements as circumstances as
seasons shift. However, the RSA reinforces the idea that climate change can be
harnessed in peacebuilding efforts, thus demonstrating why climate-conflict interventions
need to be thought about more broadly than just mitigating the exacerbated risk brought
on by those changes (Gartzke, 2012; Ide, 2018; Krampe, 2014; Matthew, 2014; Matthew
& Hammill, 2012; UNEP, 2015).

Figure 4.8: A Resource Sharing Agreement Between the Turkana and Dodoth
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Conclusion: Programming for Climate and Conflict
That climate change can act as a threat multiplier is both a compelling and
powerful discourse with growing impact in policy and academic communities. As has
been demonstrated in this research, however, the framing of climate change as a threat
multiplier becomes increasingly problematic as conversations move from policy into
programming and eventually on-the-ground interventions. While certainly logical and, to
an extent, supported by evidence, this discourse is limiting. Climate change may result in
conflict, but it can also result in cooperation. Further, climate change adaptation efforts, if
not conflict-sensitive, risk inadvertently triggering conflict (Dabelko, et al., 2013; Snorek
et al., 2014). By framing the relationship between climate change and conflict as only one
where climate drives conflict risks misses clear opportunities for development
programming.
The impacts of climate change on conflict outcomes come through complex,
locally-specific intersections of biophysical impact and economic, social, and political
processes. These processes and impacts are not confined to a particular place. The threatmultiplier framing, however, when combined with the implementation pressures under
which development organizations work, implicitly pushes both policy and
implementation actors and organizations toward framings of the climate change-conflict
relationship where causes and outcomes are viewed both spatially contained and
overlapping. The result is the potential for inappropriate or ineffective interventions,
which in turn risk furthering or even triggering negative outcomes.
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Inappropriate or ineffective interventions are not inevitable or inherent in efforts
that seek to address the relationship between climate change and conflict. For example, as
was the case in the peacebuilding efforts in Loyoro, development programming framed
around the identification of peacebuilding opportunities created by climate change
impacts can better account for the context-specific realities that shape the
interrelationships between climate change and conflict, while allowing organizations to
navigate the complex realities of development implementation. As illustrated here, a
wider policy and spatial framing of the climate-conflict relationship can enable
development implementation that encompasses the potential for opportunities as well as
challenges.
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Key Takeaways from Each Paper
This dissertation addressed the broad question: How do the discourses of climate
change and conflict travel across time and space to become policy, programming, and
ultimately a development initiative that exist on the ground? To answer this question, I
broke the research into three separate papers. The first examines how the US policy
community approaches, understands and seeks to address the discourses of climatesecurity.50 The second examines the ways in which climate change affects conflict
outcomes in Karamoja, Uganda. And the third, using the efforts of Mercy Corps in
Karamoja as a case study, examines the realities and opportunities in addressing climateconflict from a development perspective.
The first paper addresses the question: How do US policy actors and institutions
approach, understand, and seek to address to climate-security challenges. This paper
demonstrates the ways in which the policy community internalizes the issue of climateconflict. I identified three primary approaches taken by individuals working on issues that
relate directly to climate-security: 1) A challenge of adaptation and resilience; 2) A
potent political tool for elevating climate change in the policy world; and 3) A topic of
limited importance or utility. These categories offer more than just a taxonomy of the
issue, rather they provide a foundation for understanding how the discourses of climatesecurity get translated into policy and programming. I also demonstrate that though the
relationship between climate change, conflict, and security is a subject of ongoing

50

Climate-security being a slightly broader framing than climate-conflict
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academic debate,51 policy communities have largely accepted the idea that climate
change is a security concern, most often framing this relationship as a ‘threat multiplier’
– that is, climate change, though not an independent driver of conflict, enhances the
vulnerability to, or risks triggering or exacerbating, conflict and insecurity (CNA, 2007).
The first paper also demonstrates that while the threat multiplier discourse has
been critical in pushing back on more causal framings of the connection between climate
change and conflict, it does not prescribe clear policy responses to climate-conflict
challenges. Indeed, the most common framing of the climate-conflict relationship tended
to follow a very common narrative: First, describing climate change as a threat multiplier,
second, describing a need to minimize or mitigate the threat multiplication impacts, and
third, having difficulty prescribing means of addressing this ‘threat multiplication’. This
framing led me to ask why, despite widespread interest and demand, organizations were
struggling with how to address climate change and conflict (i.e., the motivation for the
second and third papers).
Though this question eventually resulted in a connection to Mercy Corps, it was a
challenge to find a suitable partner and program to study. In retrospect, the challenges I
faced in finding a partner, reflected many of the challenges facing development
organizations. That is, the reason there were so few organizations that were implementing
programming that explicitly sought to address climate-conflict mirror the reasons for the
challenges described in the third paper, including difficulty conceptualizing development
responses, concerns about safety and logistics in fragile or conflict-prone areas, and

51

See, for example, (Benjaminsen, 2016; Buhaug et al., 2014; Buhaug & Nordkvelle, 2014;
Burke et al., 2015; Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2014; Kelley et al., 2015; Nordkvelle, 2014;
Salehyan, 2014; Selby et al., 2017)
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institutional challenges inherent to an issue that spans a wide range of operational and
political interests.
Though I was fortunate to have the partnership with Mercy Corps that allowed me
to examine their work in Karamoja, it is worth highlighting what could be viewed as a
limitation. In terms of addressing climate-conflict, Mercy Corps and Karamoja are in
many ways the best-case scenarios. Mercy Corps prides itself on being innovative and
forward thinking, a reputation that was often described to me by people outside of the
organization as well as within it. Karamoja was, at the time of study, relatively safe and
stable. With the increasing presence of extractive industries, infrastructure has
significantly and rapidly improvement. Put simply, unlike Wajir, Kenya where I
conducted preliminary fieldwork, it is easy and safe to get around in Karamoja. However,
I think the case of Mercy Corps in Karamoja is broadly useful because these are the bestcase scenarios. The challenges and barriers identified throughout this dissertation are
compelling because if these challenges exist for Mercy Corps in Karamoja, then surely
they are even more pronounced elsewhere and with less functionally equipped agencies.
Furthermore, the extensive member checking of my findings with senior programmatic
personnel with direct experience in a wide array of countries suggests that the barriers I
identified in addressing climate-conflict in this project speak to concerns in other
contexts. Nonetheless, an important area for further inquiry would be a comparison of my
work in Karamoja to in places facing more severe climate-conflict connections.
The second paper examines how the impacts of climate change interact with the
post-conflict political ecology of Karamoja. This paper demonstrates that though
Karamoja continues to stabilize following years of severe conflict, the effects of climate
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change have negatively affected conflict outcomes emerging from the region’s postconflict political ecology. For years, conflict in Karamoja had been defined by interethnic
cattle raiding and the presence of small arms. Now, conflict in the region is defined
largely by a series of pressures on the land including an increasing shift to sedentary
livelihoods, land grabs, commercial resource extraction, and increasing climate
variability. Those pressures have led to more localized conflict including theft, resource
conflict, and household conflict, all of which are more prevalent during the increasingly
extreme dry season.
In addition to outlining the means by which climate change interacts with and
alters conflict in Karamoja, this paper highlights the importance of understanding the
pathways from climate change to conflict outcomes if we are to better understand and
address this relationship in a particular time and place. By examining a causal chain
linking how climate change leads to a biophysical impact, how a biophysical impact leads
to a socioeconomic impact, and how a socioeconomic impact affects conflict, I was able
to gain a clearer view of how, where, and indeed if climate change alters conflict
outcomes. By walking through the pathways from climate change to conflict it was clear
that the increasing variability/increasing intensity of dry season, when coupled with a
series of changes in land use and livelihood viability, was decreasing food security and
access to key resources. This, in turn, led to increasing theft and conflict over resources.
Central to understanding the shifting forms of conflict in Karamoja, though, is an
acknowledgement that these manifestations of conflict are paradoxically linked to the
prevailing stability in the region that followed the disarmament.
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The third paper examines the barriers and opportunities facing development
practitioners in their efforts to address the links between climate change and conflict. By
tracing how the discourses of climate-conflict shift across time and space to become
policy, programming, and ultimately interventions that exist on the ground, I illustrate
that the disparity between demand for development programming addressing the conflict
risks of climate change and the distinct lack of clarity regarding what such programming
might entail can largely be explained by three overarching challenges. First, the
unidirectionality of the near-ubiquitous ‘threat multiplier’ discourse, which presents
climate change as a driver of conflict, and closes off discussion of alternative
understandings of and approaches that might generate productive interventions. Second,
the climate-conflict relationship operates at multiple scales, with climate impacts often
occurring in one place, producing conflict outcomes in another, and with most project
scales too small to encompass these complex and often disconnected geographies. Third,
the inherent complexity of any climate-conflict interaction, coupled with the unique
challenges of program governance in conflict and post-conflict settings, leads to a series
of logistical and conceptual barriers that complicate program design and implementation.
Within these three overarching challenges are more specific – and overlapping – barriers
that plague efforts to address the relationship between climate change and conflict have
produced a series of overlapping barriers to learning and action, including: The
complexity and ambiguity of conceptualizing climate-conflict responses in traditional
framings of development; The potential incongruence between the scope of the issue and
the scope of implementing capacity; The temporal divide between acute and longer-term
environmental change; The impact of metrics and measurements as factors steering
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programming; and The logistical and security concerns inherent in conflict-related
programming. Building on the environmental peacebuilding literature (see, for example,
Conca & Dabelko, 2002; Gemenne, Barnett, Adger, & Dabelko, 2014; Ide, 2018;
Krampe, 2014; Matthew, 2014; Wolf, 2009), I also demonstrate that when the climateconflict nexus is reframed as presenting both potential opportunities and threats,
development implementers are able to address climate-conflict with programs focused on
cooperation and peacebuilding .This is highlighted by the paper’s final example,
whereby, with support from Mercy Corps, once-rivalrous pastoralist groups with a
history of inter-ethnic and cross-border conflict, developed a resource sharing agreement
in part to address their challenge of increasing climate variability and a prolonged dry
season.

From Rhetoric to Response: Key Themes Across the Dissertation
By nature of the research design, I was afforded vantage points from which to
observe the ways the discourses of climate-conflict became policy prerogatives, how
policy prerogatives became program design, and how program design ultimately became
a project that existed in a particular time and place, in this case present-day Karamoja.
Clear across all stages of this work, and linking the preceding manuscripts, is the salience
of scale in climate-conflict, the paradox of how the ‘threat multiplier’ discourse both
oversimplifies and blurs the legibility of the relationship between climate change and
conflict, and the need to further deconstruct climate-conflict in the context of particular
places.
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Far from separate issues, these topics demonstrate why, despite so much attention,
there have been only limited tangible efforts to address climate-conflict. The collective
understanding of the issue has failed to reach a threshold whereby it precisely informs
what can be done, with the exception of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and
building resilience to climatic shocks and stressors. The former, though obviously
critically important, is an issue that extends far beyond climate-conflict narratives.
Further, the argument that conflict risk is the primary reason to mitigate emissions carries
with it a risk of securitization and therefore the risk of legitimizing extreme measures in
the name of security that violate democratic norms and/or further reinforce power
differentials within and across states (Hartmann, 2014; Methmann & Rothe, 2012; Oels,
2015; Oels, 2012; Selby, 2014).
Resilience is a vague, malleable concept and though it seems intuitive at a global
level, its utility as an implementation framework can be evasive. For example, the
interpretability of resilience was a point of frustration for the Mercy Corps team focused
on climate change, who felt that too often field teams became focused on what is most
achievable rather than what is most effective; instead of programming that addressed
future climatic shocks, the focus was on short-term community needs and on-farm
productivity. A critical question to ask, then, especially for development organizations
tasked with addressing climate-conflict is what can be done to address climate-conflict in
a realistic manner?
Though this dissertation does not directly answer that question, it does inform it.
Namely, it identifies the following as key changes in organizations’ approaches to
climate-conflict:
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1) Expand conceptualizations beyond climate change as only a threat multiplier.
This project, and the wider literature (e.g., Conca & Dabelko, 2002; Ide, 2018;
Krampe, 2014; Matthew & Hammill, 2012), demonstrate that climate change
impacts can be harnessed to further peacebuilding and cooperation. For
example, resource sharing agreements offer organizations the ability to
consider and bridge some of the complexities of scale inherent to the
emergence and management of climate conflict. Moreover, as was evident in
Karamoja, the ways in which post-conflict areas are vulnerable to a host of
resource-related challenges, highlights the salience of post-conflict resource
management that incorporates potential impacts of climate change.
2) Identify locally-specific causal pathways from climate change to conflict.
Understanding how, if at all, climate change affects conflict only begins with
the acknowledgment that climate change is always part of a wider political
ecology. It requires being able to identify the ways in which climate change
alters biophysical processes, how biophysical changes alter socioeconomic
outcomes, and how socioeconomic outcomes affects conflict within this
political ecology. This spatial complexity will limit the scope of what
particular NGOs will able to achieve, especially for development
organizations who are operating at relatively localized scales. However,
knowing how and where climate change alters conflict outcomes in the
context of a particular place will offer considerable clarity to those who are
tasked with addressing it. For example, in Karamoja, acknowledging climate
change is largely leading to dry season theft and resource conflict in places of
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relative abundance provides some clarity to the programs being implemented
in this region.
3) Explicitly consider questions of scale. Due to the ways in which places are
tied to one another via markets and mobility, climate change impacts in one
place are likely to affect conflict in other places. By explicitly acknowledging
this spatiality, and actively working to develop programs and projects that
bridges these disconnects, organizations are more likely to have successful
outcomes and minimize risk of maladaptations or backdraft effects.

The central contribution of this dissertation as a whole is to elucidate the
challenges facing institutions who have the mandate of addressing climate-conflict and
wider climate-security connections. While the lessons of this project have academic
implications, the evident challenges facing practitioners in conceptualizing and
addressing the link between climate change and conflict, should serve as an argument for
the policy and implementation community to critically examine how their efforts are
affected by the discourses, scales, and mechanisms of climate-conflict and climatesecurity.
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